Mark,

Alan Wallace spent fourteen years as a Buddhist monk and was ordained by the 
Dalai Lama.  He earned his undergraduate degree in physics and the philosophy 
of science, and his PhD in religious studies.  If you read the passage, he 
states that "Since visual images, or qualia, are not located either outside or 
inside our heads...", what do you think?  Do you think he means in an objective 
or subjective sense.?


Marsha 


On Nov 17, 2011, at 1:59 PM, 118 wrote:

> Hi Marsha,
> Yes, that is what I find distracting, obscuring the quote, which is why I ask 
> questions, so as to provide clarity.  I am not sure how Wallace is using 
> "quaila" since I have not read the book who's quote you present as argument.  
> Do you know if he is presenting it in an objective sense, subjective, both or 
> neither?
> 
> In this way I can understand why you present the quote as significant to MoQ.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Mark
> 
> On Nov 17, 2011, at 10:11 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> Mark, 
>> 
>> Easier to obscure the quote than to consider it seriously.   Right.  I've 
>> got it...   
>> 
>> 
>> Marsha 
>> 
>> 
>> On Nov 17, 2011, at 12:54 PM, 118 wrote:
>> 
>>> Dear Alan (spokes person, Marsha),
>>> 
>>> There is a condition known as Cortical Blindness.  This is presented as the 
>>> inability to form visual images in the visual cortex.  Such a thing can 
>>> arise from brain injury.  This would argue that images ARE formed within 
>>> the brain.  Perhaps you are using "visual images" in a different way.  
>>> Please be so kind as to explain.
>>> 
>>> If you, Alan, wish to contribute to MoQ, you also agree to engage in 
>>> explanations of your statements.  Otherwise it is just dogma that a 
>>> discussion forum has no use for.
>>> 
>>> Mark
>>> 
>>> On Nov 17, 2011, at 1:13 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Nov 16, 2011, at 6:42 PM, david buchanan wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Matt said to Dan:
>>>>> You've been taking "Don's dog dish" as an made-up, fictional account--is 
>>>>> that right?  And _that's_ why "what dish" makes sense?   ...It had 
>>>>> suddenly occurred to me, because of the lilt of some of your comments to 
>>>>> me and to Dave, that you were basing the usage of "imaginary" on the fact 
>>>>> that I "made up" the example, as in: I have no friends by these names, so 
>>>>> it is an imaginary example.  ...  I still don't know whether you think it 
>>>>> is important or not that some cases are anecdotal and some made up whole 
>>>>> cloth; some are reportings of experience, some are thought-experiments.  
>>>>> That's what I was trying to suss out last time.
>>>>> 
>>>>> dmb says:
>>>>> Right. The tree in the forest is a classic thought experiment and nobody 
>>>>> ever asks which forest or what kind of tree, let alone a specific and 
>>>>> particular tree that Don's dog pees upon. I mean, I took "Don's dog dish" 
>>>>> to be a concrete and particular experience (although trivial) but I take 
>>>>> the tree that no one's around to hear as a hypothetical fiction, as an 
>>>>> abstract tree of no particular type and one described in terms of being 
>>>>> part of nobody's experience when it falls. Concrete and abstract are very 
>>>>> important categories when discussing empirical reasons. I'd even say that 
>>>>> no real conversation is going to occur until that is ironed out. 
>>>> 
>>>> Marsha:
>>>> Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons:
>>>> 
>>>> "Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature of 
>>>> perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see images, 
>>>> such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes.  The visual 
>>>> image of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or atomic 
>>>> structure.  It isn't located in the external world, for it arises partly 
>>>> in dependence upon our visual sense faculty, including the eye, the optic 
>>>> nerve, the visual cortex.  There are clearly brain functions that 
>>>> contribute to the generation of red images, but no evidence that those 
>>>> neural correlates of perception are actually _identical_ to those images.  
>>>> So there is no compelling reason to believe that the images are located 
>>>> inside our heads.  Since visual images, or qualia, are not located either 
>>>> outside or inside our heads, they don't seem to have any spatial location 
>>>> at all.  The same is true of all other kinds of sensory qualia, including 
>>>> sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensatio
 n
>>> s
>>>> ."
>>>> 
>>>> (Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and 
>>>> Consciousness',p.50) 
>>>> 
>>>> Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from 
>>>> the pure experience.  
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
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