Thanks Phyllis - I think part of CSPs desire was to establish the scholastic elements of his thinking. But he may also have had a genuine desire to have his philosophy distinguished from pragmatism. If that is the case there might be some consideration of whether we should assume and honor that wish. I think it would help establish Peirce as a force to be reckoned with among those who have little awareness beyond his linkage to pragmatism.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 6:48 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: > Good point, Stephen. > > Listers, Does anyone know whether Peirce referred to the name of this > proof differently after he coined the word pragmaticism in his 1905 essay, > What Pragmatism Is? Was he consistent in using pragmaticism rather than > pragmatism after that time? > > Phyllis > > > "Stephen C. Rose" <[email protected]> wrote: > > I wonder, if we are talking proof, whether we should not apply it to > pragmaticism rather than pragmatism. CSP would not have coined the term had > he not wished to underline a distinction. And I suspect it deserves to be > used posthumously as the name he gave to his evolved philosophy. > > *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > > On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 7:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Mara & listers, >> >> Mara noted in an earlier post that she did not see a proof of pragmatism >> in Chapter 7. I hope she and others will pipe in on this. I especially >> wonder whether others consider the proving abduction necessary to proving >> pragmatism (or that proving one proves the other). >> >> Kees writes >> >> "...Peirce sees semeiotics as covering either the whole of logic or >> speculative grammar only. For the purpose of grounding pragmatism, the >> latter more modest view is all we need." >> >> From a practical, experienced-based perspective, I cannot but agree--as >> long as we are speaking only of the "purpose of grounding pragmatism." >> Semiotic in this more modest sense is the third of the analysis/definition >> tools I learned/taught nearly 40 years ago and the third reason Peirce's >> writings (except in mathematics, my avowed weakness) seem so clear to me. >> However, from the perspective of pragmatism, its meaning and its proof, the >> wider view (all of ligic as semiotic) may be necessary. >> >> Peirce (CP 5.464) wrote: >> >> Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of >> metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a >> method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. >> All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that >> statement. As to the ulterior and indirect effects of practising the >> pragmatistic method, that is quite another affair [italics mine]. >> >> Thus, if pragmatism is, as Peirce states, "...merely a method of >> ascertaining the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts...," then >> pragmatism must be a philosophy of definition and, as Kees indicates, >> grounded in semiotic. In A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, >> Peirce distinguishes between an Argument and an Argumentation: >> >> An "Argument" is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a >> definite belief. An "Argumentation" is an Argument proceeding upon >> definitely formulated premises. >> >> It seems to me that this distinction is crucial for understanding the >> role of semiotic for proving pragmatism. In addition, it seems to suggest >> that "the more modest view" of semiotic is not all that is required for >> grounding (in the case of proving) pragmatism. >> >> However, in Neglected Argument, Peirce does establish that the case that >> Abduction requires Argument rather than an Argumentation. Since Argument, >> which is a definitional process, tending to produce belief, but not proof >> and, since Peirce's Argument for the Reality of God is an Argument for his >> method of hypothesis generation (abduction/retroduction), then an Argument, >> which relies upon definitional clarity (by means of semiosis) is not enough >> to prove either abduction or pragmatism. ("Retroduction does not afford >> security. The hypothesis must be tested."(NA .470). >> >> Testing (by means of gradual induction--both qualitative & >> quantitative)--requires explication & demonstration (deduction) of the >> premises derived from the abductively derived hypothesis. In draft D - MS >> L75.329-330, Peirce writes: >> >> "I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here >> permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic >> ["whatever doctrine is requisite as a preparation for critical logic"--e.g. >> speculative grammar] or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but >> heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic [the art of >> discovery and invention] it indirectly has to consider other matters; and >> it extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic." >> >> Thus, I propose that the proof of pragmatism (and of >> abduction/retroduction) will derive from Methodeutic, the branch of >> normative logic that includes both Argument and Argumentation. Methodeutic >> addresses both the definitive formulation of a hypothesis and the premises >> that follow, as well as Argumentations that proceed upon those definitely >> formulated premises. And it allows for the inclusion of other matters, not >> having to do with discovery and invention. >> >> It seems to me that Methodeutic (which is also semiotic, as is all of >> logic) is ripe for exploration as a conduit for proving pragmatism, and by >> doing so, abduction/retroduction. >> >> Regards, >> Phyllis Chiasson >> >> [The next (final?) post for this chapter will be 7.2.3 The Pragmatic >> Maxim] >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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