[Arlo]
Can you think of any activity that is 'immoral" or "wrong" that is so 
not because of a level conflict?

[Platt]
Yes. I gave the example Pirsig gave that you deny as you explained below.

[Arlo]
Again, the example you gave was certainly immoral because of a level 
conflict (intellectual understanding versus biological hunger). If 
you disagree, would you say then that it is immoral for a bear to eat 
fish if berries are abundant? Is the bear aware of its behavior being 
"immoral"? If not, then how can this immorality be contained within 
the biological level?

[Platt]
But if there are no immoral patterns within a level as you suggest, 
then I presume one intellectual pattern is just as good as another.

[Arlo]
Certainly not. Some are better. Just as I presume the bear eats the 
fish because it is better (biologically) for it to do so.

[Platt]
Would you say that from a social level view that all social patterns 
are equally moral?

[Arlo]
Equally moral? I'd say that all social patterns are patterns of 
social morality (by definition), but that some are better than others.

"But in the Metaphysics of Quality all these sets of morals, plus 
another Dynamic morality, are not only real, they are the whole 
thing." (LILA) I'd say, again, that by definition a social pattern of 
value is a social pattern of morals.

When social patterns become "unequally moral" is only in their 
conflict with the intellectual level, or in their inability to allow 
room for Dynamic evolution. But both of these pronouncements of 
"immorality" or "unequal morality" between sets of social patterns is 
only visible from the intellectual level. And hence, conflict between levels.


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