ham, with respect, you are still looking at things from a SOM perspective. *the subject is abstracted from immediate exp.* buddhists have known this for a long time, taoists too, in fact it is implicit in every enduring philosophical/spiritual tradition. we ain't making this up. it is the cornerstone of mysticism...it is the mystery itself. it reimbues life with magic. and it dissolves all dilemmas. wicked eh? all the best gav
--- On Tue, 8/7/08, Ham Priday <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Ham Priday <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [MD] Static Self > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Received: Tuesday, 8 July, 2008, 3:32 PM > Hi Gav, Marsha -- > > [Gav, on the Static Self]: > > The individual is borne of the intellectual level - it > is an idea. > > The idea of oneself as an autonomous agent evolves > from and > > opposes the purely social (bicameral?) level of > consciousness.... > > which operates by the control of the collective via a > deity, king etc. > > See, Marsha? The MoQuist says "the individual is > borne of the intellectual > level". That means DQ is the essence of the self. He > also believes > consciousness (at some level) is controlled by the > collective -- I assume he > means "collective intellect". This epistemology > totally denies the subject > of awareness and the possibility of an autonomous self. No > wonder you are > confused! > > If the individual is only an "idea", whose idea > is it? Who but the > individual self KNOWS that it is aware? Does DQ know? > Does the > "intellectual level" know? If neither knows, > "idea" is a meaningless word, > and there is no self. At least I know that I do not exist > by "control of > the collective". I am my own agent, thank you, and so > are you. If it > weren't for Pirsig's Quality thesis, this would be > self-evident. Obviously, > the author has found it necessary to dismiss selfness as > the conscious locus > of experiential reality. And, since he attributes reality > to experience, > one is left to wonder who or what it is that experiences. > > [Ham, previously]: > > Does a collection of patterns KNOW? > > Does a bunch of concepts THINK? > > [Marsha]: > > A collection of patterns might be conceptual patterns > of > > the social or intellectual kind. Thinking is an > experience > > dependent on a cause of some sort, either via the > senses > > or a previous thought. > > Yes, it might be, but causal explanations like this invoke > the fallacy of > infinite regression and lead nowhere. Rather than ponder > what "causes" > thinking, or trying to define thinking as experience, I > submit that it is > more important to realize that the Thinker is the Self. > The notion of > thoughts existing somewhere without a thinker is absurd; > yet if you take the > MoQ and its Intellectual level literally (as I do), it > seems to lead toward > that conclusion. > > Arthur Smith's essay on the Mind/Body debate may be > enlightening in this > regard. In his Abstract, Dr. Smith writes: > > "Human experience is both dualistic and monistic. It > is monistic in that > everything is experience, but dualistic in that it involves > both knower and > known. Since Socrates, an axiom of Western philosophy has > been that rational > discussion begins with defining what that subject matter > is. We could say > that consciousness (or at least ordinary human > consciousness) is experience > as a knower-self (noesis) that experiences known-others > (noema). Both are > essential aspects of experience. Without the noesis, > consciousness would be > unconscious. Without the noema it would be conscious of > nothing, i.e., also > unconscious. Thus human experience is noetically dualistic > in its > distinction of knower and known, but ontologically monistic > in being all > experience. > > "In that sense, empirical science itself, even when it > studies distant > galaxies, is part of the 'science of > consciousness,' because it can study > only phenomena in consciousness. However, not everyone > would call this a > "science of consciousness." Some want a science > of the knower without > reference to the known, and this is where it gets tricky. > As soon as we make > consciousness an object of study, it becomes the known, and > the people > studying it, the knowers, and an infinite regress of > self-reference ensues. > " > --www.arthursmithphd.com/writings.htm > > In other words, the knowing-self (noesis) is the locus of > all experience > (noema). And if experience is "the cutting edge of > reality", as Pirsig > says, having a subject to experience (and perhaps thereby > dilineate) > otherness as a differentiated reality is consistent with > his theory of a > quality source. Since everything in existence is > individuated and relational, it seems logical that knowing > (noesis or > being-aware) would also be divided into individual agents. > (You'll have to > tell my why Pirsig avoids the logic of this epistemology.) > > Am I getting anywhere with you, Marsha? > > --Ham > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Start at the new Yahoo!7 for a better online experience. www.yahoo7.com.au Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
