Dear Marsha --
Since you went to the trouble of quoting generously from Ant's doctoral
thesis, I thought it might provide a useful reference for squaring some of
my differences and agreements with the Quality thesis. In this way you,
Arlo, and others may see that I am not here to condemn the MoQ, nor am I
"totally antagonistic" toward Pirsig's tenets.
-------------
"This formulation is a tool towards understanding concepts such as the
not-self (or anatta) doctrine that is not handled particularly well by
binary logic. So, as with every static value pattern, the notion of the
‘self’ in Buddhist philosophy is not simply considered an ‘illusion’ or an
entity (as claimed by some Christian understandings of the ‘soul’) with an
inherent self-existence.
"That is, everything exists by being related to everything else
(‘dependent co-
origination’ is the usual term), but does not exist by itself. There is
no way to
state this in a way that conforms to Aristotelian logic. Hence the need
for the
logic of contradictory identity. The self exists by negating itself, as
Nishida puts
it. So, the phrase ‘the self is an illusion’ is just as much an error in
Buddhist
philosophy as ‘the self exists’. The traditional Buddhist formulation is
the
tetralemma:
One cannot say that the self
exists.
One cannot say that the self does not
exist.
One cannot say that self both exists and does
not exist.
One cannot say that the self neither exists nor
does not exist.
(Roberts, 2004)"
-------------
Except for the Tetralemma (which exploits contradiction for poetic purposes)
and the notion of self-negation (only Essence can negate itself), I have no
problem with this analysis of Buddhist ontology. I particularly like the
first sentence: "everything exists by being related to everything else
(‘dependent co-origination is the usual term), but does not exist by
itself." Indeed, existence is the relational mode of being in which finite
things and temporal events are presented to the self for evaluation and
cognitive (logical) interpretation.
As for "the existence/non-existence of self" paradox, this can be resolved
simply by recognizing that, unlike objects and events which constitute the
phenomena of experience, selfness is the conscious locus of what exists.
That is why the self is designated as the 'subject' of existence rather than
as an 'existent' per se. For the sake of clarity, I use the term
"sensibility" to describe the conscious self and "phenomena" to define the
physical objects of its experience.
-------------
"Though he doesn’t knowingly employ the logic of the tetralemma, Pirsig does
share numerous ontological beliefs with Buddhist philosophy such as
Nagarjuna’s (c.300a, p.251) perception that the unconditioned (or Dynamic)
is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static):
In their ultimate nature things are devoid of conditionedness and
contingency
belongs to this level. This very truth is revealed by also saying that
all things
ultimately enter the indeterminate dharma or that within the heart of
every
conditioned entity (as its core, as its true essence, as its very real
nature) there is
the indeterminate dharma. While the one expresses the transcendence of
the
ultimate reality, the other speaks of its immanence. The one says that
the
ultimate reality is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the
determinate,
but is the real nature of the determinate itself.
(Cooper,2002)
(McWatt, A Critical Analysis of Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of
Quality,pp.55-56)
-------------
Although these two pages deal specifically with Nagarjuna's ontology, I
assume the Cooper excerpt was included to demonstrate its metaphysical
parallel or commonality with Pirsig's philosophy. If so, what Cooper
describes as "the ultimate nature of things" represents Pirsig's Dynamic
Quality, while "conditionedness and contingency" are the experienced aspects
of static quality.
I was pleased to note Cooper's choice of words in describing the
"indeterminate dharma" which expresses the transcendence of ULTIMATE
REALITY. "As its core, as its true ESSENCE, as its very real nature there
is the indeterminate dharma" [which] "speaks of its immanence." He goes on
to explain that "the one ...is not an entity apart and wholly removed from
the determinate, but is the real nature of the determinate itself." This
is, in fact, the fundamental fundamental premise of Essentialism.
Unfortunately, it is missing (possibly hidden?) in Pirsig's exposition.
Thanks for this opportuity, Marsha. I hope I have not misconstrued the
metaphysics that Ant (and Cooper) outlined above.
Essentially speaking,
Ham
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