Ben, list, I am tending to agree with much that you wrote, Ben, but would like you to clarify a point or two if possible.
You wrote: In practice, this _*logica utens*_ aspect occurs not only prior to formal logic but afterward, in the special sciences too, since such scientists tend not to be too familiar with Peirce's formal methodeutic theory No doubt it is the case that many working in the special sciences aren't familiar with Peirce's methodeutic and use a logica utens in their work. But I think the point for Peirce would be that they *ought* to familiarize themselves better with logic, with logica docens, and apply it so that errors might be avoided,, just as he intended logic as semeiotic to clarify concepts in the interest of avoiding serious errors in metaphysics. You continued, regarding Peirce's methodeutic that this "is where pragmatism and it[s] maxim belong (I think). In the Carnegie application, Peirce places pragmatism even further along in methodeutic than I would have thought." I'll have to take a look at the Carnegie application again soon. As mentioned earlier, Kees' would seem to place the PM in theoretical grammar, and offers an interesting semiosic analogy to make his point. While I'm still reflecting on all of this, at the moment you and I seem to agree that the PM is best placed late in methodeutic. Still, Kees' argument for placing in in grammar is thought-provoking and needs serious consideration, in my opinion. You continued with a discussion of the presuppositional conception of truth. Peirce holds in various writings that reasoning presupposes certain things about truth and the real. But the reasoner at that stage hardly needs to know the THEORY of pragmatism, three grades of clearness, etc. However, the pragmatic clarification of truth does seem to involve some methodeutically based enrichment of the presuppositional conception, so one can speak of a 'pragmatic conception of truth'. It is my sense that this "methodeutically based enrichment of the presuppostional conception" suggests the way in which once logica docens, and especially methodeutic, is on a solid footing, that there is good reason to go back to what was early presupposed, to go back also to the sciences preceding logic as semeiotic, etc. and now consider them from the standpoint of the findings and the methods of a developed and purified formal logic in Peirce's broad sense. Should the pre-logical sciences never benefit from the advances of formal logic? Of course they should! You continued: And even with reality defined presuppositionally, well before methodeutic, it is not in methodeutic or logic at all, but afterward in metaphysics, that Peirce treats of just what reality so defined amounts to; his theory of truth and reality leads to modal realism and the nontrivial consequence of the reality of indeterminacy in the universe. Indeed, Peirce's theory of truth and reality eventually lead him to an *extreme* modal realism and tychism. But as you go on to say, his metaphysics of reality can be see as pragmatistic, and I would think exactly because presuppositional notions of truth and reality *will be*clarified by employing the PM. I think we're in agreement here, but I'm not certain what you mean by "clarified at or near his logic's start" in what immediately follows in your post. Do you mean in logical grammar? It would be helpful if you would clarify or expand upon the following: Pragmatism has metaphysical consequences, in Peirce's system, and one can call his metaphysics of reality 'pragmatistic'. But the presupposition of truth as the predestinate end of sufficient inquiry, as clarified at or near his logic's start, is something of which pragmatism - a theory of the clarification of ideas - is itself a theoretical application. At the moment I'm not at all clear as to what you're saying in the passage above. You continued: As regards _*logica utens*_ in phaneroscopy, in Peirce's classification there's nothing to stop _*logica utens*_, including an informal version of pragmatism, an eye to conceivable practical implications, from being involved. Of course I agree. This was a point I occasionally tried to make with Joe Ransdell, but I don't think with much success. It seemed to me then and seems to me now that formal semeiotic is not at first necessary--nor at first even possible, not at least in the fullest, most developed sense--for the sciences preceding it. I would only add now, as I mentioned above, that there is no reason why, once logic as semeiotic, and most especially, methodeutic, is developed, it would not be possible to apply its findings and methods to those earlier sciences. I take it that we're in agreement on this. You concluded: But if mathematical reasoning is _*deductiva logica utens*_, then _*logica utens*_ is not always vague and informal in every sense. If on the other hand mathematical reasoning is not _*logica utens*_, but still not _*logica docens*_ (which Peirce places as later, in philosophy), then what is it? Good question. Is there in the logic of mathematics--that is, in that quite small and 'simple' part of theoretical mathematics--anything suggesting that deduction is so rationally fundamental (or simple) as to require no formal logical support? Of course there is also that part of mathematics which requires a kind of abductiva logica utens as well, and this last involves an insight of Peirce's which broadened and deepened his father's definition of mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions." And further,as Kees might add, working mathematicians *will*talk about, for the purposes of clarifying, conceptions involved in/associate with their work. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 3:14 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, list, > > You wrote, > > So, in a nutshell, my concern, expressed as a question, is: Shouldn't we > avoid conflating the informal (logica utens) use of > pragmatic/critical-commonsensical ideas with the PM itself? > > Yes, I agree. The pragmatic maxim reflects aspects of informal reasoning > (_*logica > utens*_) in which the pragmatic maxim is not formally enounced, cited, > etc. In practice, this _*logica utens*_ aspect occurs not only prior to > formal logic but afterward, in the special sciences too, since such > scientists tend not to be too familiar with Peirce's formal methodeutic > theory, which is where pragmatism and it maxim belong (I think). In the > Carnegie application, Peirce places pragmatism even further along in > methodeutic than I would have thought. In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," > Peirce pragmatically clarifies of the conception of truth BY WAY OF EXAMPLE > of how to apply the pragmatic maxim. Peirce holds in various writings that > reasoning presupposes certain things about truth and the real. But the > reasoner at that stage hardly needs to know the THEORY of pragmatism, three > grades of clearness, etc. However, the pragmatic clarification of truth > does seem to involve some methodeutically based enrichment of the > presuppositional conception, so one can speak of a 'pragmatic conception of > truth'. And even with reality defined presuppositionally, well before > methodeutic, it is not in methodeutic or logic at all, but afterward in > metaphysics, that Peirce treats of just what reality so defined amounts to; > his theory of truth and reality leads to modal realism and the nontrivial > consequence of the reality of indeterminacy in the universe. Pragmatism has > metaphysical consequences, in Peirce's system, and one can call his > metaphysics of reality 'pragmatistic'. But the presupposition of truth as > the predestinate end of sufficient inquiry, as clarified at or near his > logic's start, is something of which pragmatism - a theory of the > clarification of ideas - is itself a theoretical application. > > As regards _*logica utens*_ in phaneroscopy, in Peirce's classification > there's nothing to stop _*logica utens*_, including an informal version > of pragmatism, an eye to conceivable practical implications, from being > involved. But if mathematical reasoning is _*deductiva logica utens*_, > then _*logica utens*_ is not always vague and informal in every sense. If > on the other hand mathematical reasoning is not _*logica utens*_, but > still not _*logica docens*_ (which Peirce places as later, in > philosophy), then what is it? > > Best, Ben > > On 4/23/2014 1:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Ben, list, > > I agree with you, Ben, that 'foundational' is the wrong word here, and > that Kees' claim is along the lines of what you wrote, namely, that "the > pragmatic maxim applies to all conceptions, so it's extremely sweeping." > But is it exactly the pragmatic maxim we're talking about when we're > considering pragmatic (or critical-commonsensical) ideas employed using a > logica utens? > > Your analysis of its use by mathematicians is quite intriguing, especially > when considering it in the sense of pragmatism being the logic of > abduction. But I wonder why you say that the PM is a part of the logica > utens. Are you speaking generally here, or only for mathematics? I'm > assuming the later, in which case I agree, for pragmatic thinking, as both > James and Peirce conceived of it, is an ancient notion which only later is > brought into formal logic by Peirce. > > Kees seems to place the formal statement of the PM in logical grammar, > whereas I (and I think Phyllis) find it is better placed in methodeutic, > the branch of logic immediately preceding metaphysics (I'll take this up > later when we get to the second half of the chapter). Certainly, > "critical-commonsense", what is to be developed as the PM and pragmatism, > employs a logica utens. Thus you wrote that it is not a formal principle in > mathematics, and I agree. But what is 'it' here? Not the PM as such, I > don't think, but something logically vaguer, more utens than docens. > > On the other hand, the PM *is * a formal principle in logic, is it not? > And whatever the case may be for the informal use of pragmatic (or > critical-commonsensical) notions by mathematicians, we're still left with > the question of if/how they are employed in phaneroscopy, and whether in > all cases preceding formal logic we're talking about the PM itself or some > informal version. > > So, in a nutshell, my concern, expressed as a question, is: Shouldn't we > avoid conflating the informal (logica utens) use of > pragmatic/critical-commonsensical ideas with the PM itself? > > Best, > > Gary > >
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