Gary R., Lists, Sorry about the incorrect citation, I was working from memory when I pasted in the quote from my notes. It is from the Regenerated Logic (CP 3.432).
In saying that questions about the nature of assertion, and especially about the nature of judgment, are secondary, I meant that they are secondary for the purposes of developing an account of the logical nature of the dicisign. In the case of questions about judgment, we've seen that the movement to include judgment as a central conception in a theory of logic (a movement that took shape in the writings of Ockham and was then later developed in the modern period by philosophers working in the tradition of the Port Royal Logic), is a root cause of a number of strands of psychologism in logic. As such, these are secondary in the sense that we should be careful about jumping to conclusions about the nature of the dicisign based on claims about the nature of judgment. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:09 PM To: [email protected] Cc: Peirce-L Subject: [biosemiotics:7290] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter Jeff, lists, I think your point is well taken and not at all 'minor'. You wrote: . . . Peirce is providing a real definition of the nature of the dicisign that generalizes from the nature of the proposition so as to articulate what is necessary for any to convey information and represent something as being true--without yet stating the reasons for its being true? The questions of what is necessary for such a sign to be asserted, or for it to be part of some kind of judgment are separate and secondary questions. As such, any sign that succeeds in meeting these functions is, by the real definition he has provided, a dicisign. As such, Peirce is arguing that sign complexes that bear the relations involved in the Dicent Indexical Sinsign and the Dicent Indexical Legisign do convey information and represent something as being true--and any that succeed at this are dicisigns. Once we understand this point, we should be able to see that it is not necessary for a dicisign to be symbolic in order for it to succeed in these functions. It seems to me that while the idea of generalizing from the notion of the proposition as carrying information to this being the very nature of all dicisigns, and not just the symbolic one, is implicit in Peirce, that the strength of Frederik's book is that he makes this explicit. And as I've said elsewhere, not only does he explicate this idea fully, but he expands it considerably, most notably in consideration of the role which it might play in biosemiotic theory (but, certainly, not only there). I'm also beginning to imagine that the term 'quasi-proposition' may not be needed, might even be misleading as pointing in the wrong direction (I'm suggesting that the direction you've argued for is the right direction: it is the dicisign idea itself which is crucial). You are also right, it seems to me, and as Gary F suggested earlier, that questions related to how a dicisign might be asserted, etc. are separate questions; although I'm not sure I would agree with you that they are "secondary"--except in so far as there seems to be a natural order of analyzing them. As for the second part of your message relating to some thoughts you had during the discussion of Chapter 3, I think I'll have to ponder those a bit further. Btw, the CP number for the quote you provided at the end of your message does not seem to be correct. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Gary R., Lists, Here is a minor point. You say: "But Frederik is arguing in his book that the other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign, may at times and in ways function in a manner similar to the Proposition in that they can convey information. Thus, these other dicentic signs may be referred to as Quasi-Propositions." Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that Peirce is providing a real definition of the nature of the dicisign that generalizes from the nature of the proposition so as to articulate what is necessary for any to convey information and represent something as being true--without yet stating the reasons for its being true? The questions of what is necessary for such a sign to be asserted, or for it to be part of some kind of judgment are separate and secondary questions. As such, any sign that succeeds in meeting these functions is, by the real definition he has provided, a dicisign. As such, Peirce is arguing that sign complexes that bear the relations involved in the Dicent Indexical Sinsign and the Dicent Indexical Legisign do convey information and represent something as being true--and any that succeed at this are dicisigns. Once we understand this point, we should be able to see that it is not necessary for a dicisign to be symbolic in order for it to succeed in these fu nctions. To restate a point I was trying to work towards at the end of our discussion of chapter 3, the real definition that Peirce supplies for the nature of the dicisign is, like any scientific definition, a work in progress. Having said that, his real definition was formed on the basis of fairly well accepted theories of the nature of inference and sign hood--and the explanations in those theories have been tested against the relevant observations. What is more, the particular kinds of observations we are drawing on for the purposes of formulating our explanations and putting them to the test are rather special. They are the kinds of observations in which we should be able to place a fair degree of confidence because they are the kinds of observed facts that noone in their right mind has been able seriously to call into question. Or, as Peirce states the claim: "But there is a much more general doctrine to which the name theory of cognition might be applied. Namely, it is that speculative grammar, or analysis of the nature of assertion, which rests upon observations, indeed, but upon observations of the rudest kind, open to the eye of every attentive person who is familiar with the use of language, and which, we may be sure, no rational being, able to converse at all with his fellows, and so to express a doubt of anything, will ever have any doubt." (CP 4.432) --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:22 PM To: Peirce-L; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions Chapter four, "Proto-propositions" Jerry, lists, In the 1903 Classification of Signs Peirce terms three of the ten sign classes Dicisigns as regards the relation of each of those signs to the Interpretent. However, only one of these three is, in its relation to the Object, a Symbol, and that sign, the Dicent Symbol Legisign, is the one commonly referred to as the Proposition. But Frederik is arguing in his book that the other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign, may at times and in ways function in a manner similar to the Proposition in that they can convey information. Thus, these other dicentic signs may be referred to as Quasi-Propositions. In the diagram below I, as do some others, use adjectives for the first two relatives to show that they are relative to the sign itself, while noting that Peirce is not consistent in this in his diagram of the 10 classes (he sometimes uses nouns, sometimes adjectives for the parts relative to the Interpretent and to the Object). Also, although I use my characteristic 'trikonic' diagram with firstness at the top, secondness at the bottom, and thirdness to the right, the three signs should be read involutionally from 3ns (relative to Interpretent) through 2ns (relative to Object) to 1ns (relative to the Sign itself) So, the 3 Dicent Signs: Dicentic indexical sinsign (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a weathercock): sinsign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) indexical (as to Object, 2ns) Dicentic indexical legisign: (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a street cry): legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) indexical (as to Object, 2ns) Dicentic symbolic legisign: (a proposition; Peirce's example, any ordinary proposition): Legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) symbolic (as to Object, 2ns) Note that only the bottom two of the three are legisigns. I hope this was helpful. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: Tyler, List: I am a quite uncertain about the meaning of the term "proto-proposition" Could you hew-out a rough definition of your meaning? It would be helpful, but not necessary, to place the notion of "proto-proposition" in relation to the terms of the triadic triad. It would also be helpful but not necessary to know whether or not a proto-proposition should be thought of a form of an antecedent. Cheers Jerry On Oct 23, 2014, at 10:56 AM, Tyler Bennett wrote: Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, Frederik, list, In my initial post I wanted to raise the question of the taxonomic approach mainly because, from one perspective it is not possible within the dicisign doctrine as it is laid out in NP. If all real signs partake of arguments, the details of which are worked out as separate interactions of icons, indices, etc., than these particular workings out are degenerate or fragmentary and as such are not "signs" per se and have no individual significance. Therefore to use the typology of ten for example to classify different kinds of sign actions would be incorrect. On this topic Edwina wrote: "My own view is that the symbol is a semiosic relation (that between the Representamen and the Object) which is confined to human cognition. As a purely artificial relation, I think that it REQUIRES an artificial means of expression - which is language or other cognitively constructed media system. Furthermore, I think that this enabled the human species to free itself from the restrictions of the physical realm and 'imagine' the world as it 'ought to be' rather than 'as it is'...This leaves the non-human realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a local mechanical reaction, and the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by virtue of its Legisign, connected to the truths of the Universal and thus, not merely reactive." While this is one way to preserve the taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of signs (e.g. for distinguishing human from non-human semiosis), it seems to me that the alternative solution could be just as effective. That alternative solution would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis (or at least to some non-humans), but to subdivide them and arguments according to the typology of 66 signs, where some kinds of symbols/arguments are applicable to E. coli for example, and others only occur in the case of verbal language signs. One reason I think this approach would be better is that NP already goes beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 where Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic objects. As Gary pointed out, this connection of the parts of the dicisign to immediate and dynamic objects is one of the most interesting portions of the book so far, and explains in a concrete example how one sign action can possess more than one relation to an object (can be an icon, index, and/or a symbol), something for which the 1903 classification does not accommodate. Another reason to prefer this solution has to do with the stress Frederik puts on hypostatic abstraction being the true human semiotic threshold. Hypostatic abstraction is another of Peirce's terms which, although it is not explicitly articulated within any known typologies of the 66 types, certainly could be said to only obtain within one of the six classes of symbolic legisigns (accordin g to Romanini's periodic table of signs). This is just one way that we could both cede symbols to all forms of semiosis, while retaining the possibility of taxonomically differentiating human from non-human semiosis, and would allow us to disambiguate some of the terms in NP. On this disambiguation, Gary R. wrote, "your unsettling question concerning the differentiation of proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs to be addressed if we are to include the proto-propositions in the kind of thinking just discussed above." For example we could possibly distinguish proto-propositions from fully fledged propositions as those which do not entail hypostatic abstraction. Though this solution would be a nice way to preserve the taxonomic use of Peirce's signs, elsewhere Frederik does maintain, "that higher animals are not only at the command of symbols in general, but also of those most demanding and complex of symbols called arguments and reasonings, involving diagrams," and "...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity of symbol types which higher animals have access to as single signs," but "To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to reasoning proper -- which is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to human reasoning only rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." 245 Diagrammatology I wonder if he would also say that there is no "upper bound" to the symbol use of the E.Coli bacteria? Frederik appears at once to allow for the taxonomic approach ("My aim here is to render the semiotic aspects of Deacon's hypothesis -- with which I basically sympathize -- somewhat more precise" [Diagrammatology]), and at the same time to preclude the possibility that this precision can be articulated in taxonomic Peircean terms. There are two ambiguities: The degrees of "self control" that distinguish the human use of signs, and the distinction between proto- and fully fledged propositions. Can/should they be 'rendered more precise' according to the higher types of sign? ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> . 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