Matt said:
Well, first, let's be clear that all the classical pragmatists are dead, which 
is why I wanted a new handle.  

DMB said:
Firstly, you're suffering from a misconception if you think all the
classical pragmatists are dead. I'd call myself a classical pragmatist
and its my assertion that Pirsig is too. Living academic philosophers
such as Hildebrand, Rosenthal and Stuhr describe themselves as
classical pragmatist precisely to distinguish themselves from
neo-pragmatists, especially Rorty. Further, this distinction is not
predicated on whether or not one adopts the insights of the linguistic
turn nor upon whether or not one looks to the dead originators of
pragmatism. All pragmatists, more or less, share those things in
common. The contemporary philosophers who describe themselves as
classical pragmatists insist that radical empiricism is a crucial
ingredient. The neo-pragmatists don't hitch their brand to radical
empiricism.

Matt:
Again, I don't see where we disagree.  I think a contemporary American 
philosopher calling themselves a classical pragmatist obscures more than 
elucidates, but I can't see that it matters much because my handle 
"retro-pragmatist" still roughly grabs the same thing you're roughly grabbing 
with "classical pragmatist."

DMB said:
And like I tried to explain above, I think our differences are quite
real and are reflected in the current distinction between classical and
neo-pragmatists.

Matt:
And yet I remain unconvinced (stemming from my 
psychological-nominalism-functions-the-same-as-radical-empiricism thesis).  For 
instance, you say, "Pirsig, for example, confesses that he was underwhelmed by 
the Vienna
Circle types and never really saw much value in the logical analysis of
language or as a handmaiden to science."  Rorty was never convinced for very 
long that there was anything interesting picked out by "logical analysis of 
language," nor did he ever have any truck with the notion that philosophy was a 
"handmaiden to science."  Rorty was taught be historians of philosophy (like 
McKeon and Strauss), out of sync Whiteheadians (like Hartshorne and Weiss), and 
in vogue positivists (like Carnap and Hempel).  He gravitated to the historians 
and Whiteheadians, but picked up pretty quickly that if he was to have a 
career, he needed to learn what Carnap and Wittgenstain were talking about.  
But I don't think one has to look much further than his '61 paper comparing 
Peirce and Wittgenstein, which first sentence is "Pragmatism is getting 
respectable again," to get the feeling that he was always skeptical about 
positivism.

I don't know--you think something big and important happens when you 
accidentally (because of contingent circumstance) trend from mysticism to 
pragmatism as opposed to when you accidentally (because of contingent 
circumstance) trend from analytic philosophy to pragmatism.  Me, not so much.  
I just see a lot of different flavors and emphases that, once one has absorbed 
the principle outlook of pragmatism, reduces the broad outlook of the various 
exponents to just that, different flavors and emphases.  One can still distaste 
Putnam's entire first volume of essays (as I do), about half of his second (as 
I do), and like most of his third without feeling the need to think the 
distaste has significant philosophical import.  

That's just me.  I tend to think that the more one goes in for pragmatism, the 
more lax one will become in trying to arrange a set of interlocking 
philosophical principles, the more one will amusingly enjoy Kenneth Burke's 
"system" in A Grammar of Motives, a system for people who don't like systems.  
He calls it "dramatism" and arranges things in sets of five: Act, Scene, Agent, 
Agency, Purpose.  And then he arranges Realism, Materialism, Idealism, 
Pragmatism, and Mysticism in corresponding relations of emphasis, pulling out 
of each philosophical tradition the wisdom obscured by their over-emphasis.  
The joke is that he says, "nominalism and rationalism increase the kinds of 
terminology to seven.  But since we have used up all our terms, we must account 
for them indirectly."  There can be nothing more unprincipled than that--"You 
know when I told you that everything under the sun is in my system of five?  
Yeah, well, here's a few more I want to talk about."  It punches up that one's 
system is what designates necessity, rather than necessity creating the system. 
 "The system wants to push me around into thinking shit's gotta' come in fives, 
but I'm gonna' talk about this stuff anyways."

DMB said:
I mean, to put it simply, our dispute reflected the debate between two already 
named schools of thought. I think we should both be flattered by that. It 
serves as a reality check and puts us in the same context as a current, living 
debate. Ouch! I just strained my arm patting myself on the back.

Matt:
Yeah, except that, having seen the debate and context before, and decided it 
best to shirk them as needless, I tend to think of you as trying to get me to 
regress.  I'm not flattered so much as impatient.

Matt

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