Mary, List: Thank you for bringing that additional passage by Peirce into the discussion. It is from the 1903 Lowell Lectures and comes a few paragraphs after his definition of "the question of nominalism and [scholastic] realism" as "whether *laws *and general *types *are figments of the mind or are real" (1.16), as well as his assertion that "all modern philosophy of every sect has been nominalistic" such that Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel were all nominalists (1.19). What he says about Aristotle (1.22) echoes his earlier remarks that I quoted in another thread a few days ago--"he may, I think, be described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism" because he "endeavors to express the universe in terms of Matter [2ns] and Form [1ns] alone," exhibiting only "an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy* [3ns]" (NEM 4:294-5, 1901). Since we are focusing here on the definition of "fact," the immediately previous paragraph is also relevant.
CSP: The heart of the dispute [between nominalism and scholastic realism] lies in this. The modern philosophers--one and all, unless Schelling be an exception--recognize but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the object's crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that existence. (1.21) Nominalists view facts as discrete individuals, not real abstractions prescinded from the continuous whole that is "the all of reality." Similarly, Peirce later identifies "three Universes, which are distinguished by three Modalities of Being" that correspond to his three categories, the second of which "is that of, 1st, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions, and of, 2nd, the facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more unambiguously, *Existents*, and the facts about them I call *Facts*. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object, subject alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a singular subject" (SS 81-2, EP 2:478-9, 1908 Dec 28). Strictly speaking, this is the *only *universe that nominalists recognize as real, since it includes qualities that are *instantiated *in existents. Of course, Peirce considers that position to be untenable. CSP: I do not think that such a thing as a consistent Nominalism is possible. Thus, Pearson, after a long discussion founded on a Nominalism so explicit as to say that it is we who make the Laws of Nature, at last remarks that of course he does not deny the concatenation of events. But Nominalism--or, at least, modern Nominalism,--is precisely the doctrine that the Universe is a heap of sand whose grains have nothing to do with one another, and to recognize concatenation is to recognize that there is something that is not Individual and has another mode of Being than that of an Individual Existent. (SWS 283, 1909 Nov 7) Another example is that although "Leibniz was an extreme nominalist" (1.19), "A great deal of the Leibnizian philosophy consists of attempts to annul the effect of nominalistic hypotheses"; most notably, "his *principle of sufficient reason*, which he regarded as one of the fundamental principles of logic. This principle is that whatever exists has a *reason *for existing, not a blind cause, but a *reason*. A reason is something essentially general, so that this seems to confer reality upon generals" (CP 4.36, 1893). Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 8:46 AM Mary Libertin <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Atila, List, > > Here is another passage discussing “fact,” from *Collected Writings*, Volume > I. Principles of Philosophy / Book 1: General Historical Orientation / Chapter > 1: Lessons from the History of Philosophy / §1. Nominalism. > > Peirce, in the passage below, connects Aristotle’s “entelechy” to his > development of three modes of being. These three modes are described from > the perspective of a definition of “fact.” This may be where Peirce is > describing, early on, the relationship of abduction — based on probability > from a future perspective or retroduction, as does Baynes, who was aware of > Peirce’s discussion of abduction — to the other two modes of being. > > I will let these passages speak for themselves, leaving it open for your > discussion. Our discussions will affect how the future will interpret the > meaning of “fact." > > Best, > Mary Libertin > > 22. Aristotle, on the other hand, whose system, like all the greatest > systems, was evolutionary, recognized besides an embryonic kind of being, > like the being of a tree in its seed, or like the being of a future > contingent event, depending on how a man shall decide to act. In a few > passages Aristotle seems to have a dim *aperçue* of a third mode of being > in the *entelechy.* The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being he > called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the course of its > development took on form. Form is an element having a different mode of > being. The whole philosophy of the scholastic doctors is an attempt to > mould this doctrine of Aristotle into harmony with christian truth. This > harmony the different doctors attempted to bring about in different ways. > But all the realists agree in reversing the order of Aristotle's evolution > by making the form come first, and the individuation of that form come > later. Thus, they too recognized two modes of being; but they were not the > two modes of being of Aristotle. > > 23. My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can > directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the > mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, > the being of actual *fact,* and the being of law that will govern *facts* > in the future. > > 24. Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just what > it consists in. If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, > you will tell me that it consists in its happening *then* and *there.* The > specifications *then* and *there* involve all its relations to other > existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie in its relations to the > universe of existents. A court may issue *injunctions* and *judgments* against > me and I not care a snap of my finger for them. I may think them idle > vapor. But when I feel the sheriff's hand on my shoulder, I shall begin to > have a sense of actuality. Actuality is something *brute.* There is no > reason in it. I instance putting your shoulder against a door and trying to > force it open against an unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a > two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come > tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have > here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. > I call that Secondness. > > 25. Besides this, there are two modes of being that I call Firstness and > Thirdness. Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject's > being positively such as it is regardless of aught else. That can only be a > possibility. For as long as things do not act upon one another there is no > sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they > are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with > others. The mode of being a *redness,* before anything in the universe > was yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility. And > redness in itself, even if it be embodied, is something positive and *sui > generis.* That I call Firstness. We naturally attribute Firstness to > outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves > which may or may not be already actualized, which may or may not ever be > actualized, although we can know nothing of such possibilities [except] so > far as they are actualized. > > 26. Now for Thirdness. Five minutes of our waking life will hardly pass > without our making some kind of prediction; and in the majority of cases > these predictions are fulfilled in the event. Yet a prediction is > essentially of a general nature, and cannot ever be completely fulfilled. > To say that a prediction has a decided tendency to be fulfilled, is to say > that the future events are in a measure really governed by a law. If a pair > of dice turns up sixes five times running, that is a mere uniformity. The > dice might happen fortuitously to turn up sixes a thousand times running. > But that would not afford the slightest security for a prediction that they > would turn up sixes the next time. If the prediction has a tendency to be > fulfilled, it must be that future events have a tendency to conform to a > general rule. "Oh," but say the nominalists, "this general rule is nothing > but a mere word or couple of words!" I reply, "Nobody ever dreamed of > denying that what is general is of the nature of a general sign; but the > question is whether future events will conform to it or not. If they will, > your adjective 'mere' seems to be ill-placed." A rule to which future > events have a tendency to conform is *ipso facto* an important thing, an > important element in the happening of those events. This mode of being > which *consists, *mind my word if you please, the mode of being which > *consists* in the *fact *that future *facts* of Secondness will take on a > determinate general character, I call a Thirdness. > > On Sep 18, 2025, at 8:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Atila, List: > > Peirce indeed prepared the entry > <https://server-66-113-234-189.da.direct/century-dictionary.com/html/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=03&page=336&query=fact> > for "fact" in *The Century Dictionary*--the complete list of his > contributions is here > <https://www.depts.ttu.edu/pragmaticism/collections/works/bibliography.pdf>, > pp. 43-83--and his second definition is indeed the one that is relevant to > what we have been discussing. > > CSP: A real state of things, as distinguished from a statement or belief; > that in the real world agreement or disagreement with which makes a > proposition true or false; a real inherence of an attribute in a substance, > corresponding to the relation between the predicate and the subject of a > proposition. By a few writers things in the concrete and the universe in > its entirety are spoken of as *facts*; but according to the almost > universal acceptation, a *fact *is not the whole concrete reality in any > case, but an abstract element of the reality. Thus, Julius Caesar is not > called a *fact*; but that Julius Caesar invaded Britain is said to have > been a *fact*, or to be a *fact*. To this extent, the use of the word *fact > *implies the reality of abstractions. With the majority of writers, also, > a *fact*, or *single fact*, relates only to an individual thing or > individual set of things. Thus, that Brutus killed Caesar is said to have > been a *fact*; but that all men are mortal is not called a *fact*, but a > *collection > of facts*. By *fact *is also often meant a true statement, a truth, or > truth in general; but this seems to be a mere inexactness of language, and > in many passages any attempt to distinguish between the meanings on the > supposition that *fact *means a true statement, and on the supposition > that it means the real relation signified by a true statement would be > empty subtlety. *Fact *is often used as correlative to *theory*, to > denote that which is certain or well settled--the phenomena which the > theory colligates and harmonizes. *Fact*, as being special, is sometimes > opposed to *truth*, as being universal; and in such cases there is an > implication that *facts *are minute matters ascertained by research, and > often inferior in their importance for the formation of general opinions, > or for the general description of phenomena, to other matters which are of > familiar experience. > > > In short, a fact is not *itself *a representation, it is what a *true > proposition* represents. As Peirce writes elsewhere, "What we call a > 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to > be an element of the very universe itself" (EP 2:304, 1901); and, "A *fact > *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be > wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). We > often colloquially use "fact" when referring to "a true statement," but it > is terminologically more precise to use "fact" as instead referring to "the > real relation signified by a true statement," i.e., an "abstract state of > things" that is prescinded from the "one *individual*, or completely > determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (ibid.). As > Peirce observes, this effectively "implies the reality of abstractions," > which is fully consistent with scholastic realism and utterly incompatible > with nominalism. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2025 at 4:39 PM Atila Bayat <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I think the Stoic definition of “fact” confuses the sense Peirce was >> driving at. Your entry seems to reflect the 1st entry in Century Dictionary >> which Peirce wrote, I believe. >> >> Actually the second entry is more fitting for a discussion on fact and >> truth. I think Peirce suggests/implies a representative characteristic to >> fact in his semiotics. Or I will check into that again later today. But I >> had the Century dictionary vols handy. >> >> Atila >> >
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