I wonder, if we are talking proof, whether we should not apply it to pragmaticism rather than pragmatism. CSP would not have coined the term had he not wished to underline a distinction. And I suspect it deserves to be used posthumously as the name he gave to his evolved philosophy.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 7:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: > Mara & listers, > > Mara noted in an earlier post that she did not see a proof of pragmatism > in Chapter 7. I hope she and others will pipe in on this. I especially > wonder whether others consider the proving abduction necessary to proving > pragmatism (or that proving one proves the other). > > Kees writes > > "...Peirce sees semeiotics as covering either the whole of logic or > speculative grammar only. For the purpose of grounding pragmatism, the > latter more modest view is all we need." > > From a practical, experienced-based perspective, I cannot but agree--as > long as we are speaking only of the "purpose of grounding pragmatism." > Semiotic in this more modest sense is the third of the analysis/definition > tools I learned/taught nearly 40 years ago and the third reason Peirce's > writings (except in mathematics, my avowed weakness) seem so clear to me. > However, from the perspective of pragmatism, its meaning and its proof, the > wider view (all of ligic as semiotic) may be necessary. > > Peirce (CP 5.464) wrote: > > Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of > metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a > method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. > All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that > statement. As to the ulterior and indirect effects of practising the > pragmatistic method, that is quite another affair [italics mine]. > > Thus, if pragmatism is, as Peirce states, "...merely a method of > ascertaining the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts...," then > pragmatism must be a philosophy of definition and, as Kees indicates, > grounded in semiotic. In A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, > Peirce distinguishes between an Argument and an Argumentation: > > An "Argument" is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a > definite belief. An "Argumentation" is an Argument proceeding upon > definitely formulated premises. > > It seems to me that this distinction is crucial for understanding the role > of semiotic for proving pragmatism. In addition, it seems to suggest that > "the more modest view" of semiotic is not all that is required for > grounding (in the case of proving) pragmatism. > > However, in Neglected Argument, Peirce does establish that the case that > Abduction requires Argument rather than an Argumentation. Since Argument, > which is a definitional process, tending to produce belief, but not proof > and, since Peirce's Argument for the Reality of God is an Argument for his > method of hypothesis generation (abduction/retroduction), then an Argument, > which relies upon definitional clarity (by means of semiosis) is not enough > to prove either abduction or pragmatism. ("Retroduction does not afford > security. The hypothesis must be tested."(NA .470). > > Testing (by means of gradual induction--both qualitative & > quantitative)--requires explication & demonstration (deduction) of the > premises derived from the abductively derived hypothesis. In draft D - MS > L75.329-330, Peirce writes: > > "I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here > permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic > ["whatever doctrine is requisite as a preparation for critical logic"--e.g. > speculative grammar] or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but > heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic [the art of > discovery and invention] it indirectly has to consider other matters; and > it extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic." > > Thus, I propose that the proof of pragmatism (and of > abduction/retroduction) will derive from Methodeutic, the branch of > normative logic that includes both Argument and Argumentation. Methodeutic > addresses both the definitive formulation of a hypothesis and the premises > that follow, as well as Argumentations that proceed upon those definitely > formulated premises. And it allows for the inclusion of other matters, not > having to do with discovery and invention. > > It seems to me that Methodeutic (which is also semiotic, as is all of > logic) is ripe for exploration as a conduit for proving pragmatism, and by > doing so, abduction/retroduction. > > Regards, > Phyllis Chiasson > > [The next (final?) post for this chapter will be 7.2.3 The Pragmatic Maxim] > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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