Ta ta Mark
On Nov 19, 2011, at 1:56 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > Mark, > > Why do you think what you write should have value for me? I haven't asked > you anything. I take your writing to be an expanded version of your 'Song > To Myself'. Nowhere to go except to agree or disagree. That type of thinking > gives me the creeps. I read your words as an interpretation of _your > experience_, not an interpretation of EXPERIENCE. I accept your view as one > of many. If you think that Alan Wallace is not a Buddhist, that's what you > think. Maybe by some criteria you've developed he cannot be a Buddhist. I > have no desire to change your mind. It's a conventional label. Just like > the concept of reification doesn't work for you? Okay. But it works for me, > so I will continue to explore it in the Buddhist (as I understand it) sense. > If you want to reject that conventional reality, as stated in many modern > Buddhist texts, is associated with the word 'relative', reject it. It > matches my experience, so I will continue to use the word, explore it and > post it. I > won't be dissuaded by some whimpy kids proclaiming that it doesn't agree > with their cultural biases. > > Bugger off Mark! > > > Marsha > > > > > > > On Nov 17, 2011, at 5:51 PM, 118 wrote: > >> Marsha, >> Are you saying that you have no opinion? >> >> I spent 6 years doing do doctorate of philosophy (Ph.D.) work, and was >> ordained by the powers that be at Oxford. I then spent years in >> internship. Does this make me a philosopher? Does this make me >> anything? I think not. >> >> You need to drop these static references that make you believe >> somebody is something. One can become a Buddhist by learning from a >> Lilly, and be ordained by a mouse. If you want to blindly accept what >> somebody writes because of their written biography, then you just >> become a docile follower, which is about as far from Buddhism as one >> can get. Buddhism teaches one just the opposite. >> >> Clearly Wallace is not a Buddhist, that I CAN tell you. For one, he >> would not be parading around arrogantly proselytizing on what Buddhism >> IS. Secondly, from the quotes you provide, Wallace is about as stuck >> in the static as one can get. Perhaps you have some quotes from >> Wallace that do indicate that he represents Buddhist thought. If not, >> then perhaps you should rethink your reverence of him. >> >> I am most eager to see why you think he is a Buddhist. I do not >> expect an answer, however, because I think you have no idea. You just >> spend your time reading books. >> >> Cheers, >> >> Mark >> >> On Nov 17, 2011, at 11:07 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> Mark, >>> >>> Alan Wallace spent fourteen years as a Buddhist monk and was ordained by >>> the Dalai Lama. He earned his undergraduate degree in physics and the >>> philosophy of science, and his PhD in religious studies. If you read the >>> passage, he states that "Since visual images, or qualia, are not located >>> either outside or inside our heads...", what do you think? Do you think he >>> means in an objective or subjective sense.? >>> >>> >>> Marsha >>> >>> >>> On Nov 17, 2011, at 1:59 PM, 118 wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Marsha, >>>> Yes, that is what I find distracting, obscuring the quote, which is why I >>>> ask questions, so as to provide clarity. I am not sure how Wallace is >>>> using "quaila" since I have not read the book who's quote you present as >>>> argument. Do you know if he is presenting it in an objective sense, >>>> subjective, both or neither? >>>> >>>> In this way I can understand why you present the quote as significant to >>>> MoQ. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> Mark >>>> >>>> On Nov 17, 2011, at 10:11 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Mark, >>>>> >>>>> Easier to obscure the quote than to consider it seriously. Right. I've >>>>> got it... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Marsha >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Nov 17, 2011, at 12:54 PM, 118 wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Dear Alan (spokes person, Marsha), >>>>>> >>>>>> There is a condition known as Cortical Blindness. This is presented as >>>>>> the inability to form visual images in the visual cortex. Such a thing >>>>>> can arise from brain injury. This would argue that images ARE formed >>>>>> within the brain. Perhaps you are using "visual images" in a different >>>>>> way. Please be so kind as to explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> If you, Alan, wish to contribute to MoQ, you also agree to engage in >>>>>> explanations of your statements. Otherwise it is just dogma that a >>>>>> discussion forum has no use for. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mark >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 17, 2011, at 1:13 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 16, 2011, at 6:42 PM, david buchanan wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Matt said to Dan: >>>>>>>> You've been taking "Don's dog dish" as an made-up, fictional >>>>>>>> account--is that right? And _that's_ why "what dish" makes sense? >>>>>>>> ...It had suddenly occurred to me, because of the lilt of some of your >>>>>>>> comments to me and to Dave, that you were basing the usage of >>>>>>>> "imaginary" on the fact that I "made up" the example, as in: I have no >>>>>>>> friends by these names, so it is an imaginary example. ... I still >>>>>>>> don't know whether you think it is important or not that some cases >>>>>>>> are anecdotal and some made up whole cloth; some are reportings of >>>>>>>> experience, some are thought-experiments. That's what I was trying to >>>>>>>> suss out last time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> dmb says: >>>>>>>> Right. The tree in the forest is a classic thought experiment and >>>>>>>> nobody ever asks which forest or what kind of tree, let alone a >>>>>>>> specific and particular tree that Don's dog pees upon. I mean, I took >>>>>>>> "Don's dog dish" to be a concrete and particular experience (although >>>>>>>> trivial) but I take the tree that no one's around to hear as a >>>>>>>> hypothetical fiction, as an abstract tree of no particular type and >>>>>>>> one described in terms of being part of nobody's experience when it >>>>>>>> falls. Concrete and abstract are very important categories when >>>>>>>> discussing empirical reasons. I'd even say that no real conversation >>>>>>>> is going to occur until that is ironed out. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Marsha: >>>>>>> Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature >>>>>>> of perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see >>>>>>> images, such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes. The >>>>>>> visual image of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or >>>>>>> atomic structure. It isn't located in the external world, for it >>>>>>> arises partly in dependence upon our visual sense faculty, including >>>>>>> the eye, the optic nerve, the visual cortex. There are clearly brain >>>>>>> functions that contribute to the generation of red images, but no >>>>>>> evidence that those neural correlates of perception are actually >>>>>>> _identical_ to those images. So there is no compelling reason to >>>>>>> believe that the images are located inside our heads. Since visual >>>>>>> images, or qualia, are not located either outside or inside our heads, >>>>>>> they don't seem to have any spatial location at all. The same is true >>>>>>> of all other kinds of sensory qualia, including sounds, smells, tastes, >>>>>>> and tactile sensa t > i >> o >>> n >>>>>> s >>>>>>> ." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and >>>>>>> Consciousness',p.50) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from >>>>>>> the pure experience. > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
