Dear Jeff, Gary, lists Den 24/10/2014 kl. 00.10 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>:
Gary R., Lists, Here is a minor point. You say: "But Frederik is arguing in his book that the other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign, may at times and in ways function in a manner similar to the Proposition in that they can convey information. Thus, these other dicentic signs may be referred to as Quasi-Propositions." Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that Peirce is providing a real definition of the nature of the dicisign that generalizes from the nature of the proposition so as to articulate what is necessary for any to convey information and represent something as being true--without yet stating the reasons for its being true? I think this is more accurate. Dicent indexical Legisigns and Dicent Indexical Sinsigns not only can but DO convey information - that follows from the definition of Dicisigns. (Of course that information may be false, irrelevant, vague, etc.) F
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