djh wrote: And so I conclude - Marsha is a mystic and has no interest in intellectual quality or questions about whether something exists before we think about it.
> Marsha responded with a Copleston annotation: > In point of fact, however, 'judgment is not the synthesis of ideas, but the > reference of ideal content to reality'. And it is Bradley's contention that > the latent and ultimate subject of any judgment is reality as a whole, > reality, we may say, with a capital letter. 'Not only (this is our doctrine) > does all judgment affirm of Reality, but in every judgment we have the > assertion that "Reality is such that S is P".' If, for example, I assert that > this leaf is green, I am asserting that reality as a whole, the universe, is > such that this leaf is green. There is no such thing as an isolated > particular fact. So-called particular facts are what they are only because > reality as a whole is what it is. > > This point of view has an evident bearing on the relative adequacy of > different types of judgment. For if reality as a whole is the latent ultimate > subject of every judgment, it follows that the more particular a judgment is, > the less adequate is it as a description of its ultimate subject. Further, an > analytic judgment, in the sense of one which analyses a particular given > sense-experience, distorts reality by arbitrarily selecting elements from a > complex whole and treating them as though they constituted a self-sufficient > particular [226] fact, whereas there are no such facts. The only > self-sufficient fact is reality as a whole. > > RMP: > Very good. djh responds: Your point Marsha? I thought you had said goodbye? Are you going to continually point at DQ? Or are you going to show interest in an intellectual question of whether something exists before we think about it? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
