Jerry, lists, In the 1903 Classification of Signs Peirce terms three of the ten sign classes Dicisigns as regards the relation of each of those signs to the Interpretent. However, only one of these three is, in its relation to the Object, a Symbol, and that sign, the Dicent Symbol Legisign, is the one commonly referred to as the Proposition.
But Frederik is arguing in his book that the other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign, may at times and in ways function in a manner similar to the Proposition in that they can convey information. Thus, these other dicentic signs may be referred to as Quasi-Propositions. In the diagram below I, as do some others, use adjectives for the first two relatives to show that they are relative to the sign itself, while noting that Peirce is not consistent in this in his diagram of the 10 classes (he sometimes uses nouns, sometimes adjectives for the parts relative to the Interpretent and to the Object). Also, although I use my characteristic 'trikonic' diagram with firstness at the top, secondness at the bottom, and thirdness to the right, the three signs should be read involutionally from 3ns (relative to Interpretent) through 2ns (relative to Object) to 1ns (relative to the Sign itself) So, the 3 Dicent Signs: *Dicentic indexical sinsign (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a weathercock):* sinsign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) indexical (as to Object, 2ns) *Dicentic indexical legisign: (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a street cry):* legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) indexical (as to Object, 2ns) *Dicentic symbolic legisign: (a proposition; Peirce's example, any ordinary proposition):* Legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) symbolic (as to Object, 2ns) Note that only the bottom two of the three are legisigns. I hope this was helpful. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected] > wrote: > Tyler, List: > > I am a quite uncertain about the meaning of the term "proto-proposition" > > Could you hew-out a rough definition of your meaning? > > It would be helpful, but not necessary, to place the notion of > "proto-proposition" in relation to the terms of the triadic triad. > > It would also be helpful but not necessary to know whether or not a > proto-proposition should be thought of a form of an antecedent. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 10:56 AM, Tyler Bennett wrote: > > Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, Frederik, list, > > In my initial post I wanted to raise the question of the taxonomic > approach mainly because, from one perspective it is not possible within the > dicisign doctrine as it is laid out in NP. If all real signs partake of > arguments, the details of which are worked out as separate interactions of > icons, indices, etc., than these particular workings out are degenerate or > fragmentary and as such are not "signs" per se and have no individual > significance. Therefore to use the typology of ten for example to classify > different kinds of sign actions would be incorrect. > > On this topic Edwina wrote: > > "My own view is that the symbol is a semiosic relation (that between the > Representamen and the Object) which is confined to human cognition. As a > purely artificial relation, I think that it REQUIRES an artificial means of > expression - which is language or other cognitively constructed media > system. Furthermore, I think that this enabled the human species to free > itself from the restrictions of the physical realm and 'imagine' the world > as it 'ought to be' rather than 'as it is'...This leaves the non-human > realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a local mechanical reaction, and > the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by virtue of its Legisign, > connected to the truths of the Universal and thus, not merely reactive." > > While this is one way to preserve the taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of > signs (e.g. for distinguishing human from non-human semiosis), it seems to > me that the alternative solution could be just as effective. That > alternative solution would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis > (or at least to some non-humans), but to subdivide them and arguments > according to the typology of 66 signs, where some kinds of > symbols/arguments are applicable to *E. coli* for example, and others > only occur in the case of verbal language signs. > > One reason I think this approach would be better is that NP already goes > beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 > where Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic > objects. As Gary pointed out, this connection of the parts of the dicisign > to immediate and dynamic objects is one of the most interesting portions of > the book so far, and explains in a concrete example how one sign action can > possess more than one relation to an object (can be an icon, index, and/or > a symbol), something for which the 1903 classification does not > accommodate. Another reason to prefer this solution has to do with the > stress Frederik puts on hypostatic abstraction being the true human > semiotic threshold. Hypostatic abstraction is another of Peirce's terms > which, although it is not explicitly articulated within any known > typologies of the 66 types, certainly could be said to only obtain within > one of the six classes of symbolic legisigns (according to Romanini's > periodic table of signs). This is just one way that we could both cede > symbols to all forms of semiosis, while retaining the possibility of > taxonomically differentiating human from non-human semiosis, and would > allow us to disambiguate some of the terms in NP. > > On this disambiguation, > Gary R. wrote, "your unsettling question concerning the differentiation of > proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs to be > addressed if we are to include the proto-propositions in the kind of > thinking just discussed above." > For example we could possibly distinguish proto-propositions from fully > fledged propositions as those which do not entail hypostatic abstraction. > > Though this solution would be a nice way to preserve the taxonomic use of > Peirce's signs, elsewhere Frederik does maintain, > "that higher animals are not only at the command of symbols in general, > but also of those most demanding and complex of symbols called arguments > and reasonings, involving diagrams," and > > "...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity of symbol types > which higher animals have access to as single signs," but > > "To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to reasoning proper -- > which is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to human reasoning > only rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." 245 Diagrammatology > > I wonder if he would also say that there is no "upper bound" to the symbol > use of the *E.Coli* bacteria? Frederik appears at once to allow for the > taxonomic approach ("My aim here is to render the semiotic aspects of > Deacon's hypothesis -- with which I basically sympathize -- somewhat more > precise" [Diagrammatology]), and at the same time to preclude the > possibility that this precision can be articulated in taxonomic Peircean > terms. > > There are two ambiguities: The degrees of "self control" that distinguish > the human use of signs, and the distinction between proto- and fully > fledged propositions. Can/should they be 'rendered more precise' according > to the higher types of sign? > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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