I really value Wallerstein's theoretical analysis (world systems theory, etc), but his current political analysis is pretty uneven.
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Steve Zeltzer <[email protected]> wrote: > "Marxist" Wallerstein writes for Erdoğan and how! " important source for the > left"? > http://sendika10.org/2016/08/wallerstein-writes-for-erdogan-and-how-ali-ergin-demirhan/ > > Ali Ergin Demirhan > Tarih: 03 Ağustos 2016 Yazdır E-posta > One wonders if Immanuel Wallerstein’s latest piece, which is as full of > inaccuracies as it is praise for Erdoğan, is an indirect apology for the days > when his name adorned the op-ed page in Zaman. Of course that isn’t the case, > but the situation is just as bad… When your sources on Turkey are liberal > intellectuals, your articles on Turkey will be stillborn – even if you are > Wallerstein > > > > > At the start of the 2000s, we got used to seeing announcements trumpeting > “Look which famous western intellectual is writing for Zaman now!” It was a > great tactic in attempting to lend some credibility to the nonsense in > whatever column was on the other side of the page. Immanuel Wallerstein was > one of the writers that bestowed prestige on Zaman, even as someone known for > being on the “left.” > > Wallerstein has long been an important source for the left. Even if he > doesn’t often resort to a class-based analysis, his evaluations of > international current events in his columns on the 1st and 15th of every > month are generally written within a coherent framework thanks to a solid > foundation in political history. It is for this reason that Sendika.Org has > often translated Wallerstein’s articles into Turkish after its foundation in > 2001, creating a hefty archive of his work. > > “Wallerstein is writing for Zaman!” > > A few days after we would take Wallerstein’s articles from Binghamton > University’s site and translate them, we would see them posted on Zaman’s > website, indicating that Zaman was taking foreign intellectuals’ articles for > other sites without permission and publishing them as if they are “writing > for Zaman.” > > We moved to alert Wallerstein to the issue with a polite email. “We’re a > leftist site that publishes news on labor and doesn’t have any commercial > interests. We translate your articles into Turkish along with the original > address. The Islamist media organ Zaman, however, is publishing your stuff > claiming that ‘Wallerstein is writing for Zaman.’ We’re upset by this, and we > thought you should know.” > > His first reaction was that since his work was followed by leftists, Kurds > and Islamists in Turkey, it wasn’t a problem if an Islamist media organ was > publishing his work. “So you’re writing for Zaman?” we asked. “It’s true, > that word ‘for’ is a problem,” he answered and had his articles removed from > the Zaman archives. > > Times comes and time goes… > > Wallerstein has generally been in tune with the Middle East and Turkey, and > his forecasts for the Middle East have generally been on the mark. He > correctly predicted that the hegemonic crisis of US imperialism would deepen > after the Iraq War, that Iran would subsequently grow in strength and that > Bashar al-Assad wouldn’t be going anywhere. > > After predicting that the 2007-2008 financial crisis was ushering in the > 500-year-old period of capitalism – to be supplanted by a 20- to 30-year > period of chaos – he arrived in Turkey to share other predictions, showing > himself to be knowledgeable on the Kurdish movement and Turkish politics. One > couldn’t say that he took the socialist left particularly seriously, but one > could chalk that up to the influence of the channels of information regarding > Turkey. > > “A really bad translation” > > After the failed 15 July coup attempt, it was unsurprising that Wallerstein’s > article on 1 August focused on Turkey, andSendika.Org’s translation team > quickly got down to work. But the article was so full of inaccuracies that > readers would likely blame Sendika.Org and the translator, given that > Wallerstein has rarely penned an article with so many errors and problems. > > As such, we thought it necessary to sit down and expound upon the possible > reasons why Wallerstein might have released such a problematic article. > > Wallerstein writes for Erdoğan! > > The title of Wallerstein’s article is “Turkey and Erdoğan: Rise and Fall?” – > something that is problematic from the outset. To suggested that the 14 years > of Justice and Development (AKP) rule is a “rise and fall” from Turkey’s > perspective is to openly deny or misrepresent the truth and the preserve of > liberal intellectuals who pretended their dreams regarding Erdoğan were true > or who occasionally acted as false witnesses for Erdoğan for personal gain. > > “The economy was going well, the country was democratizing and the winds of > peace were blowing in the Middle East. Then something happened and everything > suddenly reversed.” In this story penned by liberal intellectuals, there is > no class background that reflects Turkey’s economic and military dependence > on the imperialists (the US and the EU) or the bloody outcome of war. There > is, however, plenty of lies and demagogy. Why did Wallerstein make similar > mistakes? Likely it’s because his method, which does not accord enough > importance to the class-based hegemonic relations at the heart of the > political contradictions, has left him believing the rubbish dispensed by > shoddy liberal intellectuals. > > After 1946: A completely different story > > This is how Wallerstein summarizes the transition to the multi-party era > following a summary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic: > > “Until 1946, Turkey was governed by a single party, the Republican People’s > Party (CHP in its Turkish initials). Atatürk, founder of the CHP, died in > 1938. In 1946, his successor as president and leader of the CHP, İsmet İnönü, > allowed multi-party elections. After that, Turkey’s government alternated > between the CHP (considered center-left or social-democrat) and the rightwing > Nationalist Action Party (MHP). There were during this time repeated attempts > to establish a Muslim or Islamist party. Whenever such a party seemed to grow > strong, the armed forces launched (or threatened to launch) a coup, seeking > to defend secularism against Islamist parties.” > > It’s full of inaccuracies, but let’s start at the beginning: The transition > to a multi-party system in 1946 was indeed a milestone, but the CHP remained > in power until 1950. But the party formed in 1946 that used Islamic motifs as > a political tool – but was remembered as a “center right” party and not an > Islamist one – was the Democrat Party (DP). The MHP was only formed in 1969. > The CHP and MHP never traded power; the CHP ceded power in 1950 when the DP > won elections. The first coup was staged in 1960 against the DP. The DP was > not overthrown because of its Islamist policies against the secular republic, > but because it had ceased to be capable of managing Turkey’s contradictions, > which stemmed from the country’s decision to become a part of the > imperialist-capitalist world under the aegis of the US after 1945 and the > dependency on US imperialism in economic and military terms, particularly > during the DP era. > > The nonsense that coups were staged against Islamists > > Wallerstein asserts that Islamist parties staged coups to protect secularism, > but there is only one – at least in terms of appearance – that meets that > description: the “post-modern” coup of 28 February 1997. > > Not only were the 12 March 1971 memorandum and the 12 September 1980 coup, > which followed the 27 May 1960 coup, not staged against an Islamist party or > movement, but sought to crush revolutionary/socialist movements and the > working class movement, thereby opening the way for Turkey’s Islamification > through the suppression of the left and the working class movement. > > As much as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan portrays himself as a follower of > the DP, which was ousted in the 1960 coup, the party was on the center-right; > as such, the first appearance of political Islam on the scene would have to > wait until 1970, when Necmettin Erbakan – who had been elected as an > independent the year before – formed the National Order Party (MNP). The > Islamist Erdoğan is a follower of Erbakan, cutting his political teeth in the > MNP’s successor party, the National Salvation Party (MSP). Educated in the > school of Erbakan, Erdoğan eventually became Istanbul mayor in 1994 for the > Welfare Party (RP), another Islamist successor party to the MNP. > > In addition to aiming at the revolutionary/socialist movements and working > class movement that was sprouting from Turkey’s secular segment, the 1971 and > 1980 coups provided encouragement to Islam and Islamism to restrict the left > and the class-based movement, ultimately aiding the development of the > Islamist movement as they crushed the left. Even if two of Erbakan’s Islamist > parties were closed between 1970 and 1980, such prohibitions pale in > comparison to the policies of destruction visited upon the left and other > political currents during the period. Regardless, Islamist cadres succeeded > in quickly forming new parties after the 1980 coup, providing an indication > of how the state’s interventions always benefit political Islam. Formed by > Erbakan in 1987, the RP won a number of municipalities in 1994, including > Ankara and Istanbul, and even came to power as the senior partner in a > coalition in 1996. > > Islamists tolerant toward putschists > > The 1980 coup plotters subsequently increased the number of religious > vocational schools churning out Muslim clerics, increased the budget for the > Religious Affairs Directorate and made Sunni-oriented religious classes > mandatory. Coup leader Kenan Evren appeared at speeches with a Quran in hand, > while the Turkish-Islam Synthesis became the official ideology. At a time > when the mere mention of the left was illegal, Islamists were given carte > blanche to organize. > > Fast-forward to the post-modern coup of 1997. Forming a coalition with the > True Path Party (DYP) in 1996, the RP was ostensibly subjected to military > intervention in 1997 on the grounds that it was acting against secularism, > but mostly because it was forging a path in opposition to the US imperialism > and the largest domestic bourgeois business association, TÜSİAD. The Turkish > Armed Forces did not seize power, but forced Erbakan from office. Erdoğan > subsequently spent four months in prison and was subjected to trials to ban > him from politics, although these prohibitions were eventually disregarded. > The things that happened to Erdoğan in 1997 were not even comparable to the > pressures exerted by Erdoğan against the opposition during his term in office. > > Until an acceptable Islamist party – the AKP – emerged, the US and large > domestic bourgeois groups spent much of its time attempting to close > Erbakan’s parties after 28 February. Later, the traditionalist clique around > Erbakan was sidelined, opening the way for the neoliberal-Islamist clique > that had formed around Erdoğan to gain ascendancy. Erdoğan was ultimately > able to attract a sizable proportion of the Islamic movement and merge it > with the center-right to form the AKP in 2001. This is the extant of the > victimization of Islamists at the hands of the putschists. Such a story was > completed with the AKP’s advent as a single-party operating along > neoliberal-Islamist lines. > > But when the AKP restructured the state and began to crush the opposition, > liberals overdid the old fairy tale that “Islamists were the fundamental > power standing against the Armed Forces, the main problem with democracy,” > inventing a history of the Turkish Republic that pitted “secular putschists” > against “democratic Islamists.” > > Erdoğan’s coming to power > > Wallerstein continues, describing the AKP’s advent to power like this: “It > was … a great shock to the armed forces, the CHP, and the MHP when the > newly-formed Islamist AKP of Erdoğan won by a landslide in the 2002 > elections.” > > The AKP’s coming to power was a great success by itself, but the ones that > were shocked were not the CHP and the MHP. In presenting the AKP, CHP, MHP > and Armed Forces as the only players in the political arena, he hides the > truth. Before the 2002 election, the coalition government was formed by the > MHP, Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP). These > coalition members paid a heavy price for a big economic crisis and the > destruction caused by a giant earthquake, all failing to clear the 10% > threshold erected in the wake of the 1980 coup and enter parliament. The > center-right DYP won 9.5% of the vote, but failed to enter parliament. In > all, 45% of the votes cast in Turkey failed to produce a seat because they > were cast for parties that failed to pass the electoral hurdle. With just 34% > of the votes, the AKP won 65% of the seats in parliament, while the CHP > picked up the rest of the seats. > > Arriving in power as a single party thanks to a coup-era threshold that had > purged the political arena of all others, the AKP started on its path with an > economy that was beginning – albeit with problems – to grow again with IMF > help after its collapse, along with support from the Fethullah Gülen > Movement, as well as the USA and big business. > > Inventing a success story > > “In 2002, The Turkish economy was in very parlous shape, with a low GDP and > GDP per capita and a high rate of inflation,” Wallerstein says. > > True, the economy was in terrible shape, but it had been driven into the > ground by the former coalition following IMF policies before it started to > grow again with the IMF’s new, stringent neoliberal measures. The AKP didn’t > change these policies but became their caretaker. > > “The AKP under Erdoğan’s leadership was remarkably successful in transforming > Turkey’s situation in its first decade in power,” according to Wallerstein. > Eric Edelman and Morton Abramowitz, who viewed the case through the prism of > US imperialism, as well as representatives of capital, likewise praised the > same period. It’s too bad that the leftist Wallerstein failed to look at the > decade from the perspective of the people of Turkey. Forget about ideology, > it’s too bad he didn’t completely discount concrete data. > > “[The AKP] turned Turkey’s economy into one that boomed, and was able to > liquidate its IMF loans,” he says. Turkey’s economy grew as a result of an > extraordinary reduction workers’ rights, profound conditions of exploitation > and unrestricted attacks on cities and the environment. How is it possible to > declare an economy that grew on the back of 17,000 workers losing their lives > over the past 14 years, that raised the number of workers at subcontractors > from below 400,000 to more than 2 million, that effectively outlawed the > right to strike, that drove unemployment to above 10%, that indebted the > working class’ “welfare” to ever-rising consumer interest rates and credit > card debt, that was based on unproductive sectors like construction, that was > supported by international money-launderers like Reza Zarrab and which > continuously watched as its current account and foreign debt totals rose? > Saying the economy rose is nothing but bad propaganda continuously intoned by > representatives of capital and liberal intellectuals. > > And when the AKP even admits that it was unsuccessful on education, coupled > with the commercialization of the health system alongside a US model, we can > do nothing but move on when Wallerstein says: “[The AKP] used the new > resources to improve economic and social conditions inside the country, > notably in education and health services.” > > Don’t forget the Iraq motion > > Wallerstein suggests that the AKP was following peaceful policies in the > Middle East when it first came to power, but this is to forget that it moved > heaven and earth to support the US’ invasion of Iraq as soon as it came to > power, attempting to convince MPs to support a motion that would have allowed > US troops to use Turkish soil as part of its invasion. Opposed in parliament > by the CHP and on the street by socialists, internal splits in the AKP > resulted in the motion failing on 1 March 2003. Despite this, the AKP > effectively opened the İskenderun port to the US, as well as its airspace. > > The fire that has consumed the Middle East began in Iraq in 2003, so speaking > of a peaceful beginning is absurd. > > Suddenly? > > Wallerstein posits that the AKP became an exemplary Islamist movement in > power, before the deus ex machina: “Suddenly this all seemed to fall apart.” > He subsequently touches on the economy, the Kurdish problem and the bad > direction of Syria. Why did this happen? He doesn’t say, but it happened > suddenly. > > The economic policies were good, everything was going well on the Kurdish > issue, foreign policy was a bed of roses and the country was becoming more > democratic before everything changed suddenly. Is such a story possible? Why > is there no suggestion that the AKP’s “success story” of the first 10 years > wasn’t all that it was made out to be? > > Why are the anti-war coalition that prevented the Iraq motion, the 2013 Gezi > uprising, the October 2014 Kobanê Events and other incidents from the bottom > up that rocked the government ignored, only for everything to happen suddenly? > > There was nothing sudden. Erdoğan was already on the wrong path, and as he > set off on his journey to power, he brought Turkey to the edge of the cliff. > The success story is something invented by those who benefited from the > situation. The mass opposition, which focuses on the oppressed, was always > involved in the struggle against the direction in even the darkest days. > Cracks in the governing bloc came to the fore due to popular resistance > movements such as Gezi and Kobanê, prompting the AKP’s allies within the > mechanism of power to see that the party would soon be unable to exercise > authority. When it became clear that the mechanism of power needed to > reorganized, erstwhile friends became the fiercest foes. > > Now, we are on the edge of a cliff to which we have been dragged by the AKP > for the past 14 years – not four. Whether we are Immanuel Wallerstein or a > regular reader, we need to steer clear of liberal nonsense and direct our > attention to more class-based evaluations if we wish to comprehend the > situation. > > _______________________________________________ > NetworkedLabour mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.contrast.org/mailman/listinfo/networkedlabour -- Kevin Carson Senior Fellow, Karl Hess Scholar in Social Theory Center for a Stateless Society http://c4ss.org "You have no authority that we are bound to respect" -- John Perry Barlow "We are legion. We never forgive. We never forget. 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