Hi dmb,
> Steve said: > It didn't escape my notice that you didn't respond. You made the claim that > without free will there is no moral responsibility. That seems to be true > under SOM premises as Pirsig says, but applying your claim to the MOQ does > not stand to scrutiny. > > dmb says: > Stop right there. Forget about the metaphysical differences for a minute. > First, just think about LOGIC of the claim. Logically speaking, there cannot > be moral responsibility IF we are not free. Our actions cannot be morally > praiseworthy or blameworthy IF our actions are determined. This logic obtains > no matter which metaphysical premise you begin with. It obtains regardless of > your stance as to whether or not we actually are determined or free. If you > don't understand that, then I really don't know what else to say. It's just > simple logic and I HAVE tried to explain this to you several times already. Steve: You've jumped to the conclusion that if we don't have free will then there must be determinism. The MOQ does not accept that conclusion. It only says that that seems to be true under SOM. You insist on the bald logic of your claim that without free will there can be no moral responsibility, but Pirsig says that duty (he never as far as I know uses the term "moral responsibility," but I think it applies the same way) does not depend on such considerations. What is to be praised is what is good. What is to be condemned is what is bad. If a human being is a complex ecology of patterns of value, then what is to be condemned are the bad patterns in that forest of patterns. What is to be praised are the good patterns. In the MOQ there is no something extra that is imagined to POSSESS these patterns that is itself worthy of praise or blame by virtue of HARBORING such good or bad patterns. There is only the self which IS this ecology of patterns. dmb: > Secondly, the MOQ reformulates freedom as "one's" capacity to respond to DQ. > Pirsig's notion of freedom does not depend on the concept of the Cartesian > self, where the will supposedly resides, and either is or is not free. > Doesn't that prove that the notion of human freedom can be asserted from an > MOQ perspective? Doesn't that prove that human freedom doesn't necessarily > imply SOM? Yes, of course it does. The MOQ reformulates freedom and morality, > it does not evacuate them. In the MOQ, morality is still tied to freedom and > it's a good thing too - because it would be logically incoherent otherwise. Steve: Yes, and I've said as much over and over though you keep saying this as though I were disagreeing. Where we disagree is with regard to the importance of "the will" to the MOQ. > > Steve said to dmb: > You claimed that the concept of free will is essential to morality in the > MOQ. I reposted a quote from Marsha to back up my claim that it is not and > rather the MOQ views morality responsibility as something that is beyond > questions like free will/determinism and literally any such question that is > about what is internal versus external. > > > dmb quotes Pirsig: > "The physical order of the universe is also the moral order of the universe. > Rta is both. This was exactly what the Metaphysics of Quality was claiming It > was not a new idea It was the oldest idea known to man." > "Dharma, like rta, means ‘what holds together.’ It is the basis of all order. > It equals righteousness. It is the ethical code. It is the stable condition > which gives man perfect satisfaction." > "Dharma is duty… Dharma is beyond all questions of what is internal and what > is external. Dharma is Quality itself, the principle of ‘rightness’ which > gives structure and purpose to the evolution of life and to the evolving > understanding of the universe which life has created." > > dmb says: > Pirsig says "Dharma is Quality itself" but we can see that he is talking > about Quality as both Dynamic and static. It's the basis of all order, he > says, the stable condition and even the "physical" order of the universe. But > it's also the principle of 'rightness'. This is perfectly in line with > Pirsig's reformulation of freedom and constraint in the section on the > dilemma of Free Will and Determinism. There are static constraints to some > extent and there is also a capacity to respond to DQ. In that section, he > describes freedom as the capacity to move toward undefined "betterness". > Rightnesss is static and betterness is Dynamic and Quality is both. We are > both. Freedom and constraint are not only quite viable within the MOQ, this > is absolutely central to Pirsig's whole picture. Steve: Right, but where exactly does "the will" come in to this MOQ picture. In SOM it is a possession of the subject. What can it mean in the MOQ? dmb: > To use these quotes against my stance presumes that I have been saying that > morality IS a matter of what's external and internal, but I haven't said > anything like that. Steve: Well, yeah, you have. You defined the free will/determinism debate in exactly those terms. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
