Atila, List: Peirce indeed prepared the entry <https://server-66-113-234-189.da.direct/century-dictionary.com/html/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=03&page=336&query=fact> for "fact" in *The Century Dictionary*--the complete list of his contributions is here <https://www.depts.ttu.edu/pragmaticism/collections/works/bibliography.pdf>, pp. 43-83--and his second definition is indeed the one that is relevant to what we have been discussing.
CSP: A real state of things, as distinguished from a statement or belief; that in the real world agreement or disagreement with which makes a proposition true or false; a real inherence of an attribute in a substance, corresponding to the relation between the predicate and the subject of a proposition. By a few writers things in the concrete and the universe in its entirety are spoken of as *facts*; but according to the almost universal acceptation, a *fact *is not the whole concrete reality in any case, but an abstract element of the reality. Thus, Julius Caesar is not called a *fact*; but that Julius Caesar invaded Britain is said to have been a *fact*, or to be a *fact*. To this extent, the use of the word *fact *implies the reality of abstractions. With the majority of writers, also, a *fact*, or *single fact*, relates only to an individual thing or individual set of things. Thus, that Brutus killed Caesar is said to have been a *fact*; but that all men are mortal is not called a *fact*, but a *collection of facts*. By *fact *is also often meant a true statement, a truth, or truth in general; but this seems to be a mere inexactness of language, and in many passages any attempt to distinguish between the meanings on the supposition that *fact *means a true statement, and on the supposition that it means the real relation signified by a true statement would be empty subtlety. *Fact *is often used as correlative to *theory*, to denote that which is certain or well settled--the phenomena which the theory colligates and harmonizes. *Fact*, as being special, is sometimes opposed to *truth*, as being universal; and in such cases there is an implication that *facts *are minute matters ascertained by research, and often inferior in their importance for the formation of general opinions, or for the general description of phenomena, to other matters which are of familiar experience. In short, a fact is not *itself *a representation, it is what a *true proposition* represents. As Peirce writes elsewhere, "What we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself" (EP 2:304, 1901); and, "A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). We often colloquially use "fact" when referring to "a true statement," but it is terminologically more precise to use "fact" as instead referring to "the real relation signified by a true statement," i.e., an "abstract state of things" that is prescinded from the "one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (ibid.). As Peirce observes, this effectively "implies the reality of abstractions," which is fully consistent with scholastic realism and utterly incompatible with nominalism. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Sep 17, 2025 at 4:39 PM Atila Bayat <[email protected]> wrote: > I think the Stoic definition of “fact” confuses the sense Peirce was > driving at. Your entry seems to reflect the 1st entry in Century Dictionary > which Peirce wrote, I believe. > > Actually the second entry is more fitting for a discussion on fact and > truth. I think Peirce suggests/implies a representative characteristic to > fact in his semiotics. Or I will check into that again later today. But I > had the Century dictionary vols handy. > > Atila >
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