Ben, List, I just read the message you linked to. I must say that I find Peirce's thinking and terminology (e.g., logon) in 1911 quite confusing and even off-putting. Perhaps he's experimenting at the time--in the midst of an experiment never quite completed; or one abandoned. But, for example, to broaden semeiotic to include esthetics and ethicc? Kind of weird.
Also as you wrote in that earlier message re: a peculiar use of 'representamen': BU: Or maybe some other trichotomy, maybe from some decad, is at work here. Anyway this usage of 'representamen' in MS 675 seems unrelated to his earlier usages. In combination with remarks in MS 675, MS 676 makes it appear that the distinction involves emotional / imperative / cognitional. If he was talking about qualisign, sinsign, legisign, I don't know why he didn't say so by his usual device of saying 'which I formerly called [etc.]'. Curiouser and curiouser. . . Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 4:38 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, list, > > Regarding the Kehler letter, it's true that it may be tailored to its > singular audience, but I also had in mind MS 675, also from 1911, where > Peirce defines logic not as the science of all"vehicles of psychic > influence" but "as the science of a certain kind of signs alone" (the > logons/representamens, which seem similar to legisigns). To do the former > instead of the latter would be, says Peirce, to "cut monstrous canticles > out of the realms of the other two critical branches of philosophy" - which > earlier in the manuscript he had discussed as "the Critical, or Normative > Sciences" ethetics and ethics.*** This suggests a classificatory > expansion of semiotic beyond logic to encompass the previous normative > disciplines as well, and one wonders whether he had in mind some sort of > 'esthetons' and 'ethons' as well as logons (as I mentioned on 2/24/2014 > http://web.archive.org/web/20140225042621/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11899). > Maybe one of the late manuscripts has more hints about this. > > *** From the first versions of pages 12-13 in G.E.P.'s PDF of MS 675: > "[...] then ethics is the only one of the Critical, or Normative Sciences > that can be said, with propriety to have yet been born into the world of > actualilties [....]." > > You wrote, > > [GR] >> Finally, in passing (but considering that the present chapter > discussion concerns pragmatism which Peirce places in methodeutic), I found > it interesting that the quotation you gave concluded: > > Methodeutic, which shows how to conduct an inquiry . . . is what the > greater part of my life has been devoted to. . . (CSP) > > [GR] > So, this is the branch of logic as semeiotic, not speculative > grammar, which Peirce suggests has been his central interest; and that > makes sense to me > > Yes, indeed. It's true. Furthermore, Peirce had long regarded the study of > inquiry method as logic's culmination and crowning glory. In 1882 he called > logic "the art of devising methods of research" and quoted Peter of Spain's > definition of logic which had held sway for a very long time: "_*Dialectica > est ars artium et scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam > habens.*_" Here's a fuller version of Peter's words: > > _*Dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum > principia viam habens; sola enim dialectica probabiliter disputat de > principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum, et ideo in acquisitione omnium > aliarum scientiarum dialectica debet esse prior.*_ > > which I translate as: > > Dialectic [that is, logic, in Peter's terminology] is the art of arts, > science of sciences, having the way to the principles of all methods; for > in fact dialectic alone credibly argues about the principles of all other > sciences, and therefore in [one's] acquisition [learning] of all other > sciences dialectic must be prior. > > Obviously Peirce didn't think that logic was all that for pure > mathematics, but he liked being able to connect his view of logic with such > long tradition. > > See "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic" delivered September 1882, > _Johns Hopkins University Circulars_, v. 2, n. 19, pp. 11-12, November > 1882. > http://books.google.com/books?id=E0YFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA11&dq=%22art+of+devising+methods+of+research%22 > Reprinted (EP 1:210-14; W 4:378-82; CP 7.59-76). > > Best, Ben > > On 4/24/2014 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Ben, List, > > Well, I hope we are now both mea culpa-ed out. > > Just a couple of points as your message was overall quite clear. You wrote: > > BU: I find it quite difficult to think of phanerscopic issues without > applying ideas as principles such as universality from logical > quantification, difficult because the logical structure of such ideas seems > pertinent to me. It's one thing to think that all phenomena are > such-and-such, it's another to address generality, 'all-ness' etc., as a > phenomenon. > > I suppose this sort of thing--not a do-over--is what I was earlier > suggesting, and I recall Kees suggesting something similar for mathematics, > namely, that concepts, ideas, principles will be discussed by > mathematicians; the same is the case for phenomenologists, as well as for > theoretical estheticians and theoretical ethicists (if there are such > folk). It's not so much that these pre-logical sciences are built upon such > principles as you mentioned (although I think that's a bit of a thorny > issue, for example when considering the history of the growth of these > sciences), but that it's quite the ordinary thing for men and women to > discuss aspects of the sciences with which they are involved, especially if > they are purposefully intending to contribute to the growth of them. > > On the matter of the presuppositions of reasoning and my question as to > what you meant by this "clarified at or near his logic's start" you wrote: > > BU: In the Carnegie application (1902), he discusses [the presuppositions > of reasoning] at or near the start of his memoirs on logic. THEN he gets > into stechiology (a.k.a. speculative grammar, signs, objects, > interpretants, and their classifications). So it's quite as if logic begins > on a general level, covering presuppositions, belief, doubt, etc., then > gets into the three subdivisions of logic. Then in 1911 instead of > stechiology or speculative grammar, he puts a division called 'analytic' > first in logic, and it covers topics such as belief and doubt. Does this > include classification of signs? Who knows. > > I would doubt that Peirce would drop the classification of signs from > logic's first branch whether he calls it stechiology or analytic or > speculative grammar. Yet this is at best only hinted at in the 1911 > quotation you offered to the effect that the purpose of this first branch > is to examine "the nature of thought, not psychologically," but logically. > Still, that his examples of the definitions upon which critic is to be > based, viz., doubt, belief, learning, etc. doesn't include or make > reference to the classification of signs does seem peculiar. > > So, since he'd done so very much work on the classification of signs, and > even late in life, it's difficult for me to imagine that that which figured > so prominently in earlier descriptions of the first branch of logic > wouldn't still factor, and in a significant way. Well, the quotation is > from a letter, not a formal essay or paper, and what one chooses to include > in a letter can be pretty arbitrary in the interest of making a few > particular points to the *audience of one* that you're addressing. > > Finally, in passing (but considering that the present chapter discussion > concerns pragmatism which Peirce places in methodeutic), I found it > interesting that the quotation you gave concluded: > > Methodeutic, which shows how to conduct an inquiry . . . is what the > greater part of my life has been devoted to. . . (CSP) > > So, this is the branch of logic as semeiotic, not speculative grammar, > which Peirce suggests has been his central interest; and that makes sense > to me. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 9:57 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Gary R., list, > > This seems to be error-confession month. I've a few new ones of my own now > to mention. > > As regards _*logica utens*_ and _*logica docens*_, I confused things a > bit, for example by asking whether mathematical reasoning IS one or IS the > other, rather than asking, on which of them does mathematical reasoning > rely. > > I also mischaracterized the dependence on _*logica utens*_ in special > sciences by attributing it to unfamiliarity with Peirce. There's quite a > bit of methodological theory that addresses scientific method, and > idioscopic scientists are not entirely unfamiliar with it. Some of it is in > statistics (design of experiments, etc.) Really, we all swim in a sea of > _*logica > utens*_ and occasionally apply (or, more rarely, originate) some _ > *logica-docens*_ crystallization and enrichment of some of it. I suspect > that Peirce's methodeutic will gain increased attention, partly because of > the Internet. > > As regards Kees's view of Peirce's view of pragamatism's classificational > place (in methodeutic a.k.a. speculative rhetoric), you and he have well > covered it now in other posts. > > You wrote, > > [GR] > It is my sense that this "methodeutically based enrichment of the > presuppostional conception" suggests the way in which once logica docens, > and especially methodeutic, is on a solid footing, that there is good > reason to go back to what was early presupposed, to go back also to the > sciences preceding logic as semeiotic, etc. and now consider them from the > standpoint of the findings and the methods of a developed and purified > formal logic in Peirce's broad sense. Should the pre-logical sciences never > benefit from the advances of formal logic? Of course they should! > > In the sense in which you probably mean that, yes. I don't think that they > get a 'do-over' in the Peircean system. They get applied in examples in > ways that help flesh them out. Phaneroscopy can't take principles from > probability theory or mathematical logic, but only from pure maths, e.g., > measure theory and order theory. I find it quite difficult to think of > phanerscopic issues without applying ideas as principles such as > universality from logical quantification, difficult because the logical > structure of such ideas seems pertinent to me. It's one thing to think that > all phenomena are such-and-such, it's another to address generality, > 'all-ness' etc., as a phenomenon. > > [GR] > [...] I'm not certain what you mean by "clarified at or near his > logic's start" in what immediately follows in your post. Do you mean in > logical grammar? [....] > > [BU] >> [....] But the presupposition of truth as the predestinate end of > sufficient inquiry, as clarified at or near his logic's start [....] > > He discusses the presuppositions of reasoning in various places. In the > Carnegie application (1902), he discusses it at or near the start of his > memoirs on logic. THEN he gets into stechiology (a.k.a. speculative > grammar, signs, objects, interpretants, and their classifications). So it's > quite as if logic begins on a general level, covering presuppositions, > belief, doubt, etc., then gets into the three subdivisions of logic. Then > in 1911 instead of stechiology or speculative grammar, he puts a division > called 'analytic' first in logic, and it covers topics such as belief and > doubt. Does this include classification of signs? Who knows. The passage is > in a 1911 letter (draft or not, I don't know) to J. H. Kehler, printed in _The > New Elements of Mathematics_ v.3, p. 207. Peirce wrote the following > which I found at the _Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms_ under > "Analytic" http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/analytic.html : > > [CSP] I have now sketched my doctrine of Logical Critic, skipping a good > deal. I recognize two other parts of Logic. One which may be called > Analytic examines the nature of thought, not psychologically but simply to > define what it is to doubt, to believe, to learn, etc., and then to base > critic on these definitions is my real method, though in this letter I have > taken the third branch of logic, Methodeutic, which shows how to conduct an > inquiry. This is what the greater part of my life has been devoted to, > though I base it upon Critic. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/23/2014 5:47 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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