dmb, I'm so flattered that you need so much of my attention. Nine out of ten of your posts are directed towards what I have said. While I think you are cute, I still cannot vote for you to become prom queen. I am going to vote for Arlo.
Marsha On Jun 11, 2011, at 3:30 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > >> "Definitions are the FOUNDATION of reason. You can't reason without them." >> (Emphasis is Pirsig's. ZAMM, page 214.) >> "A metaphysics must be divisible, definable and knowable, or there isn't any >> metaphysics." (Pirsig in Lila, page 64.) > > Ron commented: > Often the rhetorical device is brought into play of not having to make sense > in a philosophical, reflective conversation because what they mean is outside > of languages conceptual ability to entirely, wholly and absolutely > encapsulate and ultimately define what they mean. This is regularly confused > with explanations of the ineffiable appearing as cryptic and enigmatic to > those not "in the know". Their arguement being more based on the consequences > of esoteria rather than the ouright rejection of meaning they believe thay > are defending. And the confusion grows from there. > > > dmb says: > If I get what you mean, the "rhetorical device" (not having to make sense) > isn't really a deliberately used technique. It's actually just the result of > Marsha's own confusion and conflation of the key concepts and central > distinctions of the MOQ. It's a result of the way she defines static > patterns, which is approximately the opposite of Pirsig's. It's a result of > the way she conflates conceptualization and definition with reification. The > result is a meaningless salad of misused words. > In both cases, the Pirsig quotes come from a context in which he is talking > about the discrepancy between intellectual definitions and undefined Quality. > This same discrepancy or distinction can be talked about in terms of static > and Dynamic, the menu and the food, or concepts and reality. We could say > that definitions are secondary and intellectual but the primary empirical > reality is pre-intellectual and pre-verbal. Those are just different ways of > saying the thing. There are slightly different terms used but they all > express the same basic concept, the same distinction. And this is probably > the most important distinction of all, assuming the goal is to understand the > MOQ. > Pirsig is saying that concepts are secondary and they are distinguishable > from the primary empirical reality precisely because they can be defined > while the primary empirical reality cannot be defined. But Marsha completely > misses the point of this central distinction and somehow construes it to mean > that words and concepts can't be defined. This effectively erases the > distinction between what is definable and undefinable thereby erasing the > distinction between concepts and empirical reality, between static quality > and DQ. > > Ironically, that's exactly what reification is: the inability to distinguish > concepts from reality. > > That's what Pirsig is pushing back against when he attacks Plato's fixed and > eternal Form of the Good and when he attacks the notion of a single, > exclusive objective reality. Those are both cases of reification. This is > what's behind his attack on subject-object metaphysics too. He and James are > both saying "subjects" and "objects" are concepts rather than the structures > of reality itself. If Marsha understood the concept of reification properly > she would be bringing Buddhism in to support the MOQ central distinctions, > not undermining them. She thinks the Buddhist claim against permanence is > something other than the MOQ's claim against the fixed and eternal, as if > permanent and eternal don't mean the same thing because she can't translate > english into english. > ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
