Steve said:
But Pirsig talks about the possibility of taking the glasses off. I can't see 
how that works if the glasses "constitute the world as we understand it." But 
maybe I'm pushing too hard against the text here since it was written to make a 
different point about the mythos as you say.

dmb says:

That's a fair question but, like I already said with respect to the objection 
to ocular metaphors, taking the glasses of doesn't mean seeing the objective 
world directly. The "objective reality" is just an idea handed to us by the 
culture because that idea is built right into the glasses. When you take them 
off, you get pure experience, the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, the 
immediate flux of life. These phrases don't refer to any kind of pre-existing 
external reality, which is a concept, but simply experience prior to any such 
concepts. 


Steve said:
I suppose it is about semantics. I introduced the term [ironic] here because I 
thought it may be a useful term to for understanding and talking about what Bo 
is doing with the M in MOQ as compared to the way I think Pirsig is using it. 
What is really "ironic" for me is that Bo has found more to agree with in what 
I've said than anyone else!

dmb says:
Yea, but there is already a word in philosophy for what Bo is doing to the MOQ. 
When intellectual abstractions are mistaken for existential realities, it is 
called "reification". Rorty and others like to use the word "essentialism" in a 
similar way. Pirsig goes after "substance" as one of those a priori concepts 
that has been mistaken for an actual concrete reality, and for some 
materialists or physicalists it is the only actual reality. I mean, I think we 
agree about Bo's mistake, mistaking concepts (the MOQ) for reality (the Quality 
it refers to). 


Steve said:
This traditional (I think) view of metaphysics is what I see Bo as using when 
he says things like "the MOQ IS reality." While I see Pirsig as talking about 
his "metaphysics" as a way of talking about reality and one of an inexhaustible 
possibilities for talking about reality. In other words, I see Pirsig as an 
ironist while Bo is reading him as a traditional metaphysician. But I could be 
wrong. At least no one seems to like the distinction I've been trying to draw.

dmb says:

I agree but prefer to use different terms. It's just that construing the 
difference between traditional metaphysics and ironic metaphysics doesn't work 
particularly well here because it uses the term "metaphysics" in a way that is 
quite different from the meaning used in this forum's central phrase - the 
"metaphysics" of quality. Rorty uses the term to oppose metaphysics, as a 
response to the death of metaphysics but Pirsig is not at all doing what Rorty 
opposes and yet he's quite comfortable using the term as a label for his own 
work. And so I feel these terms are unnecessarily confusing. There are other 
words that express the same idea and I agree with the idea itself. I would say 
that Bo has reified the MOQ. I'd say Bo is an essentialist about the MOQ. I'd 
say that Pirsig is not an essentialist, maybe even an anti-essentialist. Then 
I'd be saying the same thing you're saying but without the potentially 
confusing terms.

Steve said:
I don't know about Sandy [Dr. Rosenthal], but I think you are demonstrating a 
strange allergy to Rorty. In other words, for some reason that I can't figure 
out you seem to have an over-active immune system when it comes to him. For 
example, for someone who sees truth as Pirsig and Rorty do   and as you and I 
do--as a word used to describe the quality of aesthetic intellectual 
creations--the charge of relativism should sound about as on point as the 
charge of blasphemy does to an atheist, but you seem to need this word to have 
something to grab onto to try to club Rorty with. The more I read of Rorty the 
more I agree with Matt K that you just haven't tried to understand Rorty at 
all. If you gave him a chance I bet you would really dig him.


dmb says:

Yes, much to Matt's chagrin I do not like Richard Rorty. I don't think it's 
quite fair to call it "a strange allergy" or "an over-active immune system" 
though. I mean, that certainly suggests that my reactions are founded on some 
personal quirk on my part but what if the guy really is poison? I've learned 
that there is a whole school of pragmatism that distinguishes themselves in 
opposition to Rorty's brand of the same. Sandra Rosenthal is a member of that 
school, the classical pragmatists. Like me, they insist that radical empiricism 
is central to the whole thing. 
And may I remind you that ZAMM was criticized for relativism, that Lila begins 
with Rigel accusing "the author" of relativism and that one of the important 
things going on in the second book is Pirsig denying that the MOQ is a form of 
relativism. I mean, we don't like absolutism either but relativism is not the 
only alternative. This is a pretty serious issue with practical consequences. I 
mean, if there is no such thing as a universal truth, not even a provisional 
one, then what happens to universal principles like "human rights"? You don't 
have to be a reactionary to believe that relativism is a moral disaster, you 
know?



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