Hello Ham, I think claiming the tetralemma to be a poetic device may represent a cultural bias rather than a fair assessment; likewise for some to dismiss Buddhism because of the concept of 'reincarnation' or 'karma' is also rather foolish.
What you may be calling "conscious locus" I recognize as the "silent witness" from meditating. I sometimes call it "awareness", which seems a better term within the mindfulness experience. This is why I find an attraction to some of your posts. I've often wanted to ask if your Essentialism isn't more compatible with Hindu philosophy with its Brahman and Atman. In Ms. Albahari's book, she writes "Finally, 'consciousness' describes witnessing as it operates _through_ the various sensory and mental modalities, taking various objects as a focus." For my purposes, her thesis is quite wonderful. The quote from Anthony's Ph.D. thesis fits my perspective completely; I have always felt the MoQ to be a bridge between West and East. I suppose that's why I was immediately attracted to the ideas within ZAMM. I had become frustrated with both Eastern and Western philosophy, and RMP offered a perfect doorway to a better understanding of both, and the telling was quite beautiful. My mother often quoted my Oma saying "We are too soon stupid, and too late smart." - I have the deepest respect for you, and have in the last few years felt more agreement with you than difference. I chalk up some, though not all, of our differences to terminology. Well, I think some of your adjectives are unnecessary, and proposing a purpose is unprovable speculation. Regardless, I do not doubt for one moment your sincerity or the value of your valuistic approach to this list. Marsha On Sep 17, 2011, at 2:00 PM, Ham Priday wrote: > > Dear Marsha -- > > Since you went to the trouble of quoting generously from Ant's doctoral > thesis, I thought it might provide a useful reference for squaring some of my > differences and agreements with the Quality thesis. In this way you, Arlo, > and others may see that I am not here to condemn the MoQ, nor am I "totally > antagonistic" toward Pirsig's tenets. > > ------------- > > "This formulation is a tool towards understanding concepts such as the > not-self (or anatta) doctrine that is not handled particularly well by binary > logic. So, as with every static value pattern, the notion of the ‘self’ in > Buddhist philosophy is not simply considered an ‘illusion’ or an entity (as > claimed by some Christian understandings of the ‘soul’) with an inherent > self-existence. > > "That is, everything exists by being related to everything else > (‘dependent co- > origination’ is the usual term), but does not exist by itself. There is no > way to > state this in a way that conforms to Aristotelian logic. Hence the need for > the > logic of contradictory identity. The self exists by negating itself, as > Nishida puts > it. So, the phrase ‘the self is an illusion’ is just as much an error in > Buddhist > philosophy as ‘the self exists’. The traditional Buddhist formulation is the > tetralemma: > > One cannot say that the self exists. > One cannot say that the self does not exist. > One cannot say that self both exists and does not > exist. > One cannot say that the self neither exists nor does > not exist. > (Roberts, 2004)" > > ------------- > > Except for the Tetralemma (which exploits contradiction for poetic purposes) > and the notion of self-negation (only Essence can negate itself), I have no > problem with this analysis of Buddhist ontology. I particularly like the > first sentence: "everything exists by being related to everything else > (‘dependent co-origination is the usual term), but does not exist by itself." > Indeed, existence is the relational mode of being in which finite things and > temporal events are presented to the self for evaluation and cognitive > (logical) interpretation. > > As for "the existence/non-existence of self" paradox, this can be resolved > simply by recognizing that, unlike objects and events which constitute the > phenomena of experience, selfness is the conscious locus of what exists. That > is why the self is designated as the 'subject' of existence rather than as an > 'existent' per se. For the sake of clarity, I use the term "sensibility" to > describe the conscious self and "phenomena" to define the physical objects of > its experience. > > ------------- > > "Though he doesn’t knowingly employ the logic of the tetralemma, Pirsig does > share numerous ontological beliefs with Buddhist philosophy such as > Nagarjuna’s (c.300a, p.251) perception that the unconditioned (or Dynamic) is > the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static): > > In their ultimate nature things are devoid of conditionedness and > contingency > belongs to this level. This very truth is revealed by also saying that all > things > ultimately enter the indeterminate dharma or that within the heart of every > conditioned entity (as its core, as its true essence, as its very real > nature) there is > the indeterminate dharma. While the one expresses the transcendence of the > ultimate reality, the other speaks of its immanence. The one says that the > ultimate reality is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the > determinate, > but is the real nature of the determinate itself. > (Cooper,2002) > > (McWatt, A Critical Analysis of Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of > Quality,pp.55-56) > > ------------- > > Although these two pages deal specifically with Nagarjuna's ontology, I > assume the Cooper excerpt was included to demonstrate its metaphysical > parallel or commonality with Pirsig's philosophy. If so, what Cooper > describes as "the ultimate nature of things" represents Pirsig's Dynamic > Quality, while "conditionedness and contingency" are the experienced aspects > of static quality. > > I was pleased to note Cooper's choice of words in describing the > "indeterminate dharma" which expresses the transcendence of ULTIMATE REALITY. > "As its core, as its true ESSENCE, as its very real nature there is the > indeterminate dharma" [which] "speaks of its immanence." He goes on to > explain that "the one ...is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the > determinate, but is the real nature of the determinate itself." This is, in > fact, the fundamental fundamental premise of Essentialism. Unfortunately, it > is missing (possibly hidden?) in Pirsig's exposition. > > Thanks for this opportuity, Marsha. I hope I have not misconstrued the > metaphysics that Ant (and Cooper) outlined above. > > Essentially speaking, > Ham > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
