Greetings David, For me the James stuff is still too difficult. I'd like to try to explain why. I started the mp3 version of his 'Essays on Radical Empiricism', but quickly realized it required total concentration. It felt like I walked in on a very interesting discussion on an unfamiliar topic. I listened to the first two chapters and was just beginning to get some sense of the rhythm and meaning of his language. I stopped because I realized this was going to require listening to the book twice and with more time and energy than I had available. I certainly want to pursue understanding Radical Empiricism to his depth, and I plan to get back to it after the holidays. Hopefully others are doing better than I.
Marsha At 09:54 PM 12/17/2007, you wrote: >Bo, Steve and all MOQers: > >Maybe you'd like to hear from some other >pragmatists on the topic of SOM. John Stuhr is >the Editor of "Pragmatism and Classical American >Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive >Essays. (Oxford University Press, 2000.) He >says, In beginning to understand his view, it >cannot be overemphasized that Dewey is not using >the word experience in its conventional sense. >For Dewey, experience is not to be understood in >terms of the experiencing subject, or as the >interaction of a subject and object that exist >separate from their interaction. Instead, >Deweys view is radically empirical and >experience is an activity in which subject and >object are unified and constituted as partial >features and relations within this ingoing, >unanalyzed unity (PCAP 437). Or, as Dewey >himself explains SOM in The Need for a Recovery >of Philosophy, the characteristic feature of >this prior notion is the assumption that >experience centres in, or gathers about, or >proceeds from a centre or subject which is >outside the course of natural existence, and set >over against it (PCAP 449). This prior notion >is what radical empiricism is rejecting. It is >seen as a mistake and as the source of many fake >problems in philosophy. As Stuhr puts it, the >error of materialists and idealists alike is >the error of conferring existential status upon >the products of reflection (PCAP 437). This is >a matter of treating our products of >reflection as if they were ontological >realities instead of parts of a conceptual >scheme. In this case, subjects and objects are >our primary example. When these abstractions are >taken from the realm of practical doings and >then asked to do work metaphysics or >epistemology, it creates many problems and >questions. Most of these have to do with how >subjects and objects relate, how the former can >know what the latter "really" is, for example. >The problem of knowledge as conceived in the >industry of epistemology is the problem of >knowledge in general of the possibility, >extent, and validity of knowledge in general >but, Dewey says in The Need for a Recovery of >Philosophy, this problem only exists because >it is assumed that there is a knower in general, >who is outside of the world to be known, and who >is defined in terms antithetical to the traits >of the world (PCAP 449). Or, as William James >puts it in A World of Pure Experience, the >first great pitfall from which a radical >standing by experience will save us is an >artificial conception of the relations between >knower and known. Throughout the history of >philosophy the subject and its object have been >treated as absolutely discontinuous entities >and their relations have assumed a paradoxical >character which all sorts of theories had to be >invented to overcome (PCAP 184). I think all >this fits quite neatly with Pirsig's attack on >SOM. Not only does he explicitly align the MOQ >with James's radical empiricism, he attacks SOM >for the same reasons. He calls it a >"metaphysical assumption" or "concepts derived >from experience" instead of the "products of >reflection" but the complaint is about mistaking >intellectual abstractions for existential >realities. And I suppose one of the reasons the >abstraction seems so hard to shake is that we >can't shake the practical doings of life from >which they are drawn. The experience from which >they are abstracted remains even when the abstractions are seen as such. > >The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what >is called empiricism. It claims that all >legitimate knowledge arises from the sense or by >thinking about what the sense provided. Most >empiricists deny that validity of any knowledge >gained through imagination, authority tradition, >or purely theoretical reasoning. They regard >fields such as art, morality, religion, and >metaphysics as unverifiable. The Metaphysics of >Quality varies from this by saying that the >values of art and morality and even religious >mysticism are verifiable, and that in the past >they have been excluded for metaphysical >reasons, not empirical reasons. They have been >excluded because of the metaphysical assumption >that all the universe is composed of subjects >and objects and anything that cant be >classified as a subject or an object isnt >real. There is no empirical evidence for this >assumption at all. Its just an assumption (LILA 99). > >The second of James two main systems of >philosophy was his radical empiricism. By this >he meant that subject and objects are not the >starting points of experience. Subjects and >objects are secondary. They are concepts derived >from something more fundamental which he >described as the immediate flux of life which >furnishes the material to our later reflection >with its conceptual categories. In this basic >flux of experience, the distinctions of >reflective thought, such as those between >consciousness and content, subject and object, >mind and matter, have not yet emerged in the >forms which we make them. Pure experience cannot >be called either physical of psychical: it >logically precedes this distinction (LILA 365). > >Hope that answers some questions. > >Thanks, >dmb >_________________________________________________________________ >The best games are on Xbox 360. Click here for >a special offer on an Xbox 360 Console. >http://www.xbox.com/en-US/hardware/wheretobuy/ >Moq_Discuss mailing list >Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >Archives: >http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
