Hi Marsha, Even after your explanation, I have no idea what you are talking about. Could you say it another way for a simple-minded person such as myself?
Are you saying that our innate tendency is "wrong"? Is there a higher Truth which governs such tendency? Where does that come from. It is this form of doctrine that you present which I do not get. Could you explain this for me? I am sure it makes sense, I am just slow sometimes. Perhaps I am overcomplicating it. What I would say, is that our innate tendency is our innate tendency, but our education unbalances our awareness towards the objectification of things, and a rebalance is necessary. But, I think you may be saying something more profound than that. Thanks, Mark On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 10:02 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > Mark, > > Again, I must state I have no idea what you are talking about. I presented a > quote pertaining to perceptions and asked that the quote be considered when > addressing the categories of "concrete" and "abstract", and "empirical > reasons". All I wrote in addition to the quote was "Seems to me both > "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from the pure experience." > So easy to take the the "concrete" as 'concrete' because of our innate > tendency to reify. > > > Marsha > > > > On Nov 17, 2011, at 12:44 PM, 118 wrote: > >> Hi Marsha, >> >> I do not quite understand how you are using "illusionary nature" in terms of >> MoQ, perhaps you can explain this. Is it your contention that Quality is an >> illusion? >> >> If one argues that what is presented by the brain is an illusion, then isn't >> that premise also of illusionary nature? That is, an illusion being >> dismissed by an illusion? What is your fundamental ground? Mine is >> non-illusionary Quality. Otherwise one gets stuck in a relativistic world >> rather than growing in a relational one. >> >> Just some questions presented in good faith. >> >> Cheers, >> >> Mark >> >> On Nov 17, 2011, at 1:13 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Nov 16, 2011, at 6:42 PM, david buchanan wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Matt said to Dan: >>>> You've been taking "Don's dog dish" as an made-up, fictional account--is >>>> that right? And _that's_ why "what dish" makes sense? ...It had >>>> suddenly occurred to me, because of the lilt of some of your comments to >>>> me and to Dave, that you were basing the usage of "imaginary" on the fact >>>> that I "made up" the example, as in: I have no friends by these names, so >>>> it is an imaginary example. ... I still don't know whether you think it >>>> is important or not that some cases are anecdotal and some made up whole >>>> cloth; some are reportings of experience, some are thought-experiments. >>>> That's what I was trying to suss out last time. >>>> >>>> dmb says: >>>> Right. The tree in the forest is a classic thought experiment and nobody >>>> ever asks which forest or what kind of tree, let alone a specific and >>>> particular tree that Don's dog pees upon. I mean, I took "Don's dog dish" >>>> to be a concrete and particular experience (although trivial) but I take >>>> the tree that no one's around to hear as a hypothetical fiction, as an >>>> abstract tree of no particular type and one described in terms of being >>>> part of nobody's experience when it falls. Concrete and abstract are very >>>> important categories when discussing empirical reasons. I'd even say that >>>> no real conversation is going to occur until that is ironed out. >>> >>> Marsha: >>> Can you consider this when discussing empirical reasons: >>> >>> "Philosophers and scientists have long recognized the illusory nature of >>> perceptual appearance. When we observe the world around us, we see images, >>> such as shapes and colors, that lack physical attributes. The visual image >>> of the color red, for instance, doesn't have any mass or atomic structure. >>> It isn't located in the external world, for it arises partly in dependence >>> upon our visual sense faculty, including the eye, the optic nerve, the >>> visual cortex. There are clearly brain functions that contribute to the >>> generation of red images, but no evidence that those neural correlates of >>> perception are actually _identical_ to those images. So there is no >>> compelling reason to believe that the images are located inside our heads. >>> Since visual images, or qualia, are not located either outside or inside >>> our heads, they don't seem to have any spatial location at all. The same >>> is true of all other kinds of sensory qualia, including sounds, smells, >>> tastes, and tactile sensation >> s >>> ." >>> >>> (Wallace, B. Alan, 'Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and >>> Consciousness',p.50) >>> >>> Seems to me both "concrete" and "abstract" are patterns abstracted from the >>> pure experience. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ___ > >> > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
