Hi DMB,
Steve said:
I agree that Pirsig often seems to use metaphysics that way, and if
that is what we always mean by metaphysics, it is indeed impossible
to argue about having one. But then we can still ask, do we need to
model our thinking about knowledge on vision at all? Do we have to
think of ourselves as wearing cultural glasses that come between a
mental eye and its object and prevent us from knowing the world as
it really is?
dmb says:
Ah yes, I remember that one too. It could be that Matt got the idea
elsewhere but I think the objection to "ocular metaphors" comes
from Rorty. As you indicated by putting it in terms of "a mental
eye and its object", this objection is something like an attack on
SOM wherein the correspondence theory of truth says that real
knowledge exists when our subjective understanding "sees" objective
reality clearly and accurately. This objection is a good one when
it's used to identify such a theory of truth or the assumptions
that support it. But this problematic theory of truth is only
associated with ocular metaphors. We can't always apply the
objection just because some explanation or the other uses "seeing"
or "eyes" (or eye glasses) as a metaphor. I mean, Pirsig doesn't
think the glasses sit between the world and our eyes so much as he
thinks the glasses constitute the world as we understand it. He's
talking about the mythos, that evolved pile of analogies upon
analogies that co
nstitutes our reality. Or, to put it quite simply, the objection
doesn't apply to the MOQ because it already explicitly rejects of a
single objective truth. Also, please notice that the glasses are
used to "interpret experience", not to see objective reality.
Steve:
But Pirsig talks about the possibility of taking the glasses off. I
can't see how that works if the glasses "constitute the world as we
understand it." But maybe I'm pushing too hard against the text here
since it was written to make a different point about the mythos as
you say.
Steve said:
But I'm very attracted to the paintings in a gallery bit: ".. if
Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it
becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then
one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth." One seeks instead the
highest quality intellectual explanation of things with the
knowledge that if the past is any guide to the future this
explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something
better comes along."
Steve interjects:If he expects something better to come along, then
he sounds to me like an ironist about his own creation. [AND] ...He
is not willing to say that any particular metaphysics is true, then
he sounds like an ironist to me.
dmb says:
Maybe this is only a semantic debate but I don't think there is
anything particularly ironic about the position that says truths
are provisional. That, and the unwillingness to declare
metaphysical truths, just means you're not an absolutist or a
religious fanatic.
Steve:
I suppose it is about semantics. I introduced the term here because I
thought it may be a useful term to for understanding and talking
about what Bo is doing with the M in MOQ as compared to the way I
think Pirsig is using it. What is really "ironic" for me is that Bo
has found more to agree with in what I've said than anyone else!
Steve said previously:
As far as I know, metaphysics is not taken to be the creation of ways
of talking about reality/experience but the search for THE way of
talking about it, i.e. trying to find the language in which the
universe itself demands to be spoken about and to find the correct
sentences that the universe demands be said about it.
Steve:
This traditional (I think) view of metaphysics is what I see Bo as
using when he says things like "the MOQ IS reality." While I see
Pirsig as talking about his "metaphysics" as a way of talking about
reality and one of an inexhaustible possibilities for talking about
reality. In other words, I see Pirsig as an ironist while Bo is
reading him as a traditional metaphysician. But I could be wrong. At
least no one seems to like the distinction I've been trying to draw.
DMB:
For Rorty, I think, it's not so easy to escape the charge of
relativism. Sandra Rosenthal thinks that's exactly what he is.
Steve:
I don't know about Sandy, but I think you are demonstrating a strange
allergy to Rorty. In other words, for some reason that I can't figure
out you seem to have an over-active immune system when it comes to
him. For example, for someone who sees truth as Pirsig and Rorty do
and as you and I do--as a word used to describe the quality of
aesthetic intellectual creations--the charge of relativism should
sound about as on point as the charge of blasphemy does to an
atheist, but you seem to need this word to have something to grab
onto to try to club Rorty with. The more I read of Rorty the more I
agree with Matt K that you just haven't tried to understand Rorty at
all. If you gave him a chance I bet you would really dig him.
Best,
Steve
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