Good point, Stephen. Listers, Does anyone know whether Peirce referred to the name of this proof differently after he coined the word pragmaticism in his 1905 essay, What Pragmatism Is? Was he consistent in using pragmaticism rather than pragmatism after that time?
Phyllis "Stephen C. Rose" <[email protected]> wrote: >I wonder, if we are talking proof, whether we should not apply it to >pragmaticism rather than pragmatism. CSP would not have coined the term had >he not wished to underline a distinction. And I suspect it deserves to be >used posthumously as the name he gave to his evolved philosophy. > >*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > >On Fri, May 2, 2014 at 7:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Mara & listers, >> >> Mara noted in an earlier post that she did not see a proof of pragmatism >> in Chapter 7. I hope she and others will pipe in on this. I especially >> wonder whether others consider the proving abduction necessary to proving >> pragmatism (or that proving one proves the other). >> >> Kees writes >> >> "...Peirce sees semeiotics as covering either the whole of logic or >> speculative grammar only. For the purpose of grounding pragmatism, the >> latter more modest view is all we need." >> >> From a practical, experienced-based perspective, I cannot but agree--as >> long as we are speaking only of the "purpose of grounding pragmatism." >> Semiotic in this more modest sense is the third of the analysis/definition >> tools I learned/taught nearly 40 years ago and the third reason Peirce's >> writings (except in mathematics, my avowed weakness) seem so clear to me. >> However, from the perspective of pragmatism, its meaning and its proof, the >> wider view (all of ligic as semiotic) may be necessary. >> >> Peirce (CP 5.464) wrote: >> >> Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of >> metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a >> method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. >> All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that >> statement. As to the ulterior and indirect effects of practising the >> pragmatistic method, that is quite another affair [italics mine]. >> >> Thus, if pragmatism is, as Peirce states, "...merely a method of >> ascertaining the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts...," then >> pragmatism must be a philosophy of definition and, as Kees indicates, >> grounded in semiotic. In A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, >> Peirce distinguishes between an Argument and an Argumentation: >> >> An "Argument" is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a >> definite belief. An "Argumentation" is an Argument proceeding upon >> definitely formulated premises. >> >> It seems to me that this distinction is crucial for understanding the role >> of semiotic for proving pragmatism. In addition, it seems to suggest that >> "the more modest view" of semiotic is not all that is required for >> grounding (in the case of proving) pragmatism. >> >> However, in Neglected Argument, Peirce does establish that the case that >> Abduction requires Argument rather than an Argumentation. Since Argument, >> which is a definitional process, tending to produce belief, but not proof >> and, since Peirce's Argument for the Reality of God is an Argument for his >> method of hypothesis generation (abduction/retroduction), then an Argument, >> which relies upon definitional clarity (by means of semiosis) is not enough >> to prove either abduction or pragmatism. ("Retroduction does not afford >> security. The hypothesis must be tested."(NA .470). >> >> Testing (by means of gradual induction--both qualitative & >> quantitative)--requires explication & demonstration (deduction) of the >> premises derived from the abductively derived hypothesis. In draft D - MS >> L75.329-330, Peirce writes: >> >> "I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here >> permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic >> ["whatever doctrine is requisite as a preparation for critical logic"--e.g. >> speculative grammar] or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but >> heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic [the art of >> discovery and invention] it indirectly has to consider other matters; and >> it extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic." >> >> Thus, I propose that the proof of pragmatism (and of >> abduction/retroduction) will derive from Methodeutic, the branch of >> normative logic that includes both Argument and Argumentation. Methodeutic >> addresses both the definitive formulation of a hypothesis and the premises >> that follow, as well as Argumentations that proceed upon those definitely >> formulated premises. And it allows for the inclusion of other matters, not >> having to do with discovery and invention. >> >> It seems to me that Methodeutic (which is also semiotic, as is all of >> logic) is ripe for exploration as a conduit for proving pragmatism, and by >> doing so, abduction/retroduction. >> >> Regards, >> Phyllis Chiasson >> >> [The next (final?) post for this chapter will be 7.2.3 The Pragmatic Maxim] >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. >> >> >> >> >> >>
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