Note: In reading my most recent post over I see that I used "relative" in two ways, both in the technical sense within semiotic, as well as in the ordinary workaday sense. I hope this doesn't cause any confusion regarding the question at hand, which is all that it meant to address: namely, distinguishing propositions from quasi-propositions? GR
*Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:22 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry, lists, > > In the 1903 Classification of Signs Peirce terms three of the ten sign > classes > Dicisigns as regards the relation of each of those signs to the > Interpretent. However, only one of these three is, in its relation to the > Object, a Symbol, and that sign, the Dicent Symbol Legisign, is the one > commonly referred to as the Proposition. > > But Frederik is arguing in his book that the other two, the Dicent > Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign, may at times and in > ways function in a manner similar to the Proposition in that they can > convey information. Thus, these other dicentic signs may be referred to as > Quasi-Propositions. > > In the diagram below I, as do some others, use adjectives for the first > two relatives to show that they are relative to the sign itself, while > noting that Peirce is not consistent in this in his diagram of the 10 > classes (he sometimes uses nouns, sometimes adjectives for the parts > relative to the Interpretent and to the Object). > > Also, although I use my characteristic 'trikonic' diagram with firstness > at the top, secondness at the bottom, and thirdness to the right, the three > signs should be read involutionally from 3ns (relative to Interpretent) > through 2ns (relative to Object) to 1ns (relative to the Sign itself) > > So, the 3 Dicent Signs: > > *Dicentic indexical sinsign (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a > weathercock):* > > sinsign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) > |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) > indexical (as to Object, 2ns) > > *Dicentic indexical legisign: (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a > street cry):* > > legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) > |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) > indexical (as to Object, 2ns) > > *Dicentic symbolic legisign: (a proposition; Peirce's example, any > ordinary proposition):* > > Legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) > |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) > symbolic (as to Object, 2ns) > > Note that only the bottom two of the three are legisigns. > > I hope this was helpful. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Tyler, List: >> >> I am a quite uncertain about the meaning of the term "proto-proposition" >> >> Could you hew-out a rough definition of your meaning? >> >> It would be helpful, but not necessary, to place the notion of >> "proto-proposition" in relation to the terms of the triadic triad. >> >> It would also be helpful but not necessary to know whether or not a >> proto-proposition should be thought of a form of an antecedent. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> On Oct 23, 2014, at 10:56 AM, Tyler Bennett wrote: >> >> Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, Frederik, list, >> >> In my initial post I wanted to raise the question of the taxonomic >> approach mainly because, from one perspective it is not possible within the >> dicisign doctrine as it is laid out in NP. If all real signs partake of >> arguments, the details of which are worked out as separate interactions of >> icons, indices, etc., than these particular workings out are degenerate or >> fragmentary and as such are not "signs" per se and have no individual >> significance. Therefore to use the typology of ten for example to classify >> different kinds of sign actions would be incorrect. >> >> On this topic Edwina wrote: >> >> "My own view is that the symbol is a semiosic relation (that between the >> Representamen and the Object) which is confined to human cognition. As a >> purely artificial relation, I think that it REQUIRES an artificial means of >> expression - which is language or other cognitively constructed media >> system. Furthermore, I think that this enabled the human species to free >> itself from the restrictions of the physical realm and 'imagine' the world >> as it 'ought to be' rather than 'as it is'...This leaves the non-human >> realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a local mechanical reaction, and >> the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by virtue of its Legisign, >> connected to the truths of the Universal and thus, not merely reactive." >> >> While this is one way to preserve the taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of >> signs (e.g. for distinguishing human from non-human semiosis), it seems to >> me that the alternative solution could be just as effective. That >> alternative solution would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis >> (or at least to some non-humans), but to subdivide them and arguments >> according to the typology of 66 signs, where some kinds of >> symbols/arguments are applicable to *E. coli* for example, and others >> only occur in the case of verbal language signs. >> >> One reason I think this approach would be better is that NP already goes >> beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 >> where Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic >> objects. As Gary pointed out, this connection of the parts of the dicisign >> to immediate and dynamic objects is one of the most interesting portions of >> the book so far, and explains in a concrete example how one sign action can >> possess more than one relation to an object (can be an icon, index, and/or >> a symbol), something for which the 1903 classification does not >> accommodate. Another reason to prefer this solution has to do with the >> stress Frederik puts on hypostatic abstraction being the true human >> semiotic threshold. Hypostatic abstraction is another of Peirce's terms >> which, although it is not explicitly articulated within any known >> typologies of the 66 types, certainly could be said to only obtain within >> one of the six classes of symbolic legisigns (according to Romanini's >> periodic table of signs). This is just one way that we could both cede >> symbols to all forms of semiosis, while retaining the possibility of >> taxonomically differentiating human from non-human semiosis, and would >> allow us to disambiguate some of the terms in NP. >> >> On this disambiguation, >> Gary R. wrote, "your unsettling question concerning the differentiation >> of proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs to be >> addressed if we are to include the proto-propositions in the kind of >> thinking just discussed above." >> For example we could possibly distinguish proto-propositions from fully >> fledged propositions as those which do not entail hypostatic abstraction. >> >> Though this solution would be a nice way to preserve the taxonomic use of >> Peirce's signs, elsewhere Frederik does maintain, >> "that higher animals are not only at the command of symbols in general, >> but also of those most demanding and complex of symbols called arguments >> and reasonings, involving diagrams," and >> >> "...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity of symbol types >> which higher animals have access to as single signs," but >> >> "To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to reasoning proper -- >> which is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to human reasoning >> only rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." 245 Diagrammatology >> >> I wonder if he would also say that there is no "upper bound" to the >> symbol use of the *E.Coli* bacteria? Frederik appears at once to allow >> for the taxonomic approach ("My aim here is to render the semiotic aspects >> of Deacon's hypothesis -- with which I basically sympathize -- somewhat >> more precise" [Diagrammatology]), and at the same time to preclude the >> possibility that this precision can be articulated in taxonomic Peircean >> terms. >> >> There are two ambiguities: The degrees of "self control" that distinguish >> the human use of signs, and the distinction between proto- and fully >> fledged propositions. Can/should they be 'rendered more precise' according >> to the higher types of sign? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
