Peirce-Listers: Peirce claimed that there was a proof of pragmatism in the 1903 “Lectures on Pragmatism.” For a detailed account of that proof, I would refer Peirce-Listers to Jeremiah McCarthy’s 1990 paper, “An Account of Peirce’s Proof of Pragmatism,” which is available at the Arisbe web site. The paper extracts an actual proof – you know, all that premissy-conclusiony type stuff – which discussions of Peirce’s proof seem to be allergic to. For some reason this paper has been resolutely ignored in discussions of the proof of pragmatism. I just about fainted in my chair when I read a reference to it by Ben Udell. It’s the only one I’ve seen aside from references in Turrisi’s book, where she gives it the brush-off. She seems to think that pragmatism is proved to be a correct method for conceptual clarification when it can be shown to be part of methodeutic. Well, the a priori method is part of methodeutic too, so I refute her thus.
So, if anybody is really serious about understanding what Peirce had in mind as the proof of pragmatism in 1903, he should start with my paper that has been hanging around for years almost absolutely ignored. If you’re not serious about the proof of pragmatism, just keep on talking and getting nowhere. As for the existential graphs in connections with pragmatism and continuity, there is a work on that, “Peirce's Logic of Continuity: A Conceptual and Mathematical Approach” by Fernando Zalamea. This is a topic I didn’t touch on, since I had no idea what Peirce thought he was doing with revisions of his proof after 1903 and was uncertain about how to handle the material in the supplementary seventh lecture. So color me very damned frustrated. Now I’ll shut up. J. McCarthy It is not the sleep of reason that produces monsters, but the fury thereof. Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 12:17:54 -0400 From: [email protected] To: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.2 Proof of Pragmatism & Semiotic (modest view + overarching view incl methodeutic) I wonder, if we are talking proof, whether we should not apply it to pragmaticism rather than pragmatism. CSP would not have coined the term had he not wished to underline a distinction. And I suspect it deserves to be used posthumously as the name he gave to his evolved philosophy. @stephencrose On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 7:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: Mara & listers, Mara noted in an earlier post that she did not see a proof of pragmatism in Chapter 7. I hope she and others will pipe in on this. I especially wonder whether others consider the proving abduction necessary to proving pragmatism (or that proving one proves the other). Kees writes “…Peirce sees semeiotics as covering either the whole of logic or speculative grammar only. For the purpose of grounding pragmatism, the latter more modest view is all we need.” >From a practical, experienced-based perspective, I cannot but agree--as long >as we are speaking only of the “purpose of grounding pragmatism.” Semiotic in >this more modest sense is the third of the analysis/definition tools I >learned/taught nearly 40 years ago and the third reason Peirce’s writings >(except in mathematics, my avowed weakness) seem so clear to me. However, from >the perspective of pragmatism, its meaning and its proof, the wider view (all >of ligic as semiotic) may be necessary. Peirce (CP 5.464) wrote: Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement. As to the ulterior and indirect effects of practising the pragmatistic method, that is quite another affair [italics mine]. Thus, if pragmatism is, as Peirce states, “…merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts…,” then pragmatism must be a philosophy of definition and, as Kees indicates, grounded in semiotic. In A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, Peirce distinguishes between an Argument and an Argumentation: An “Argument” is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief. An “Argumentation” is an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premises. It seems to me that this distinction is crucial for understanding the role of semiotic for proving pragmatism. In addition, it seems to suggest that “the more modest view” of semiotic is not all that is required for grounding (in the case of proving) pragmatism. However, in Neglected Argument, Peirce does establish that the case that Abduction requires Argument rather than an Argumentation. Since Argument, which is a definitional process, tending to produce belief, but not proof and, since Peirce’s Argument for the Reality of God is an Argument for his method of hypothesis generation (abduction/retroduction), then an Argument, which relies upon definitional clarity (by means of semiosis) is not enough to prove either abduction or pragmatism. (“Retroduction does not afford security. The hypothesis must be tested.”(NA .470). Testing (by means of gradual induction--both qualitative & quantitative)--requires explication & demonstration (deduction) of the premises derived from the abductively derived hypothesis. In draft D - MS L75.329-330, Peirce writes: "I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic [“whatever doctrine is requisite as a preparation for critical logic”--e.g. speculative grammar] or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic [the art of discovery and invention] it indirectly has to consider other matters; and it extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic." Thus, I propose that the proof of pragmatism (and of abduction/retroduction) will derive from Methodeutic, the branch of normative logic that includes both Argument and Argumentation. Methodeutic addresses both the definitive formulation of a hypothesis and the premises that follow, as well as Argumentations that proceed upon those definitely formulated premises. And it allows for the inclusion of other matters, not having to do with discovery and invention. It seems to me that Methodeutic (which is also semiotic, as is all of logic) is ripe for exploration as a conduit for proving pragmatism, and by doing so, abduction/retroduction. Regards, Phyllis Chiasson [The next (final?) post for this chapter will be 7.2.3 The Pragmatic Maxim] ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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