Bo --
On 16 Jan. you wrote:

The one glaring inconsistency in the MOQ was its 4th. level
that originally looked like "the cognitive capacity" and made
people of the 3rd. level sound like half-wits. The cognitive
capacity (AKA intelligence) reached an apex with Homo
Sapiens and is evenly distributed among human beings.

I don't know what "people of the 3rd level" means. Pirsig identifies it with "Social" and places it between Biological and Intellectual. As far as I'm concerned, people (Homo sapiens) are constituted of inorganic, biological, and cognitive properties. With the possible exception of "societal" (which refers to people interrelating in the collective sense and is not a primary human "constitutent"), take away any of the others, and you lose human beingness as we know it.

The essence of Kant is contained in this passage translated from
the philosophy book I use.

   "The solution Kant suggested he called Copernican: it
   turns inside-out of an established way of thinking. It's not
   experience that determines our geometry, arithmetics and
   our causal natural laws, it's we ourselves who appear to be
   geometric, arithmetic and causative. In a figurative sense
   Kant again put man in the center of the world of
   experience. To the degree the world is perceived as
   existing in time and space, it's something created by man's
   mental faculties. The world of experience is a world of
   experience for US, not a world IN ITSELF."

I guess this fits your view, and must fit any sane person whose
premises are SOM.

It fits my view of man as a conscious being in the experiential world. However, it doesn't explain how self-awareness (the subject) is different than the objects of experience. Pirsig's thesis is that there is no difference, and that they are both "levels (or patterns) of Quality". Instead of simple common-sense duality, which we all understand, he's "fractioned" something called Quality to replace subject/object with an endless, arbitrary and unnecessary cacophony.

As said, from SOM's premises it would be silly to deny -
in Kant's words - that "the world is a world for us". I have
said many times that SOM's subjective side is the stronger.
If you have read ZAMM you will remember P. being
confronted by the two S/O "horns", his finding both untenable
and then the break with SOM and the first tentative MOQ
that began with a "pre-intellectual (to be dynamic) Q-reality /
intellectual (to be static) S/O".  Later in LILA this had grown
to the present MOQ where intellect's S/O had become the
highest level.

Simply acknowledging the "subjective side as the stronger" doesn't overcome the objective side. The two "S/O horns" may be a dilemma for Pirsig, who wants to reduce them to Quality for dialectical "simplicity" rather than confront the fact that existence -- being in the world -- is a dichotomy of sensibility and beingness. Why not explain the metaphysics of THAT instead of inventing a fantasy paradigm, the core element of which is unrealizable without the subject he dismisses?

You still have not explained what "dynamic" and "static" mean as related to Quality or Value. But, as I see that a "part 2" to your response is forthcoming, I shall hold my breath in abeyance until it arrives.

Thanks, Bo.

--Ham


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