dmb said: I've learned that there is a whole school of pragmatism that distinguishes itself in opposition to Rorty's brand of the same. Sandra Rosenthal is a member of that school, the classical pragmatists. Like me, they insist that radical empiricism is central to the whole thing.
Steve replied: I suppose the issue has something to do with the "linguistic turn." While the classical and neo-classical pragmatists talk about experience. Rorty focuses on language. I'd be interested in hearing your take on the linguistic turn and what is lost in taking this turn. dmb says: Yes, that's right. David Hildebrand writes (a paper and a book) about how the linguistic turn led Rorty to a "theoretical starting point", which is at odds with what he calls the "natural starting point" in James and Dewey, both of whom were radical empiricists. And basically that's lost in his theoretical starting point. Rorty doesn't begin with experience. He begins with language. We hear this echoed in the way he construes the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth as a matter of matching "sentences" with reality. The radical empiricists instead says that valid concepts or high quality ideas have to agree with experience. Rorty's starting point basically has him rejecting any kind of empiricism. If memory serves, he thinks epistemology is just as dead as metaphysics. Steve said: As far as radical empiricism being "central to the whole thing," it is interesting that Pirsig read James to be saying that he thought that radical empiricism was "independent of pragmatism." So it seems that someone can be called a pragmatist without talking about radical empiricism. dmb says: Yea, James did say they were separate but contemporary classical pragmatists have fused the two, which is what Pirsig does in Lila. Today, if you call yourself a pragmatist but don't include radical empiricism, you're called a neo-pragmatist instead of classical pragmatist. As I said to Matt a few moons ago, I think we should both be flattered that our differences are reflected in the differences between these two schools of pragmatism. It shows that we can both find support among professionals, that the professionals argue about the very same thing. If I have the advantage, it's only because this is a forum for discussing Pirsig. If I went to similar place that discussed Rorty most of the time, I imagine it would be tough to make friends, if you know what I mean. Steve said: Another issue that may separate Rorty from other pragmatists is that Rorty doesn't equate truth with "warranted assertability" which is why, as I recall, Davidson never wanted to be called a pragmatist and why Putnam didn't think Rorty was really a pragmatist. dmb says: Yea, Hildebrand's book is very much about the Rorty-Putnam debates and the phrase "warranted assertability" gets used a lot. It's telling, I suppose, that all three of those guys come out of the analytic tradition and when that dream didn't pan out there was a tendency to find something less ambitious as far as discovering "reality" and the "truth". I mean, I don't like Putnam or Davidson any better than Rorty. Somehow that whole tradition just smells like the kind of amoral rationality that Pirsig sought to overcome. Putnam, for example, thought that Rorty was a spoiler, a nihilist and "an explicit cultural relativist". Even if that's only half way true, it would still be very far away from what Pirsig is up to. Steve said: When I hear the charge of relativism being made, all it sounds like is an epithet that a Rigel type uses when he disagrees with someone else's morality. As I see it, Rigel is going to walk away unconvinced by both Pirsig's and Rorty's protestations about being called a relativist, but that doesn't make either one a relativist. I completely understand that Pirsig and Rorty will be accused of relativism by someone like Rigel, but I can't understand how you would be interested in making the charge. Isn't asking if morality is relative or absolute pretty much the same as asking whether it is subjective or objective? dmb says: I know what you mean. Whenever a person complains about relativism I find myself waiting for the other shoe to drop. The next step is very, very often a defense of God's morality or the greatness of one's own culture. In other words, complaints about relativism are very often motivated by absolutism or religious fanaticism. And Rigel himself, as a character, is kind of a dick. But I can also tell you that the issue of relativism came up in every one of my philosophy classes. Apparently, college kids these days are mostly one or the other, either they are relativists or they are religious as hell. Professors can't stand up in front of the classroom and dis religion but they certainly have a few choice words about relativism. I mean, just because a dick says it doesn't necessarily mean the point is invalid. I think your equation - where relative truths are subjective and absolute truths are objective - is pretty damn good. That's one of the reasons I'm so suspicious of Rorty notion of what counts as truth, namely "intersubjective agreement". I think it's pretty clear that this is the idea that leads Rorty's critics to conclude that he's an explicit cultural relativist. Thanks,dmb _________________________________________________________________ Get your vacation photos on your phone! http://windowsliveformobile.com/en-us/photos/default.aspx?&OCID=0809TL-HM Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
