Jeremiah, I would think that any proof of any hypothesis would require premissy-conclusiony type stuff, with testing in between those two and abduction/retroduction for formulating the hypothesis from which premises and explications of these flow. Otherwise all we'd have is deduction. I will read your paper on Arisbe as soon as I am able.
Regards, Phyllis Jeremiah McCarthy <[email protected]> wrote: >Peirce-Listers: > >Peirce claimed that there was a proof of pragmatism in the 1903 “Lectures on >Pragmatism.” For a detailed account of that proof, I would refer >Peirce-Listers to Jeremiah McCarthy’s 1990 paper, “An Account of Peirce’s >Proof of Pragmatism,” which is available at the Arisbe web site. The paper >extracts an actual proof – you know, all that premissy-conclusiony type stuff >– which discussions of Peirce’s proof seem to be allergic to. For some reason >this paper has been resolutely ignored in discussions of the proof of >pragmatism. I just about fainted in my chair when I read a reference to it by >Ben Udell. It’s the only one I’ve seen aside from references in Turrisi’s >book, where she gives it the brush-off. She seems to think that pragmatism is >proved to be a correct method for conceptual clarification when it can be >shown to be part of methodeutic. Well, the a priori method is part of >methodeutic too, so I refute her thus. > >So, if anybody is really serious about understanding what Peirce had in mind >as the proof of pragmatism in 1903, he should start with my paper that has >been hanging around for years almost absolutely ignored. If you’re not >serious about the proof of pragmatism, just keep on talking and getting >nowhere. As for the existential graphs in connections with pragmatism and >continuity, there is a work on that, “Peirce's Logic of Continuity: A >Conceptual and Mathematical Approach” by Fernando Zalamea. This is a topic I >didn’t touch on, since I had no idea what Peirce thought he was doing with >revisions of his proof after 1903 and was uncertain about how to handle the >material in the supplementary seventh lecture. > >So color me very damned frustrated. Now I’ll shut up. > >J. McCarthy > >It is not the sleep of reason that produces monsters, but the fury thereof. > > >Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 12:17:54 -0400 >From: [email protected] >To: [email protected] >CC: [email protected] >Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.2 Proof of Pragmatism & Semiotic (modest >view + overarching view incl methodeutic) > >I wonder, if we are talking proof, whether we should not apply it to >pragmaticism rather than pragmatism. CSP would not have coined the term had he >not wished to underline a distinction. And I suspect it deserves to be used >posthumously as the name he gave to his evolved philosophy. >@stephencrose > > > >On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 7:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: > >Mara & listers, > > > >Mara noted in an earlier post that she did not see a proof of pragmatism in >Chapter 7. I hope she and others will pipe in on this. I especially wonder >whether others consider the proving abduction necessary to proving pragmatism >(or that proving one proves the other). > > > > >Kees writes > > > >“…Peirce sees semeiotics as covering either the whole of logic or speculative >grammar only. For the purpose of grounding pragmatism, the latter more modest >view is all we need.” > > > >From a practical, experienced-based perspective, I cannot but agree--as long >as we are speaking only of the “purpose of grounding pragmatism.” Semiotic in >this more modest sense is the third of the analysis/definition tools I >learned/taught nearly 40 years ago and the third reason Peirce’s writings >(except in mathematics, my avowed weakness) seem so clear to me. However, from >the perspective of pragmatism, its meaning and its proof, the wider view (all >of ligic as semiotic) may be necessary. > > > > >Peirce (CP 5.464) wrote: > > > >Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of >metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a >method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. >All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement. >As to the ulterior and indirect effects of practising the pragmatistic method, >that is quite another affair [italics mine]. > > > > >Thus, if pragmatism is, as Peirce states, “…merely a method of ascertaining >the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts…,” then pragmatism must be a >philosophy of definition and, as Kees indicates, grounded in semiotic. In A >Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, Peirce distinguishes between an >Argument and an Argumentation: > > > > >An “Argument” is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a >definite belief. An “Argumentation” is an Argument proceeding upon definitely >formulated premises. > > > >It seems to me that this distinction is crucial for understanding the role of >semiotic for proving pragmatism. In addition, it seems to suggest that “the >more modest view” of semiotic is not all that is required for grounding (in >the case of proving) pragmatism. > > > > >However, in Neglected Argument, Peirce does establish that the case that >Abduction requires Argument rather than an Argumentation. Since Argument, >which is a definitional process, tending to produce belief, but not proof and, >since Peirce’s Argument for the Reality of God is an Argument for his method >of hypothesis generation (abduction/retroduction), then an Argument, which >relies upon definitional clarity (by means of semiosis) is not enough to prove >either abduction or pragmatism. (“Retroduction does not afford security. The >hypothesis must be tested.”(NA .470). > > > > >Testing (by means of gradual induction--both qualitative & >quantitative)--requires explication & demonstration (deduction) of the >premises derived from the abductively derived hypothesis. In draft D - MS >L75.329-330, Peirce writes: > > > > >"I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here >permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic >[“whatever doctrine is requisite as a preparation for critical logic”--e.g. >speculative grammar] or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but >heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic [the art of >discovery and invention] it indirectly has to consider other matters; and it >extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic." > > > > >Thus, I propose that the proof of pragmatism (and of abduction/retroduction) >will derive from Methodeutic, the branch of normative logic that includes both >Argument and Argumentation. Methodeutic addresses both the definitive >formulation of a hypothesis and the premises that follow, as well as >Argumentations that proceed upon those definitely formulated premises. And it >allows for the inclusion of other matters, not having to do with discovery and >invention. > > > > >It seems to me that Methodeutic (which is also semiotic, as is all of logic) >is ripe for exploration as a conduit for proving pragmatism, and by doing so, >abduction/retroduction. > > > >Regards, > >Phyllis Chiasson > > > >[The next (final?) post for this chapter will be 7.2.3 The Pragmatic Maxim] > > > > > > > > >----------------------------- > >PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >. To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > >
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