Ham,
Thank you for your quick response to my last post yesterday. I will be returning to your remarks there later. In the meantime, please find the next part of my response to your e-mail of May 5th. Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: Next [Robert Pirsig] states [in Chapter 8 of LILA] that "the Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to ...empiricism"! Now how does empiricism -- reliance on knowledge derived from objective experience -- in any way support Quality as the fundamental reality? The author himself admits "it flies outrageously in the face of common experience"… Ant McWatt comments: Ham, you’re begging the question yet again! For instance, where does this notion of “objective” experience come from? Why is it “objective” not “subjective”? By “pre-qualifying” experience as “objective” you’re already relying on the assumption that there are objects “out there” which create experience for a subject. Northrop (1946 & 1947) dismissed this particular SOM fiction nearly 70 years ago. Moreover, when Pirsig states "it flies outrageously in the face of common experience" it is the assumption that the universe is composed of only subjects and/or objects that Pirsig is complaining about here; not the MOQ! This shows quite clearly that you’ve completely mis-read this section of Chapter 8. This can be seen by (carefully!) reading these two paragraphs in full: “The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is called empiricism. It claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or by thinking about what the senses provide. Most empiricists deny the validity of any knowledge gained through imagination, authority, tradition, or purely theoretical reasoning. They regard fields such as art, morality, religion, and metaphysics as unverifiable. The Metaphysics of Quality varies from this by saying that the values of art and morality and even religious mysticism are verifiable, and that in the past they have been excluded for metaphysical reasons, not empirical reasons. They have been excluded because of the metaphysical assumption that all the universe is composed of subjects and objects and anything that can't be classified as a subject or an object isn't real. There is no empirical evidence for this assumption at all. It is just an assumption.” “It is an assumption that flies outrageously in the face of common experience. The low value that can be derived from sitting on a hot stove is obviously an experience even though it is not an object and even though it is not subjective. The low value comes first, then the subjective thoughts that include such things as stove and heat and pain come second. The value is the reality that brings the thoughts to mind.” It can be seen that jettisoning the idea of reality being composed of only subjects and objects, and instead using the MOQ (with its four static levels and a recognition of Dynamic Quality), brings us a fuller, and therefore, more useful description of the world. Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: Then [Pirsig] goes on to posit a "second principle": "A thing that has no value does not exist," from which he concludes that "value has created the thing", as opposed to the other way around. Ant McWatt comments: Well, this “The other way round” is how SOM metaphysicians see the world. It sounds to me that you’re still under the illusion that human constructs are more than working models for how the universe operates. The reality is (as it where) is that you pick one or two postulates that you assume to be true (e.g. the universe is composed of unpatterned and patterned value) and, if in practice it works better than older models (such as the traditional SOM one that you are still holding i.e. that things or subjects create values) then you go with that. And, by the way, while you’re still under this metaphysical illusion, you’ll be well and truly trapped in an SOM prison. Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: Mind you, I happen to agree that value sensibility is what creates (i.e. actualizes) our empirical reality. My criticism here lies in the rhetoric by which he argues the case. He talks about "substance" as a "subspecies of value"; yet he offers no epistemology to support this thesis. It's no wonder that the Pirsigians are confused about what SOM means. Ant McWatt comments: Ham, that confusion is largely derived from the pre-existing SOM based philosophies and languages (of the Western world). Anyway, for those who care to read DiSanto & Steele’s “Guidebook to ZMM” or Chapter 1 of my PhD, the various notions of “subjects”, “objects”, “subjective” and “objective” can be unpicked. For instance, from the latter: “It is apparent that for SOM the notions of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’ are assigned as metaphysical terms (referring to types of reality such as mind and matter) in addition to being assigned as epistemological terms (referring to ways of knowing; as in the ‘spectatorial’ accounts of knowing criticised by Heidegger). A further SOM semantic construction of note is that being a ‘subject’ (for instance, being a centre of consciousness) is not usually considered problematic but (with the simple addition of a seemingly neutral suffix) being ‘subjective’ (as a criticism of being engaged in conscious activity that will lead to an incorrect relation with an object) is. On the other hand, it is considered problematic to treat people like objects but unproblematic (in most contexts) to treat them ‘objectively’ (i.e. without prejudice). In this context, to treat people ‘objectively’ entails that they are not treated as ‘objects’. On the other hand, it can be argued that it is only by subjectively identifying and empathising with their subjects that anthropologists, for instance, can arrive at fair-minded, informed and more ‘objective’ accounts. Yet, this shows an ambiguity in SOM as we observe ‘subjective’ knowledge (gained through empathy and identification) mysteriously becoming ‘objective’.” “Furthermore, the term ‘subjective’ can be employed pejoratively in two distinct contexts. In one context, to assert that a certain statement is ‘subjective’ is to suggest that the statement is ‘unrealistic’ and ‘non-empirical’. For instance, a lack of support in non-mental reality for a statement could be considered by an empiricist as an instance of poor thinking. In another context, to state that a certain statement is ‘subjective’ is to suggest that the statement is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable’. For instance, a rationalist would possibly use the term in this context to suggest that an opponent keep to logical patterns of thinking in an argument rather than use intuition or feelings. It is apparent, therefore, that in the empiricist view, you are ‘objective’ when your statements correspond correctly to non-mental reality while, for a rationalist, you are ‘objective’ when your statements cohere together through employing the correct procedures for analysis, categorization and drawing inferences.” “Moreover, it is apparent that the terms ‘subject’ and object’ are usually complementary, in that a knowing mind is a ‘subject’ insofar as it is aware of an ‘object’ while an object is termed an ‘object’ insofar as it stands or, at least, can stand, in a certain relation to a subject. On the other hand, the terms ‘subjectivity’ and objectivity’ are usually perceived as being opposed, in that as one increases, the other decreases. Finally, as noted above, an ‘object’ can be an object of thought, a grammatical object or a physical object. It should be noted that the above illustrations are by no means exhaustive so, in consequence, pinning down the meaning of particular SOM terminology can be often like catching the proverbial ‘greased pig’.” “Considering the ambiguities surrounding subject-object terminology, it comes as no surprise to discover that Pirsig (2002h, p.530) was considering a complete jettisoning of SOM terms when constructing the MOQ: ‘My earlier view, when I was concentrating on the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them entirely to help clarify things.’” (McWatt PhD, 2004, Section 1.1.) Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: The reminder of this 10-page chapter is mostly a play on the "platypus" analogy as a means of deriding substance, science, causation, the Big Bang, and cultural evolution… Ant McWatt comments: Ham, God, you love misconstruing Mr Pirsig. To be honest with you, it starts to get rather irritating after a while. Anyway, at best, yes, Pirsig derides the notions of causation and material substance but if material substance is understood as being in continual existence then it has never existed. As Pirsig points out towards the end of Chapter 8, quanta can’t fulfill this definition because, of course, they disappear and appear at random! I also think Pirsig is quite correct to deride the (SOM) idea of causation. This is supported by Karl Popper (with his theory of propensities) and, more recently by Bart Kosko and his idea of fuzzy logic. Both Popper and Kosko are examined at length in my PhD and both wrote extensive texts about their areas of concern for anybody who cares to read them. Regarding cultural evolution, the MOQ supports this notion. Likewise the Big Bang paradigm lies behind the moral hierarchy of the four static levels that Pirsig uses in the MOQ so God knows where you get the idea that Pirsig derides these two particular notions. (“Galen Strawman” time, eh?) To be fair to you, Pirsig’s relationship with science is a little more complicated but between the religious priests and the scientists, Pirsig’s sympathies lie far more with the latter. Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: Don't you find it inconsistent that, despite the author's need to denigrate these concepts, he fills 24 additional chapters explaining experiential reality in terms of "static patterns" while romancing us with a cosmology by which Dynamic Quality continually evolves toward moral "betterness"? Ant McWatt comments: No, essentially because the alternatives are rather pathetic. It either means you have a pre-determined teleological universe (where, for instance, you say goodbye to any real notion of free-will and, moreover, you have the problem of an omnipresent and omniscient God – or creator - who lets evil things happen) or a nihilistic universe (where, for instance, there can be no real sense of right or wrong, or better or worse. It entails relativism and seeing morals as purely subjective human constructs). Both these (SOM-based) options don’t ring true and will never be reconciled within a purely SOM paradigm. It’s just a pity that forests of paper have already been lost on these metaphysical dead ends. Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: Good? Bad? Better? --all subjective criteria that do not exist in the absence of conscious awareness… Ant McWatt comments: Ham you’re begging the question yet again! The fact you can’t see this or refuse to see this, leads me to think, you’re wasting your time and everybody else’s at this Discussion group. (Maybe trying to teach old dogs, new tricks, is indeed a pointless exercise?) Hamilton Priday continued May 5th: yet are purported to be that ultimate, essential Reality which, the author still insists, is indefinable. Ant McWatt comments: In the sense that there is a knower and a known, yes, Quality is essentially indefinable. If Pirsig’s Quality is equated to the Tao or the Buddhist’s notion of “no-thingness” (an identity which I think metaphysically “holds” especially as you can’t have more than ONE ultimate mystic reality in the universe!), then you just need to read a half-decent text from either of these traditions to understand where Pirsig is coming from here. Part 3 of this post (largely about Ayn Rand) to follow soon, Best wishes, Anthony ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hamilton Priday concluded May 5th: Incidentally, I noted that your response to my Apr 14th message was largely a diatribe against my "right wing" views, including the 'Wicked Witch of Westminster' quotes and characterization of Ayn Rand as a "hippie". So, perhaps this assignment was directed toward my conservatism as much as it was a request to provide a position statement of my philosophy viz-à-viz Pirsig's MOQ. If you had a metaphysical purpose, however, I'll be most happy to elaborate on any aspect of Essentialism you don't understand. . Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
