Hi Marsha, I do not quite understand how you are using "illusionary nature" in terms of MoQ, perhaps you can explain this. Is it your contention that Quality is an illusion?
If one argues that what is presented by the brain is an illusion, then isn't that premise also of illusionary nature? That is, an illusion being dismissed by an illusion? What is your fundamental ground? Mine is non-illusionary Quality. Otherwise one gets stuck in a relativistic world rather than growing in a relational one. Just some questions presented in good faith. Cheers, Mark On Nov 17, 2011, at 1:13 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Nov 16, 2011, at 6:42 PM, david buchanan wrote: > >> >> >> Matt said to Dan: >> You've been taking "Don's dog dish" as an made-up, fictional account--is >> that right? And _that's_ why "what dish" makes sense? ...It had suddenly >> occurred to me, because of the lilt of some of your comments to me and to >> Dave, that you were basing the usage of "imaginary" on the fact that I "made >> up" the example, as in: I have no friends by these names, so it is an >> imaginary example. ... I still don't know whether you think it is >> important or not that some cases are anecdotal and some made up whole cloth; >> some are reportings of experience, some are thought-experiments. That's >> what I was trying to suss out last time. >> >> dmb says: >> Right. The tree in the forest is a classic thought experiment and nobody >> ever asks which forest or what kind of tree, let alone a specific and >> particular tree that Don's dog pees upon. I mean, I took "Don's dog dish" to >> be a concrete and particular experience (although trivial) but I take the >> tree that no one's around to hear as a hypothetical fiction, as an abstract >> tree of no particular type and one described in terms of being part of >> nobody's experience when it falls. Concrete and abstract are very important >> categories when discussing empirical reasons. I'd even say that no real >> conversation is going to occur until that is ironed out. > > Marsha: > Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons: > > "Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature of > perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see images, > such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes. The visual image > of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or atomic structure. > It isn't located in the external world, for it arises partly in dependence > upon our visual sense faculty, including the eye, the optic nerve, the visual > cortex. There are clearly brain functions that contribute to the generation > of red images, but no evidence that those neural correlates of perception are > actually _identical_ to those images. So there is no compelling reason to > believe that the images are located inside our heads. Since visual images, > or qualia, are not located either outside or inside our heads, they don't > seem to have any spatial location at all. The same is true of all other > kinds of sensory qualia, including sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile > sensation s > ." > > (Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and > Consciousness',p.50) > > Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from the > pure experience. > > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
