Hi all,
>> Marsha: >> Within the MoQ, there is only Dynamic Quality and static quality >> as static patterns of value. Free-will is an intellectual pattern. >> That which best represent what is free, on the other hand, is >> explained in Chapter 12 of LILA: >> > Pirsig said: > "To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of > quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic > Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free." > > > dmb says: > It seems that a lot of the debate centers around the interpretation of these > two sentences. Steve, for example, keeps saying that it makes no sense to say > we are free to choose our values because we ARE those values. Steve: Yep. I also say that it makes no sense to say we are determined by our values, since we ARE our values, but dmb conveniently left that out. dmb: He also seems to think that rejecting SOM means all issues of freedom and control are rendered meaningless. Steve: Nope. Rejecting SOM means we reject the premise upon which it makes sense to wonder about free will and determinism, but it still makes sense to talk about freedom as I've said repeatedly. Pirsig had a lot to say on the subject and associated it with DQ. dmb: Likewise, Marsha says Free-will is an intellectual pattern, a useful illusion. But in the quote Pirsig is saying that one's behavior is free to the extent that one follows DQ. Steve: Yep. But he does NOT say that one is in control of his behavior to the extent he follows DQ and not in control to the extent he follows sq. That dubious interpretation of Pirsig's statement as defending the traditional SOM notion of free will is all dmb's. dmb: In the MOQ, then, freedom is neither static nor patterned. To deny one's freedom is to deny that we are capable of responding to DQ. Steve: Of course I don't deny that we are capable of responding to DQ. Pirsig says people can respond to DQ just as rocks and trees and atoms can. No one thinks of atoms as having free will, but if dmb is willing to stretch the term that far he will be misunderstood by most as supporting the SOM notion of free will that the MOQ denies along with determinism. He is either deliberately or inadvertently trying to slip the Cartesian Self (that entity that either does or does not possess the little god known as "the will") in the back door of the MOQ. dmb: > The capacity to follow DQ, Pirsig says, extends from inorganic patterns to > his own philosophical creativity. The only question is, to what extent is the > atom and the philosopher free to follow DQ. And to the extent that static > patterns provide stability and preserve the freedoms gained in the past, the > prevent moral degeneration. Not just life, he says, but EVERYTHING is an > ethical activity. Steve: Agreed. Obviously. dmb: And without freedom there is no such thing as an ethical or unethical activity. If your activity is controlled, then you can't rightly be praised or blamed for what you do because you're not responsible for those acts. Steve: If by "without freedom" you mean "without DQ" then we agree, since all of reality depends on it, but I suspect that you mean the world would be different some how "without 'free will'." I don't think we have to imagine such a little god inside each human being to make talk of moral responsibility coherent. In the MOQ, atoms have the MOQ retooled version of free will as "the capacity to respond to DQ" too, yet we don't regard them as morally responsible, so the link between free will as "the capacity to respond to DQ" and moral responsibility is not there in the MOQ. Moral responsibility in the MOQ comes from having social and intellectual patterns. dmb without comment ends by quoting part of a quote that Marsha recently quoted as though he dug it up himself and as though it somehow helps his case: > "Dharma, like rta, means 'what holds together.' It is the basis of all > order. It equals righteousness. It is the ethical code. It is the stable > condition which gives man perfect satisfaction. ...Dharma is Quality itself, > the principle of 'rightness' which gives structure and purpose to the > evolution of all life and to the evolving understanding of the universe which > life has created." (LILA, Chapter 30) Steve: dmb snipped this bit and replaced it with a "..." for a reason that will be clear: "Dharma is duty. It is not external duty which is arbitrarily imposed by others. It is not any artificial set of conventions which can be amended or repealed by legislation. Neither is it internal duty which is arbitrarily decided by one's own conscience. Dharma is beyond all questions of what is internal and what is external." If Pirsig says that Dharma is duty and is beyond all questions about what is internal (free will) and what is external (determinism), then it seems pretty obvious that dmb errs in in asserting that this SOM question is so important to the MOQ and also in asserting that free will is necessary for duty (moral responsibility). Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
