Atila, Frederik, List: AB: Cf. Buchler’s edition *Philosophical Writings* Chapter 6 complete, specifically ‘’What is fact’ excerpt is from 1896.
Buchler's section in chapter 6 that begins with "What is *fact*?" (pp. 90-1) is also found at CP 1.427-8 (c. 1896). In this passage, "fact" is Peirce's one-word name for 2ns, and he includes in it "first, that which the logicians call the *contingent*, that is, the accidentally actual, and second, whatever involves an unconditional necessity, that is, force without law or reason, *brute *force." AB: Notice in the Century Dictionary definition, there is only a reference to a “simple” fact. Actually, there is no such reference in Peirce's *Century Dictionary* definition, although he does mention there a "*single fact*" as one that "relates only to an individual thing or individual set of things." He also says, in a different passage that Frederik and I both quoted, that a fact "can be wholly represented in a simple proposition," although I omitted his subsequent clarification that "the term 'simple,' here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). AB: CSP will describe “Hard facts” in his papers. Cf. Collected Papers (CP) 7.659; see the whole excerpt. Indeed, in that 1903 paragraph, Peirce states, "We speak of *hard facts*. We wish our knowledge to conform to hard facts. Now, the 'hardness' of fact lies in the insistency of the percept, its entirely irrational insistency,--the element of 2ns in it. That is a very important factor of reality." This is what he elsewhere calls the "outward clash," and it is consistent with his definition of "experience" as the *compulsive *aspect of cognition--how reality *forces *us, at least in the long run, to adopt true beliefs and abandon false ones. AB: MS.283, he introduced formal distinctions of facts again; these ideas lead me back to the section in CP 1.183; (in a well-stated paraphrase by E. Freeman, Categories of Peirce (1934)) pp. 17-19. Just to clarify, the CP passage that Freeman explicates ( https://archive.org/details/categoriesofchar0000free) is not 1.183, but 1.356 (EP 1:248, 1887-8), which appears on *page *183 of the first volume. "The 1st is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The 2nd is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second. The 3rd is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other." AB: Perhaps the best treatment of ‘fact and Secondness’ I found is in J. Feibleman’s Introduction to Peirce (1946), pp. 160-61. As another clarification, Feibleman's book title is *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy: Interpreted as a System* ( https://archive.org/details/introductiontope0000feib_s2r8). In the referenced section, he states, "2ns regarded as an individual thing is termed a fact. There are, according to Peirce, twelve separate and distinct characteristics of fact," which he goes on to present and discuss--primarily, by quoting more extensively from the same text as Buchler (CP 1.419&427-40, c. 1896). AB: Does anyone recall the talk T. Sebeok delivered in 1989 at the Harvard Sesquicentennial for CSP? I remember taking notes on Indexicality. Sebeok published a longer version of that talk as chapter 13 of his 1991 book, *A Sign Is Just a Sign* ( https://publish.iupress.indiana.edu/read/a-sign-is-just-a-sign/section/7832a152-5e18-45b0-a365-d95ebcea2d81 ). FS: In my 2014 book Natural Propositions on ”Dicisigns” I investigate Peirce’s idea from around 1903 that Dicisigns may represent Facts. Thanks for sharing that very pertinent excerpt from your book. It includes two key quotations of Peirce that I have been repeating often in recent List threads--EP 2:304, 1901 (not 1904 as incorrectly dated by the EP editors); and CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906--because they clearly express the scholastic realist understanding that facts are *prescinded *from reality as one continuous whole, not the nominalist understanding that reality is *assembled *from facts as discrete individuals. As you put it, "states-of-things or facts in Peirce's account are *structures* of reality," not "simple subsets of reality." FS: Thus, facts or states-of-things are ”principles”, structures extracted from reality explaining their Janus-headed doubleness, consisting at the same time of particular objects (secondnesses, referred to by the indices of the proposition) and general properties (firstnesses, described by the icons of the proposition). As I have said before, within the structure of a proposition, I associate general properties with 3ns, not 1ns--emphasizing their generality, not their qualitativeness. After all, they are usually represented by words as symbols, not any sort of icons. I view the iconic aspect of a proposition as how its syntax embodies the logical relations between its subjects and predicates. This is especially evident in the Beta part of Existential Graphs, where the subjects are (indexical) lines of identity, the predicates are (symbolic) words, and the syntax is the (iconic) attachment of the latter to the former. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Sep 20, 2025 at 12:04 PM Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Peircers – > > In my 2014 book *Natural Propositions* on ”Dicisigns” I investigate > Peirce’s idea from around 1903 that Dicisigns may represent Facts. Below, a > section of the discussion. > > Best > > Frederik > > > > 3.8 Facts as Truth-makers of Dicisigns > > > > ”What we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, > but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself” (*Kaina > Stoicheia,* 1904, EPII 304), Peirce claims, and this fact theory is what > explains the ability of propositions to depict facts. Facts are the > truth-makers of Dicisigns: if a Dicisign is true, the corresponding fact > is the case. > > > > Thus, the fact depicted by the Dicisign is different from the object > reference of the Dicisign. This distinction allows for an obvious way of > explaining the existence of false Dicisigns – something which may > sometimes be a challenge for picture-oriented theories of the expression > of propositions (cf. G.E. Moore; the early Russell). The syntax keeping > together the Dicisign in itself functions as an index of the two aspects > of the fact corresponding to the two aspects of the Dicisign: ”Every > informational sign thus involves a Fact, which is its Syntax” (*Syllabus*, > 1903, EP II 282; 2.321). Peirce thus maintains a theory of facts or > state-of-things to account for what was later called the truth-makers of > propositions. Thus, he distinguishes the object or referent of the Dicisign > given > by its indexical subject part, on the one hand, and the truth-maker making > true the Dicisign as a truth-bearer given by the fact structured in the > same way as the syntax of the proposition. This plastic theory permits > Peirce's > account to escape problems encountered by proposition theories taking > states-of-affairs > or facts to be not only the truth-makers of propositions but also their > referents. Such simpler doctrines immediately, of course, run into trouble > because of their difficulty in accounting for false propositions. But > even theories admitting false propositions may encounter problems. False > propositions refer to non-existing facts, but the same thing is achieved by > meaningless > propositions. The difference between propositions such as ”Barack Obama > is the president of China” and ”The present king of France is bald” tends to > evaporate in such a theory. Russell, as is well known, concluded that the > latter > just like the former must be counted as false. In Peirce's account, we should > rather take the former proposition as a false claim about an existing person > and the latter as a meaningless claim about a non-existing person because it > fails to make an object reference for the proposition in the Universe of > Discourse > even if both have non-existing truth-makers. (In the framework of bivalent > logic, Peirce tended to count meaningless propositions as true, reserving > ”false” > to refer to ascriptions of erroneous predicates to potentially existing > entities > only.) > > > > Facts, in Peirce's doctrine, are certain simple states of things: > > > > A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a > nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one > *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all > of reality. A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, > that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term > ”simple”, here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative > expression. (*The Basis of Pragmaticism in the **Normative Sciences*, > EPII, 378, 5.549) > > Thus, simplicity here pertains to the relevant level of observation, not > to any supposedly basic level of reality, such as was the case in > Wittgenstein's in some respects similar picture theory of language in the > *Tractatus* which famously led him to found his whole theory upon logical > atoms without being able to point out a single example of one. Even if > Peirce's theory of Dicisigns may, even in a very strong sense, be called > a picture theory of propositions, it does not follow that the objects and > properties singled out by a proposition be simple in any absolute sense. > This is because states-of-things or facts in Peirce's account are > *structures* of reality, distinct from simple subsets of reality: > > ... I must first point out the distinction between a Fact and what in other > connexions, is often called an Event* [Foot note* Or at least the > temporal element of it is not the whole of it since [the] thing to which > the event happens [is] an element of the event.], but which, owing to > that word being used in the Doctrine of Chances in its stricter sense of > the way in which a doubt about what will happen is ultimately resolved, > must be here called an Occurrence. If from the Universe of the Actual we > cut out in thought all that, between two instances of time, influences or > involves in any considerable degree certain Existent Persons and Things, > this Actual fragment of what exists and actually happens, so cut out, I > call an Actual Occurrence which Thought analyzes into Things and > Happenings. It is necessarily Real; but it can never be known or even > imagined in all its infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand is so much > of the Real Universe as can be represented in a Proposition, and instead of > being, like an Occurrence, a slice of the Universe, it is rather to be > compared to a chemical principle extracted therefrom by the power of > Thought; and though it is, or may be, Real, yet, in its Real Existence, > it is inseparably combined with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which > make no part of the Fact itself. (Ms. 647 *Definition*, 5th draught 16-18 > Feb. 1910, p. 8-11, discussing Laplace) > > Thus, facts or states-of-things are ”principles”, structures extracted > from reality explaining their Janus-headed doubleness, consisting at the > same time of particular objects (secondnesses, referred to by the indices > of the proposition) and general properties (firstnesses, described by the > icons of the proposition). Scientifically traceable causal relations hold > between facts, not between occurrences. Thus, Peirce's version of > scientific realism (and scholastic realism, assuming the reality of some > predicates) is dependent upon this ability of Dicisigns to depict > extracted, structured aspects of reality. Here, the ability of Dicisigns > to involve the large array of iconic predicate possibilities of maps, > diagrams, > graphs, etc., becomes central to his notion of diagrammatical reasoning in > the sciences. The important claim above, that the simplicity of facts is > relative only, gives an easy way of understanding why simple Dicisigns may > express > facts stemming from very different levels of ontology (from ”2+2 = 4” to > ”There are two classes of elementary particles”, ”This chair is white” to > ”The Movement of Enlightenment took place in the 17th and 18th > centuries”) where the objects involved have highly different ontology and > complexity, cf. on diagrams and language in ch. 7. This simplicity > pertains to fact structure only, not to the objects and events > co-constituting those facts. > > *Fra: *[email protected] <[email protected]> på > vegne af Atila Bayat <[email protected]> > *Dato: *lørdag, 20. september 2025 kl. 17.17 > *Til: *[email protected] <[email protected]>, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> > *Emne: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Facts, Opinion, Perspective, and Inquiry, was, > Truth, Ethics, and Esthetics > > Jon, Mary, Ben, List: > > > > Thank you for these excellent citations and corrections. Mary supplied a > brilliant passage from Collected paper Volume 1 (*§ *22-26), and reflects > my sentiment. Let me add to this some other passages from CSP around the 2 > nd category; > > CP Vol. 1, p.183 > > Cf. Buchler’s edition Philosophical Writings Chapter 6 complete, > specifically ‘’What is fact’ excerpt is from 1896…excerpts in that chapter > are not in chronological order. > > CP Vo. 7, 7.659; see the whole excerpt. Notice in the Century Dictionary > definition, there is only a reference to a “simple” fact. CSP will describe > “Hard facts” in his papers. Cf. Collected Papers (CP) 7.659; see the whole > excerpt. > > MS.283, he introduced formal distinctions of facts again; these ideas lead > me back to the section in CP 1.183; (in a well-stated paraphrase by E. > Freeman, *Categories of Peirce* (1934)) pp. 17-19. I'd like to direct you > there and include an excerpt later. > > Invariably, CSP will tie these definitions into his discussion and > demonstration of his ontological constructs - in his papers - of how his > categories are derived as mental processes, and of course, how these > correspond to the three kinds of signs. Freeman writes, “These three kinds > of relations and signs…are the clues to the three essentially different > kinds of mental processes.” p.14 > > Jon, that’s a good correction, and I see it. While I incorrectly wrote > “representation,” I will opt for the expression from J. Esposito: “From > Schiller Peirce took over the idea that reality was a synthesizing > interplay of opposing tendencies—*a concretizing tendency* *and a > generalizing tendency*.” (Peirce Studies Symposium #1 1979, ‘On the > Origins and Foundations of Peirce’s Semiotic.’ Peirce lays out these > definitions, anticipating his systematic leaning toward developing both a > theory of categories and a theory of semiotic process. > > Perhaps the best treatment of ‘fact and Secondness’ I found is in J. > Feibleman’s *Introduction to Peirce* (1946), pp. 160-61. Important. It > seems some of these matters could lead to an exhaustive dissertation. Does > anyone recall the talk T. Sebeok delivered in 1989 at the Harvard > Sesquicentennial for CSP? I remember taking notes on Indexicality. > > Sorry for the late reply. Ben, please send me an email. I need to get > updated to share digital content. Regards, > > Atila > >
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