List, A few years ago, I posted a short note online that accurately addresses this issue. https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le ven. 7 nov. 2025 à 02:10, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a écrit : > Gary R., List: > > I changed the subject line to reflect the narrower focus of this > discussion. > > I agree with you and those other scholars that even a "first-time" sign > token is an instance of a sign type because its (definitely significant) > *form *is capable of repetition in subsequent sign tokens, and the same > is true of natural signs. In fact, anything that we can describe using > words, which as sign tokens are *always *instances of sign types, must > likewise be either a general itself or an instantiation of a general. Only > an* entirely unique* sign token would *not *be an instance of a sign > type--something brute, unrepeatable, and indescribable; pure 2ns, with no > 3ns whatsoever, which of course is impossible for anything involved in > semiosis. > > In a communicational context, there can be a disconnect between the > intention of the utterer, which pertains to the object of the sign, and the > understanding of the interpreter, which pertains to its interpretant. Put > simply, the utterer can be *unsuccessful *in conveying his/her intention > in the sign's *immediate *interpretant, resulting in an unexpected *dynamical > *interpretant; everyone has experienced this. In your example, the sender > wanted to utter an instance of the sign whose type in English is "hide," > but the receiver interpreted it as an instance of the sign whose type in > English is "run." Did the receiver misinterpret, or did the sender misspeak > (using his/her hands)? > > Who can say, since there was no pre-established *definition* of that > particular gesture, corresponding to its immediate interpretant? Although > like every sign token, it was an instance of a sign type, that type had not > yet been associated by *both *parties with any sign *in itself*, such > that it was capable of being translated into "hide," "run," or some other > English word. The sender presumably *thought* something equivalent to > "hide," which he/she translated into a certain hand signal; but when the > interpreter saw it, he/she instead *thought *something equivalent to > "run." > > I do not know how to answer your concluding question, "how wide should we > consider 'type' and 'law' to be in Peirce's semiotic?" What does "wide" > mean in this context? By contrast, what would "narrow" mean? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2025 at 8:14 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> Is it possible that any of these -- a unique (first time) hand signal, or >> a lightning flash, or a hiccup -- is an example of a token that is not an >> instance of a type? >> >> Some Peirce scholars, including Joe Ransdell (but also Short, Liszka, and >> Parker), wondered about 'first-time' or 'natural' signs that at "first >> blush" (as Joe would say) look type-less. But, as I recall, these scholars, >> each and all, concluded that such (e.g., 'natural signs') function under >> *some* generality: a natural law, a habit, or an 'interpretive >> generalization', even if that interpretation were formed on the spot (and >> even, say, if that first time unique hand signal were misinterpreted to >> mean 'run' when the signaler meant 'hide'.) >> >> So my own answer to the question would be that there really isn't a >> sign-token that isn’t, in some way, an instance of a type. >> >> But then another question arises: how wide should we consider 'type' and >> 'law' to be in Peirce's semiotic? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
