You are correct, of course, Gary F. As i mentioned in my first post, I work backwards from experience. So for me definition and the development of clarity, which Peirce describes in NA, moves from the subjective to the definitional/explanatory. Not like a real philosopher would do it, I'm sure. And i don't mean definition in the sense of a dictionary, but something in a form that can be tested & refined. I'm sure there must be a better term, though; one that applies between the getting of a hunch and a hypothesis with clear, testable premises. Whatever that word is, for me, it has been in operation 35 years and counting.
Regards, Phyllis Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: >Phyllis, List, > >There's a couple of points here that I don't follow, Phyllis: > >PC: [[ Thus, if pragmatism is, as Peirce states, “…merely a method of >ascertaining the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts…,” then >pragmatism must be a philosophy of definition ]] > >gf: It seems to me there's a big difference between "ascertaining the meaning" >of a word and "defining" it, and an even bigger difference for concepts. >Likewise, I wouldn't say that "Argument ... is a definitional process", even >Argument as opposed to Argumentation. In order to produce belief, an argument, >even though it "relies upon definitional clarity", surely must involve some >appeal to experience as well, no? > >gary f. > >-----Original Message----- >From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:[email protected]] >Sent: 2-May-14 7:48 AM >To: peirce-l@list iupui. edu >Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.2 Proof of Pragmatism & Semiotic (modest view >+ overarching view incl methodeutic) > >Mara & listers, > >Mara noted in an earlier post that she did not see a proof of pragmatism in >Chapter 7. I hope she and others will pipe in on this. I especially wonder >whether others consider the proving abduction necessary to proving pragmatism >(or that proving one proves the other). > >Kees writes > >“…Peirce sees semeiotics as covering either the whole of logic or speculative >grammar only. For the purpose of grounding pragmatism, the latter more modest >view is all we need.” > >From a practical, experienced-based perspective, I cannot but agree--as long >as we are speaking only of the “purpose of grounding pragmatism.” Semiotic in >this more modest sense is the third of the analysis/definition tools I >learned/taught nearly 40 years ago and the third reason Peirce’s writings >(except in mathematics, my avowed weakness) seem so clear to me. However, from >the perspective of pragmatism, its meaning and its proof, the wider view (all >of ligic as semiotic) may be necessary. > >Peirce (CP 5.464) wrote: > >Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of >metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a >method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. >All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement. >As to the ulterior and indirect effects of practising the pragmatistic method, >that is quite another affair [italics mine]. > >Thus, if pragmatism is, as Peirce states, “…merely a method of ascertaining >the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts…,” then pragmatism must be a >philosophy of definition and, as Kees indicates, grounded in semiotic. In A >Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, Peirce distinguishes between an >Argument and an Argumentation: > >An “Argument” is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a >definite belief. An “Argumentation” is an Argument proceeding upon definitely >formulated premises. > >It seems to me that this distinction is crucial for understanding the role of >semiotic for proving pragmatism. In addition, it seems to suggest that “the >more modest view” of semiotic is not all that is required for grounding (in >the case of proving) pragmatism. > >However, in Neglected Argument, Peirce does establish that the case that >Abduction requires Argument rather than an Argumentation. Since Argument, >which is a definitional process, tending to produce belief, but not proof and, >since Peirce’s Argument for the Reality of God is an Argument for his method >of hypothesis generation (abduction/retroduction), then an Argument, which >relies upon definitional clarity (by means of semiosis) is not enough to prove >either abduction or pragmatism. (“Retroduction does not afford security. The >hypothesis must be tested.”(NA .470). > >Testing (by means of gradual induction--both qualitative & >quantitative)--requires explication & demonstration (deduction) of the >premises derived from the abductively derived hypothesis. In draft D - MS >L75.329-330, Peirce writes: > >"I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here >permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic >[“whatever doctrine is requisite as a preparation for critical logic”--e.g. >speculative grammar] or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but >heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic [the art of >discovery and invention] it indirectly has to consider other matters; and it >extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic." > >Thus, I propose that the proof of pragmatism (and of abduction/retroduction) >will derive from Methodeutic, the branch of normative logic that includes both >Argument and Argumentation. Methodeutic addresses both the definitive >formulation of a hypothesis and the premises that follow, as well as >Argumentations that proceed upon those definitely formulated premises. And it >allows for the inclusion of other matters, not having to do with discovery and >invention. > >It seems to me that Methodeutic (which is also semiotic, as is all of logic) >is ripe for exploration as a conduit for proving pragmatism, and by doing so, >abduction/retroduction. > >Regards, >Phyllis Chiasson > >[The next (final?) post for this chapter will be 7.2.3 The Pragmatic Maxim] > > >
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