Mary said:
We are all totally mired in Subject-Object Logic for every minute of every day
everywhere. The breakthrough, the singular THING that makes the MoQ so
important is that Pirsig was the FIRST PERSON EVER in the WEST to stand up and
point that out. His idea is enormous. Every metaphysics the West is founded
upon, everything we think we believe, everything we do is based on this
fundamental principle of DISCRETENESS. I am different from you. I am "in" the
world, a part of the world, but I am not the world. This we believe in the
West and all other Western metaphysics takes this as a given. It is not
questioned. It is not examined. ... Is it a heresy in this group to admit that
maybe Pirsig isn't the only one that's ever had this idea? He's just the only
one in the West - the only one I could understand.
dmb says:
SOM has been very common among Modern Western philosophers and scientists. It
has become ingrained in common sense realism and so I can understand why it
might seem so inescapable.
But it's just not true that Pirsig was the first person ever to point this out.
More than a hundred years ago, William James took direct aim at subject-object
dualism.
"The first great pitfall from which [radical empiricism] will save us is an
artificial conception of the relations between knower and known. Throughout the
history of philosophy the subject and its object have been treated as
absolutely discontinuous entities; and thereupon the presence of the latter to
the former, or the 'apprehension' by the former of the latter, has assumed a
paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be invented to
overcome."
James talks like a Victorian but it translates into very simple claim; the big
bad gap between subjects and objects is fake. He's also offer radical
empiricism as a way out of this fake problem. This gap between subjects and
objects, I think, is more or less the same thing as your "fundamental principle
of discreteness" and so he is addressing your issues and questions pretty
directly. After naming a few of the various attempts at solutions to this fake
problem in the recent history of philosophy, he says,..
"All the while, in the very bosom of the finite experience, every conjunction
required to make the relation intelligible is given in full."
Again, this translates into a simple claim; there is no gap between subjects
and objects because they are already connected to each other within experience.
To show this connection, James asks us to pay closer attention to the way we
actually experience thoughts and things. He makes a huge deal out of the
experiences that connect thoughts and things, referring to these transitional
experiences as "conjunctive relations". (Always reminds me of Schoolhouse Rock;
sing it along with me now... "Conjunction Junction, what's your function?")
James is saying that subjects and objects are not "absolutely discontinuous
entities". They're not even entities. They're just different portions or phases
of experience with one naturally leading to the other and entering into all
sorts of relations as stream of experience unfolds from moment to moment. The
differences between thoughts and things are known and felt in experience and
that experience is quite real but to then take those differenc
es and turn them into ontological realities or construe them as the very
ground of reality, well then you've opened up that fake gap and the fake
problems come rushing back in.
"continuous transition is one sort of a conjunctive relation; and to be a
radical empiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all
others, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole
be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions
pour into our philosophy. The holding fast to this relation means ... to take
it just as we feel it, and not to confuse ourselves with abstract thought about
it.."
Lunch is ready, gotta go.
dmb
> > From Lila's Child:
> > Bo: A while back, we spoke about the emergence of intellect and I said
> > that in a way Subject/Object Metaphysics could be seen as identical to
> > the intellectual level of the MOQ!
> > Pirsig: This seems too restrictive. It seems to exclude
> > non-subject-object constructions such as symbolic logic, higher
> > mathematics, and computer languages from the intellectual level and
> > gives them no home. Also the term "quality" as used in the MOQ would be
> > excluded from the intellectual level. In fact, the MOQ, which gives
> > intellectual meaning to the term quality, would also have to be
> > excluded
> > from the intellectual level.If we just say the intellect is the
> > manipulation of language-derived symbols for experience, these problems
> > of excessive exclusion do not seem to occur.
> >
> > Bo: Long before the Lila Squad days, it had puzzled me greatly that
> > Subject/Object metaphysics may be viewed as the intellectual level of
> > MOQ! I even raised the question in a letter to Pirsig, but he did not
> > respond.
> > Pirsig: I don't remember not responding, so it must have been an
> > oversight. I don't think the subject-object level is identical with
> > intellect. Intellect is simply thinking, and one can think without
> > involving the subject-object relationship. Computer language is not
> > primarily structured into subjects and objects. Algebra has no subjects
> > and objects.
> >
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