This is an example of how our assumptions tumble out of us, beckoned or not. We 
enter into a situation, assess it from our own personal worldview, and 
generously offer suggestions for improvement that were never invited in the 
first place. In The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge writes: “Mental models are 
deeply ingrained assumptions that influence how we understand the world and how 
we take action. We do not “have” mental models. We “are” our mental models…The 
discipline of working with mental models starts with turning the mirror inward; 
learning to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to bring them to the 
surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny.” (Phillips, Jan, 'The Art of 
Original Thinking – The Making of a Thought Leader')

Marsha:
I see "mental models" very close to "static patterns of value".  The last 
sentence in the above also sets forward a working solution. 


dmb says:
The last sentence is the solution?  "The discipline of working with mental 
models starts with turning the mirror inward; learning to unearth our internal 
pictures of the world, to bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to 
scrutiny.” Hmmm. Hold them rigorously to scrutiny. Yea, I think that is exactly 
what I'm trying to get you to do and exactly you are not doing. If you'd just 
take a good look at your own assertions, you should be able that you're still 
making the same mistake. You're still rejecting the solution as if it were the 
problem. You are confusing the NAIVE reality accepted by human beings (the 
problem) with the pragmatic theory of truth (the solution). 

Marsha commits the same old error once again:
It is not to merely accept the thoughts flowing through our consciousness as 
'real' or 'true', (whether that be a "creative self", "the pragmatic theory of 
truth" or  "truth is an idea which represents experience beautifully").  That's 
the NAIVE reality accepted by human beings that Lila points to in Chapter 14.  
I'll take holding static pattens of value as hypothetical (supposed but not 
neccesarily real or true) any day of the week, rather than be one that would 
act destructively to prove their world-view to be the "correct one" and use 
foece to have everyone else accept it.  It's analogy, boys, merely analogy; you 
do not hold some objective truth.  You talk about the MoQ's new conception of 
truth, yet defend it like it is absolute.


dmb says:
Somehow you've misread the pragmatic theory of truth so that it is 
indistinguishable from "some objective truth", from naive realism, from 
absolutes, from the belief that there is only one correct world view. Somehow 
you are unable to distinguish the old notion of a single exclusive Truth (the 
problem) from the MOQ's provisional and plural truths (the solution). And so 
once again you have taken a critique of the problem and senselessly used it to 
attack the solution. 

Apparently, you're oblivious to another important distinction, although it 
doesn't depend on Pirsig's work nor is it even particularly philosophical. I 
see this error in your last sentences: "It's analogy, boys, merely analogy; you 
do not hold some objective truth. You talk about the MoQ's new conception of 
truth, yet defend it like it is absolute."

Wouldn't want to speak for all the boys but I've certainly been defending the 
MOQ's conception of truth - but not like it is absolute. There are two basic 
questions to ask about the MOQ's conception of truth. I'm answering one of them 
but you think I'm answering the other. The first question merely asks what that 
conception is and the second one asks if that conception is true. I'm only 
trying to show you that you have the wrong conception. 

One can't even begin to ask the second question until the first question has 
been answered. Obviously, nobody can determine the validity of a claim unless 
they understand the meaning of the claim. I think you are confused about the 
MOQ's conception of truth, that you don't understand Pirsig's claim. If you 
ever do understand it, then we can talk about whether or not it's absolutely 
true. (Here's a hint: It's not. It would be contradictory for a pragmatist to 
make such a claim.)

Ironically, I think your position takes a pretty big hit from your own textual 
evidence. Take a few moments to reflect and compare what you say to Peter 
Senge's assertion. You say you have nothing to say about truth, that you're not 
interested, and more or less dismiss it all. By contrast Senge writes: "We 
“are” our mental models…The discipline of working with mental models starts 
with turning the mirror inward; learning to unearth our internal pictures of 
the world, to bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny."

If we "are" static patterns and the only one who doesn't "pollute" the world 
with metaphysical understandings is yet unborn, then having a world view is 
avoidably part of what we "are". The only question is its quality. Since 
everyone must have a world view, must have a truth of some kind, we can just 
passively inherit a hodge-podge of what ever was handed to us or we can engage 
in reflection, self-examination, rigorous thought and otherwise take an active 
role in scrutinizing that world view. Some people will even tell you that the 
unexamined life is not worth living. And yet you say you just don't care about 
truth. That's a deeply nihilistic position and it's based on sloppy "thinking". 
I think you took a lousy road to a very nasty place. That's just how it works. 
Faulty thinking lead to bad conclusions.




 





                                          
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