Hello everyone On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:35 AM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dan said to Steve: > .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and > causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I > noticed. > > > > dmb says: > I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the > traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of > causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality.
Dan: Yes, exactly. That is what I mean: causality is tantamount to the preclusion of morality. I probably misspoke by saying morality and causality are equal. Sorry for the misunderstanding. dmb: This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. Dan: But in a sense, in the classical dilemma, they are linked. dmb: > That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of > preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific > determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture > even at the "physical" level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. > This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular > patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Dan: Lets consult LILA in an effort to clear things up. This is what RMP says about replacing causality with value: "The only difference between causation and value is that the word "cause" implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of "value" is one of preference." Dan comments: Note that he states THE ONLY DIFFERENCE... he says nothing about introducing choice, only preference. And here he is examining determinism vs free will: "On the other hand, if the determinists let go of their position it would seem to deny the truth of science. If one adheres to a traditional scientific metaphysics of substance, the philosophy of determinism is an inescapable corollary. If "everything" is included in the class of "substance and its properties," and if "substance and its properties" is included in the class of "things that always follow laws," and if "people" are included in the class "everything," then it is an airtight logical conclusion that people always follow the laws of substance. "To be sure, it doesn't seem as though people blindly follow the laws of substance in everything they do, but within a Deterministic explanation that is just another one of those illusions that science is forever exposing. All the social sciences, including anthropology, were founded on the bedrock metaphysical belief that these physical cause-and-effect laws of human behavior exist. Moral laws, if they can be said to exist at all, are merely an artificial social code that has nothing to do with the real nature of the world. A "moral" person acts conventionally, "watches out for the cops," "keeps his nose clean," and nothing more. "In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free." Dan comments: The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not introduce choice. It introduces preference. Choice implies certainty, which is not a matter of preference. RMP clearly states that when our behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality we are WITHOUT choice. Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
