Ben, list, I agree with you, Ben, that 'foundational' is the wrong word here, and that Kees' claim is along the lines of what you wrote, namely, that "the pragmatic maxim applies to all conceptions, so it's extremely sweeping." But is it exactly the pragmatic maxim we're talking about when we're considering pragmatic (or critical-commonsensical) ideas employed using a logica utens?
Your analysis of its use by mathematicians is quite intriguing, especially when considering it in the sense of pragmatism being the logic of abduction. But I wonder why you say that the PM is a part of the logica utens. Are you speaking generally here, or only for mathematics? I'm assuming the later, in which case I agree, for pragmatic thinking, as both James and Peirce conceived of it, is an ancient notion which only later is brought into formal logic by Peirce. Kees seems to place the formal statement of the PM in logical grammar, whereas I (and I think Phyllis) find it is better placed in methodeutic, the branch of logic immediately preceding metaphysics (I'll take this up later when we get to the second half of the chapter). Certainly, "critical-commonsense", what is to be developed as the PM and pragmatism, employs a logica utens. Thus you wrote that it is not a formal principle in mathematics, and I agree. But what is 'it' here? Not the PM as such, I don't think, but something logically vaguer, more utens than docens. On the other hand, the PM *is *a formal principle in logic, is it not? And whatever the case may be for the informal use of pragmatic (or critical-commonsensical) notions by mathematicians, we're still left with the question of if/how they are employed in phaneroscopy, and whether in all cases preceding formal logic we're talking about the PM itself or some informal version. So, in a nutshell, my concern, expressed as a question, is: Shouldn't we avoid conflating the informal (logica utens) use of pragmatic/critical-commonsensical ideas with the PM itself? Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 10:00 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, list, > > I think you're off to a solid start! > > You wrote, > > > My first question is, What can we think of this very broad claim as to > the foundational character of the [pragmatic maxim] for all of science, > philosophy, and thought generally? Does Kees perhaps go too far here? > > "Foundational" was, I think, not quite the right word, but I find it > difficult to think of the right word in the context that Kees was > discussing. The pragmatic maxim applies to all conceptions, so it's > extremely sweeping. It is not a formal principle in mathematics, but it is > part of the _*logica utens*_. Or at least so Peirce's ideas imply. Peirce > holds that abductive inference is involved in doing mathematics, and that > pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. Mathematicians don't often > formally express the guesswork that has led them to their deductive proofs. > However, when a proof has not been found for an important thesis or > conjecture, mathematicians often enough state non-deductive arguments for > or against it. I don't know a lot about such arguments, but I think think > that they do often enough consider the implications of a claim's > truth/falsity for nontrivial mathematical structures, especially ones that > have already been the object of considerable study; such implications seem > a mathematical version of 'practical implications'. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/21/2014 1:28 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > List, > > Welcome to the discussion of Chapter 7 of Peirce: A Guide for the > Perplexed. I'm very much looking forward to co-emceeing this discussion > with Phyllis Chiasson as I consider her to be something of an expert in > Peirce's pragmatism, especially when one considers it, as Peirce did in the > 1903 Harvard Lectures, as "the logic of abduction." While over the years > I've read a number of her papers, articles, and encyclopedia entries, I am > only now reading her book, Peirce's Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking. > While I've just begun it, I can already say that I regret not having read > it earlier. > > Our plan is for me to introduce in two posts the first half of the chapter > comprising a brief reflection on the history of pragmatism, and then > section 7.1, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Several days later Phyllis will > do something similar with 7.2, Proving pragmatism, and 7.3, Some > applications of the pragmatic maxim. This is an exceedingly rich chapter in > which Kees brings together a number of salient points from the chapters > preceding it while explicitly anticipating the next, the penultimate > chapter, "Truth and reality." > > One of the things which I most admire about Kees' book is that, in this > regard analogous to good criticism (and whether or not one fully agrees > with any particular interpretation or not), his explication and analysis > lead one *into* the work, Speaking personally, such an approach makes me > want to reread and more deeply reflect on some of the seminal works Kees > considers, something which I've been doing. I have found that, looking at > the book as a whole, I tend to agree with his interpretations more often > than I disagree with them. Yet, and I think that this was brought home to > me by Joe Ransdell, discussion is most fruitful in those, shall we say, > *crevices > * or even *crevasses of analysis* where we find ourselves not in complete > agreement with or even quite opposed to another's thinking. So, the > following remarks are meant to be taken in that spirit. > > Kees begins with the familiar "legend" that modern pragmatism has its > origins in the discussions of The Metaphysical Club (TMC) in Cambridge > (which included Peirce, of course, but also William James, Chauncey Wright, > Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and others), most particularly in their > reflections on Bain's definition of *belief* as "that upon which a man is > prepared to act." Indeed, Peirce will remark that his pragmatism almost > necessarily follows from Bain's definition, and not only pragmatism, but > his theory of inquiry as well. > > As Kees notes, the notion that Peirce is the father of pragmatism very > likely comes from William James' pointing to the pragmatic maxim (PM) as it > was first articulated in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in James' widely > discussed 1898 Berkeley Union address. Kees claims that the singular > importance of the PM is that it "leaves no intellectual conception, > philosophical or scientific, untouched, and as a result it causes the > entire fabric of thought to shift in significant ways." Thus, it is in fact > as uniquely important as James considered it to be. > > My first question is, What can we think of this very broad claim as to the > foundational character of the PM for *all* of science, philosophy, and > thought generally? Does Kees perhaps go too far here? If so, in what > direction(s)? If not, what are the implications of the PM being > *this*foundational for present and future thought and inquiry? > > My own sense is that even in the sciences of discovery that it is > difficult to see how the PM is foundational in relation to the sciences > which precede logic (I might also disagree with Kees as to which branch of > logic as semeiotic the PM belongs, something I'll comment on when we get to > 7.3) and especially his claim that it is foundational to theoretical > mathematics (despite Kees' discussion of π in 7.3, which seems to me to > apply more to applied than to pure mathematics) and most especially to > phaneroscopy. For example, Kees quotes Peirce in 7.2 to the effect that > pragmatism "is a study *guided* by mathematics" (118, emphasis added). In > another place Peirce says that the express purpose of the PM is to clarify > words and concepts in *metaphysics*. Now once *that* is accomplished one > can readily see how it might effect sciences further down in his > classification of sciences, notably, the special sciences. But "*all > intellectual conception, philosophic or scientific*"? > > The chapter continues with a brief history of late 19th century pragmatism > and how, for better or for worse, James' version dominated the intellectual > scene. His metaphor of truth as the "cash value" of ideas appeared crass > and materialistic to many thinkers (then and now), perhaps contributing to > the fact that pragmatism in all its forms was poorly received by the > philosophical community even though, as Kees notes, both men argued that it > was indeed a very old and even noble idea, Peirce even finding it > adumbrated in Jesus' saying: "by their fruits you may know them." > > Kees concludes this prefatory segment of the chapter by commenting on > James' biographer, Ralph Barton Perry's notion, that modern pragmatism was > formed "as a result of James' misunderstanding of Peirce." Contra Perry, > Kees argues that when one looks at James' early work one finds his > pragmatism already formed well before Peirce had published his famous > essay. He judges James' version of pragmatism to be just "another strand" > of it, probably conceived during the years of TMC. That this version gained > great popularity, almost completely overshadowing Peirce's--and yet was so > far from Peirce's own understanding of the doctrine as to, shall we say, > intellectually *lead astray* --famously caused Peirce to rename his > doctrine 'pragmaticism', a word "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." > > It seems to me. whether or not James developed his pragmatic ideas early > on, that Perry makes a good point, namely, that James, lacking thorough > training in the modern logic of his era, found it most difficult to grasp > Peirce's pragmatistic conceptions (consider, for example, James' remarks > about the incomprehensibility of Peirce's 1903 lectures on pragmatism in > letters written at that time). And so, even if both men were influenced by > Bain's dictum during the days of TMC, James, in promulgating his own > (again, as Kees correctly notes, nominalistic) brand of pragmatism, while > yet conflating his idiosyncratic conception with Peirce's radically > different one, did Peircean pragmatism a disservice. It is my sense that > classical pragmatism *was* , as Perry argues, indeed formed under James', > not Peirce's, ideas. In never truly grasping Peirce's doctrine, while yet > ascribing the seminal pragmatic idea to him (and associating his own work > with *that* ), James strongly impeded--and, I believe, even to the > present day--the fullest comprehension and furthest development of Peircean > pragmatism. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
