Hi Dan, >> Dan: >>> Within the framework of the MOQ, it is not an exclusive, either/or >>> proposition but rather both. From a static quality, conventional point >>> of view, both free will and determinism are seen as correct. From a >>> Dynamic point of view, both free will and determinism are illusions, >>> the result of a dysfunctional narrative in which we have come to >>> believe. . >> >> >> Steve: >> I still don't follow you on what these two different perspectives are. >> I never claim to have anything other than a conventional perspective. > > Dan: > > Yes, I see. But Robert Pirsig does talk about it quite a lot. From LILA'S > CHILD: > > The MOQ, as I understand it, denies any existence of a > “self” that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or > intellectual patterns. There is no “self” that contains these > patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees > with both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In > Zen, there is reference to “big self” and “small self.” Small > self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. > > “Hunting for weaknesses, [in your paper] I find that on page one, > paragraph four, there is a sentence, ‘Fundamentally Pirsig’s term is a > mystic one, and refers to the undifferentiated, indeterminate, reality > from which the universe has evolved (or grown) from.’ Although this > is true at a Buddha’s level of understanding, it would be confusing > and illogical in the world of everyday affairs to say that the world is > evolving both from and toward the same thing. I have had some > reader mail that has pointed out at one place I seem to imply that > Quality and chaos are the same and at another that they are different, > so I haven’t been clear on this myself and have left an opening to > attack. To close it up, let us say that the universe is evolving from a > condition of low quality (quantum forces only, no atoms, pre-Big > Bang) toward a higher one (birds, trees, societies and thoughts) and > that in a static sense (world of everyday affairs) these two are not the > same.” > (Letter from Robert Pirsig, March 29, 1997. The word “mystic” > originally in bold not italics.) > > DG: > ...a materialist might dream that someday science will > develop a theory of everything. On the other hand, an idealist might > tend to side with the Buddhists in saying intellectual concepts of > reality are not central to or even part of reality itself? That we will > never develop a theory of everything? That there’s no chance we can > ever intellectually know reality? > > RMP: > The confusion here seems to result from the two languages of > Buddhism, the language of the Buddha’s world and language of > everyday life. In the language of everyday life, reality and intellect are > different. From the language of the Buddha’s world, they are the > same, since there is no intellectual division that governs the Buddha’s > world. > > Dan comments: > > From the everyday perspective, free will and determinism are different > and mutually exclusive notions. The MOQ brings them together, however, > by stating that the dilemma of free will vs determinism doesn't come > up. They are both correct in a conventional static quality sense. But > from a Dynamic perspective, one free of any intellectual divisions, > they are illusions. > > Does that help you see better what I am getting at?
Steve: I Think I have a better idea what you mean by these two perspectives, but I would unpack the perspective of Big Self versus small self to this issue differently. Here is what I wrote on the issue when I first weighted in on the free will debate back in April (!): From: Steven Peterson <[email protected]> Date: Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM Subject: [MD] The MOQ has no soul "No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as "I" about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, "do I have free will?" This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as "I" that has important ontological status that transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. The MOQ makes no such fundamental postulate. Free will is formulated as a question that is asked in the SO context. Instead, in MOQ terns we can reformulate the question where "I" could refer to the static patterns (small self in Zen terms) or the "I" could refer to the capacity for change, emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all the static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and destroyer of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what Pirsig did with the question. We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. Or we can identify with the capacity to generate, sustain, or destroy existing patterns in favor of (we hope) new and better ones. To the extent we do we are free. Cultivating practices such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free." >> Steve: >> In the MOQ, all we are and in fact experience itself is Value. We are >> not determined by values. We are not "free to choose" our values. We >> ARE our values. "Choosing" is the manifestation of what we ARE as sets >> of values with the capacity to respond to DQ. In the MOQ, it is the >> fact of such choices (value patterns) from which "the will" or the >> self is inferred rather than the other way around. In contrast, the >> SOM notion of free will is of an autonomous subject with metaphysical >> primacy. dmb keeps saying that if we drop the notion of a choosing >> subject (though he does say he drops the notion of a metaphysical >> soul), then morality goes out window. I see that as about the most >> un-MOQish thing one could possibly say. The MOQ is about asserting an >> understanding of the world as a moral order through _denying_ the >> subject-object picture. Instead of free will as the possession of a >> self, Pirsig retools the notion of freedom (note that in the quote you >> posted he shifts from "free will" to "freedom") as the capacity to >> respond to DQ. And in LC he says that you are going to talk about free >> will in MOQ terms as this capacity, then you may as well say that >> rocks and trees and atoms have free will. But let's not slip the SOM >> version of a freely choosing subject with metaphysical primacy in >> through the back door here. Pirsig's notion of freedom associated with >> DQ is very different from traditional SOM free will that is suppose to >> distinguish humanity from the animals. > > Dan: > > First of all, I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate > morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, > at least not that I noticed. Still, I have to ask you: in what sense > is the notion of free will and freedom different? And as to LC where > RMP says what you say he says, I am having problems finding just what > you're talking about. Perhaps if you have the time, you might point me > to the exact quote. Steve: I am referring to RMP Annotation 68 Traditionally this is the meaning of free will. But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels. At the lowest inorganic level the freedom is so small that it can be said that nature follows laws but the quantum theory shows that within the laws the freedom is still there. I remember a physicist telling me that according to quantum theory all the molecules of air in a room could of their own free will move to one side, suffocating someone standing on the other side, but the probability of this happening is so small no one need ever worry about it. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
