Gary, list,
You wrote,
So, in a nutshell, my concern, expressed as a question, is:
Shouldn't we avoid conflating the informal (logica utens) use of
pragmatic/critical-commonsensical ideas with the PM itself?
Yes, I agree. The pragmatic maxim reflects aspects of informal reasoning
(_/logica utens/_) in which the pragmatic maxim is not formally
enounced, cited, etc. In practice, this _/logica utens/_ aspect occurs
not only prior to formal logic but afterward, in the special sciences
too, since such scientists tend not to be too familiar with Peirce's
formal methodeutic theory, which is where pragmatism and it maxim belong
(I think). In the Carnegie application, Peirce places pragmatism even
further along in methodeutic than I would have thought. In "How to Make
Our Ideas Clear," Peirce pragmatically clarifies of the conception of
truth BY WAY OF EXAMPLE of how to apply the pragmatic maxim. Peirce
holds in various writings that reasoning presupposes certain things
about truth and the real. But the reasoner at that stage hardly needs to
know the THEORY of pragmatism, three grades of clearness, etc. However,
the pragmatic clarification of truth does seem to involve some
methodeutically based enrichment of the presuppositional conception, so
one can speak of a 'pragmatic conception of truth'. And even with
reality defined presuppositionally, well before methodeutic, it is not
in methodeutic or logic at all, but afterward in metaphysics, that
Peirce treats of just what reality so defined amounts to; his theory of
truth and reality leads to modal realism and the nontrivial consequence
of the reality of indeterminacy in the universe. Pragmatism has
metaphysical consequences, in Peirce's system, and one can call his
metaphysics of reality 'pragmatistic'. But the presupposition of truth
as the predestinate end of sufficient inquiry, as clarified at or near
his logic's start, is something of which pragmatism - a theory of the
clarification of ideas - is itself a theoretical application.
As regards _/logica utens/_ in phaneroscopy, in Peirce's classification
there's nothing to stop _/logica utens/_, including an informal version
of pragmatism, an eye to conceivable practical implications, from being
involved. But if mathematical reasoning is _/deductiva logica utens/_,
then _/logica utens/_ is not always vague and informal in every sense.
If on the other hand mathematical reasoning is not _/logica utens/_, but
still not _/logica docens/_ (which Peirce places as later, in
philosophy), then what is it?
Best, Ben
On 4/23/2014 1:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben, list,
I agree with you, Ben, that 'foundational' is the wrong word here, and
that Kees' claim is along the lines of what you wrote, namely, that
"the pragmatic maxim applies to all conceptions, so it's extremely
sweeping." But is it exactly the pragmatic maxim we're talking about
when we're considering pragmatic (or critical-commonsensical) ideas
employed using a logica utens?
Your analysis of its use by mathematicians is quite intriguing,
especially when considering it in the sense of pragmatism being the
logic of abduction. But I wonder why you say that the PM is a part of
the logica utens. Are you speaking generally here, or only for
mathematics? I'm assuming the later, in which case I agree, for
pragmatic thinking, as both James and Peirce conceived of it, is an
ancient notion which only later is brought into formal logic by Peirce.
Kees seems to place the formal statement of the PM in logical grammar,
whereas I (and I think Phyllis) find it is better placed in
methodeutic, the branch of logic immediately preceding metaphysics
(I'll take this up later when we get to the second half of the
chapter). Certainly, "critical-commonsense", what is to be developed
as the PM and pragmatism, employs a logica utens. Thus you wrote that
it is not a formal principle in mathematics, and I agree. But what is
'it' here? Not the PM as such, I don't think, but something logically
vaguer, more utens than docens.
On the other hand, the PM /is / a formal principle in logic, is it
not? And whatever the case may be for the informal use of pragmatic
(or critical-commonsensical) notions by mathematicians, we're still
left with the question of if/how they are employed in phaneroscopy,
and whether in all cases preceding formal logic we're talking about
the PM itself or some informal version.
So, in a nutshell, my concern, expressed as a question, is: Shouldn't
we avoid conflating the informal (logica utens) use of
pragmatic/critical-commonsensical ideas with the PM itself?
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 10:00 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:
Gary, list,
I think you're off to a solid start!
You wrote,
> My first question is, What can we think of this very broad
claim as to the foundational character of the [pragmatic maxim]
for all of science, philosophy, and thought generally? Does Kees
perhaps go too far here?
"Foundational" was, I think, not quite the right word, but I find it
difficult to think of the right word in the context that Kees was
discussing. The pragmatic maxim applies to all conceptions, so it's
extremely sweeping. It is not a formal principle in mathematics, but
it is part of the _/logica utens/_. Or at least so Peirce's ideas
imply. Peirce holds that abductive inference is involved in doing
mathematics, and that pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference.
Mathematicians don't often formally express the guesswork that has
led them to their deductive proofs. However, when a proof has not
been found for an important thesis or conjecture, mathematicians
often enough state non-deductive arguments for or against it. I don't
know a lot about such arguments, but I think think that they do often
enough consider the implications of a claim's truth/falsity for
nontrivial mathematical structures, especially ones that have already
been the object of considerable study; such implications seem a
mathematical version of 'practical implications'.
Best, Ben
On 4/21/2014 1:28 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
List,
Welcome to the discussion of Chapter 7 of Peirce: A Guide for the
Perplexed. [....]
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