Wikipedia: Anti-foundationalism (also called nonfoundationalism) as the name implies, is a term applied to any philosophy which rejects a foundationalist approach, i.e. an anti-foundationalist is one who does not believe that there is some fundamental belief or principle which is the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge.[1]
Anti-foundationalists use logical or historical/genealogical attacks on foundational concepts (see especially Nietzsche and Foucault), often coupled with alternative methods for justifying and forwarding intellectual inquiry, such as the pragmatic subordination of knowledge to practical action.[2] Foucault dismissed the search for a return to origins as Platonic essentialism, preferring to stress the contingent nature of human practices.[3] Anti-foundationalists oppose metaphysical methods. Moral and ethical anti-foundationalists are often criticized for moral relativism, but anti-foundationalists often dispute this charge, offering alternative methods of moral thought that they claim do not require foundations. Thus while Charles Taylor accused Foucault of having "no order of human life, or way we are, or human nature, that one can appeal to in order to judge or evaluate between ways of life", Foucault nevertheless insists on the need for continuing ethical enquiry without any universal system to appeal to.[4] Niklas Luhmann used cybernetics to challenge the role of foundational unities and canonical certainties.[5] Totalisation and legitimation Antifoundationalists opposed totalising visions of social, scientific or historical reality, considering them to lack legitimation,[6] and preferring local narratives instead. No social totality but a multitude of local and concrete practices; “not a history but at best histories”.[7] In such neopragmatism, there is no overall truth, merely an ongoing process of better and more fruitful methods of edification.[8] Even our most taken for granted categories for social analysis – of gender, sex, race, and class – are considered by anti-essentialists like Marjorie Garber as social constructs.[9] Hope and fear Stanley Fish distinguishes between what he calls “antifoundationalist theory hope” and “antifoundationalist theory fear” - finding them however both equally illusory.[10] Fear of the corrosive effects of antifoundationalism was widespread in the late twentieth century, anticipating such things as a cultural meltdown and moral anarchy,[11] or (at the least) a loss of the necessary critical distance to allow for leverage against the status quo.[12] For Fish, however, the threat of a loss of objective standards of rational enquiry with the disappearance of any founding principle was a false fear: far from opening the way to an unbridled subjectivity, antifoundationalism leaves the individual firmly entrenched within the conventional context and standards of enquiry/dispute of the discipline/profession/habitus within which s/he is irrevocably placed.[13] By the same token, however, the antifoundationalist hope of escaping local situations through awareness of the contingency of all such situations – through recognition of the conventional/rhetorical nature of all claims to master principles - that hope is to Fish equally foredoomed by the very nature of the situational consciousness, the all-embracing social and intellectual context, in which every individual is separately enclosed.[14] Fish has also noted how, in contradistinction to hopes of an emancipatory outcome from antifoundationalism, anti-essentialist theories arguing for the absence of a transcontextual point of reference have been put to conservative and neo-conservative, as well as progressive, ends.[15] Thus, for example, John Searle has offered an account of the construction of social reality fully compatible with the acceptance stance of “the man who is at home in his society, the man who is chez lui in the social institutions of the society...as comfortable as the fish in the sea”.[16] G.W.F. Hegel is considered to be one of the early anti-foundationalistsJohn DeweyMichel FoucaultG.W.F. HegelWilliam JamesNagarjunaFriedrich NietzscheCharles Sanders PeirceRichard RortyWilfrid SellarsSeng Ts'anGiambattista VicoLudwig Wittgenstein > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 16:11:55 -0600 > Subject: [MD] Analogies = Turtles? > > In the "perceptions" thread, Adrie said to Marsha: > ...l have to say Dmb was correct that you took an indeterminate knife to > undercut an indeterminate philosophical approach as were the debate > determinism/indeterminism already was clear, not only in Pirsig's statements, > but also in the mainstream today's commons understandings of the issue. > Your mistake was to make the undercut using a double negation, not so > uncommon. > > > > dmb says: > Thanks, Adrie. It's good to know that somebody gets the point even if poor > Marsha can't see it. It's sort of interesting to watch her obliviously repeat > this same mistake - this problem of undercutting the MOQ by using Pirsig's > criticisms (of SOM, Platonism, etc.) against the MOQ itself. This time it's > about the turtles. Notice how she equates Pirsig's analogies with the > proverbial turtles, as in the phrase "it's turtles all the way down"? > > > In the thread titled "perceptions," Marsha said: > "It's analogy all the way down and all the way out, and not a problem if we > cannot always understand each other." > > > > In the thread titled "turtles, or fun with metaphysics," Marsha said: > "Being that it's turtles all the way down, it is interesting to see where one > draws the line. .... But in the end the line is drawn like the spinning seed > pods of the maple tree, self-generating whirlybirds drifting on a lazy, > lovely breeze. > > > This looks like another instance of Marsha using philosophical terms and > concepts that she doesn't really understand. In this case, she is ignorantly > and inadvertently using anti-foundationalism against the MOQ, which is > already a form of anti-foundationalism. Once again, this makes everything too > slippery and loose by about 100%. This poisonous double dose - wherein > anit-foundational criticisms are used against the MOQ's analogies or static > patterns - coverts the MOQ from anti-foundationalism into full blown nihilism > and relativism. > > The same arguments that I made in criticizing Marsha's use of concept of > "indeterminate" could be used against her use of turtles without hardly any > modification. Like the determinate concepts of truth rejected by the MOQ, > foundational philosophies want to ground their truth in something certain and > eternally fixed. If you look up anti-foundationalism in an encyclopedia, you > find familiar names like William James, John Dewey, Nietzsche, Nagarjuna and > I think it's pretty clear that Pirsig fits right in with such thinkers. > Pragmatism is an anti-foundational theory of truth. But Marsha wants to use > anti-foundational critiques even against Pirsig's pragmatic truth. Thus > Marsha, foolishly mistaking the cure for the disease, administers the > poisonous double-dose. Good thing she's not a doctor, eh? > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
