List, Today I came upon two quotations, one an aphorism by an unknown author, the other a snippet of a quotation by the Stoic Roman emperor, Marcus Aurelius, both of which touch upon, albeit loosely, the ethics of inquiry. First, the aphorism:
*“A fact is objective information; an opinion is a personal belief; ignorance is a lack of facts; and stupidity is a rejection of facts in favor of opinions.”* This view would seem to establish a hierarchy of intellectual 'attitudes': Facts are seen as objective, while opinions are subjective and even potentially dangerous when they are opposed to hard evidence. In this view ignorance is 'curable', but stupidity reflects a willful rejection of 'objective knowledge'. The following quotation seems to me to enrich, or at least to complicate this hierarchy: * “Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth.” *Marcus Aurelius Here Aurelius points to the fallibility of human cognition. What we take to be fact is mediated by our perspectives and is therefore, from the standpoint of the individual, *always* provisional. Of course this doesn't in any way deny the possibility of truth, but rather points out that our individual access to it is indirect, fallible, and sometimes, perhaps even often, biased. Peirce offers a theory of inquiry which seems to me to synthesize these two insights. As Jon pointed out recently, the truth of facts -- truth itself -- requires the 'community of inquirers'; here facts and truth transcend individual perspectives and, so, remain open to revision. Opinions, on the other hand, are mere beliefs which may or may not withstand the tests of experience and, especially, communal inquiry. Ignorance is simply a lack of tested belief, while the stubborn rejection of evidence either is Peirce's, or is related to his, 'method of tenacity': clinging to a belief despite conflicting experience and evidence. And Peirce’s fallibilism seems to me to be in sync with Aurelius’ warning. Every belief, no matter how strongly held, is subject to correction; and all our perceptions are 'perspectives', not truths, not even facts. However, Peirce avoids sliding into skepticism by grounding truth in a long-run 'convergence of inquiry'. While no single perspective delivers truth, the disciplined testing of beliefs across many perspectives over many generations can yield stable knowledge. In this way, *Peirce transforms fallibility into a call for ethical, open, communal inquiry.* So, in my view, the aphorism’s concern with rejecting facts in favor of opinion, and Aurelius’ emphasis on perspective, find common ground in Peirce’s ethics of inquiry. Facts/truth can be (fallibly) established, but only as the outcome of ongoing communal investigation. There are a plethora of opinions, but only those shaped and corrected by experience and experiment have the right to guide action. In this view, ignorance is a temporary gap in knowledge, while stupidity is an ethical failure in the unwillingness to submit belief to rigorous inquiry. By linking his theory of how we attain knowledge with ethics, Peirce demonstrates that *the pursuit of truth requires both intellectual rigor and moral integrity.* Further, Peirce offers a pragmatic framework for attaining truth: we live in a world where facts seem sometimes to resist us, where opinions are as abundant as blackberries, but where truth is (or could become) a communal goal. I can imagine that Peirce would not be opposed to my saying that this process of inquiry is not only an intellectual duty but, as well, an ethical one, that* it is the community of inquiry alone which leads us to truth.* Best, Gary R On Mon, Sep 15, 2025 at 6:31 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jack, List: > > What exactly do you mean by "'convergence' within Peirce's system" and > "the price ... of the dynamic(al) object" that must allegedly be paid in > order to affirm it? What exactly do you mean by "positivist knowledge" in > this context? The pragmaticistic definition of truth as what an infinite > community *would *believe after infinite investigation does not preclude > us from already *actually *knowing *some *truths, innately or otherwise. > "On many questions the final agreement is already reached" (CP 8.12, 1871), > and "upon innumerable questions, we have already reached the final opinion" > (CP 8.39, 1885). Nevertheless, the doctrine of fallibilism "says that > people cannot attain absolute certainty concerning questions of fact" (CP > 1.149, c. 1897). > > Of course, it is controversial whether any *ethical *questions are among > those that are susceptible of ultimate answers; the nominalist says no, the > scholastic realist says yes. Moreover, Jerry R. rightly notes that for > Peirce, esthetics is prior to ethics--before we can know how we ought to > behave, we must first establish "what is the state of things which is most > admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason" (CP 1.611, EP 2:253, > 1903). You suggest that avoiding deliberate harm fits the bill, but it > seems to me that this is not *intrinsically *admirable, especially since > there are circumstances when many would argue that harming or even killing > another person is morally justified for the sake of a higher good; > chemotherapy, self-defense, and capital punishment are examples that > immediately come to mind. > > Peirce gives a different answer to his own question a few paragraphs > later. "The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason > is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can > comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to > execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a > hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, > it is 'up to us' to do so" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255). Elsewhere, he connects > this directly with his maxim of pragmatism--"the only ultimate good which > the practical facts to which it directs attention can subserve is to > further the development of concrete reasonableness ... Synechism is founded > on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming > governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases > of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness" (CP 5.3-4, > 1902). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > >
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