DMB and Group. On 17 Dec. you wrote:
> Or, as Dewey himself explains SOM in The Need for a Recovery of > Philosophy, the characteristic feature of this prior notion is the > assumption that experience centres in, or gathers about, or proceeds > from a centre or subject which is outside the course of natural > existence, and set over against it (PCAP 449). I understand and accept Dewey's rejection of SOM and if that is Radical Empiricism so am I such an empiricist, but aren't you re- inventing the wheel? All moqists takes for granted that the S/O distinction as reality's deepest ground - as metaphysics - is nil and void, but hopefully all agree that it is what has given us the modern world and the as such must find a place inside MOQ's static hierarchy. > This prior notion is > what radical empiricism is rejecting. It is seen as a mistake and as > the source of many fake problems in philosophy. As Stuhr puts it, the > error of materialists and idealists alike is the error of conferring > existential status upon the products of reflection (PCAP 437). This is > a matter of treating our products of reflection as if they were > ontological realities instead of parts of a conceptual scheme. In this > case, subjects and objects are our primary example. All is correct, the Reality=S/O is flawed but I have the sinking feeling that the "source of the S/O product" becomes "man" (as in the Sophist argument of ZAMM) and because it's the mind of man that does the reflection we have SOM "at the doors" again. A more radical solution is required, namely Reality=DQ/SQ where the highest static level is intellect that keeps churning out S/Os ... even when trying to solve its own paradoxes!! > When these abstractions are taken from the realm of practical doings > and then asked to do work metaphysics or epistemology, it creates many > problems and questions. Most of these have to do with how subjects and > objects relate, how the former can know what the latter "really" is, > for example. The problem of knowledge as conceived in the industry of > epistemology is the problem of knowledge in general of the > possibility, extent, and validity of knowledge in general Like this. Both the 'S' and the 'O' are now "abstractions" in contrast to the "concrete" practical doings. See! a higher plane of the S/O spiral. > but, Dewey says in The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, this > problem only exists because it is assumed that there is a knower in > general, who is outside of the world to be known, and who is defined in > terms antithetical to the traits of the world (PCAP 449). Or, as > William James puts it in A World of Pure Experience, the first great > pitfall from which a radical standing by experience will save us is an > artificial conception of the relations between knower and known. > Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have > been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities and their relations > have assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had > to be invented to overcome (PCAP 184). I think all this fits quite > neatly with Pirsig's attack on SOM. Not only does he explicitly align > the MOQ with James's radical empiricism, he attacks SOM for the same > reasons. He calls it a "metaphysical assumption" or "concepts derived > from experience" instead of the "products of reflection" but the > complaint is about mistaking intellectual abstractions for existential > realities. Intellect is what creates the S/O "abstractions" (you conclude) and now you can't escape with the usual about SOM just ONE intellectual pattern, the S/O distinction IS intellect (its static value that is) but it also proves that experience as "concrete" (vs the S/O as abstractions) is another form of Quality=Reality and the MOQ an intellectual pattern. IMO Bo Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
