Jeff, lists, You wrote:
. . . we should be careful about jumping to conclusions about the nature of the dicisign based on claims about the nature of judgment. I completely agree. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., Lists, > > Sorry about the incorrect citation, I was working from memory when I > pasted in the quote from my notes. It is from the Regenerated Logic (CP > 3.432). > > In saying that questions about the nature of assertion, and especially > about the nature of judgment, are secondary, I meant that they are > secondary for the purposes of developing an account of the logical nature > of the dicisign. In the case of questions about judgment, we've seen that > the movement to include judgment as a central conception in a theory of > logic (a movement that took shape in the writings of Ockham and was then > later developed in the modern period by philosophers working in the > tradition of the Port Royal Logic), is a root cause of a number of strands > of psychologism in logic. As such, these are secondary in the sense that > we should be careful about jumping to conclusions about the nature of the > dicisign based on claims about the nature of judgment. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:09 PM > To: [email protected] > Cc: Peirce-L > Subject: [biosemiotics:7290] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter > > Jeff, lists, > > I think your point is well taken and not at all 'minor'. You wrote: > > . . . Peirce is providing a real definition of the nature of the dicisign > that generalizes from the nature of the proposition so as to articulate > what is necessary for any to convey information and represent something as > being true--without yet stating the reasons for its being true? The > questions of what is necessary for such a sign to be asserted, or for it to > be part of some kind of judgment are separate and secondary questions. As > such, any sign that succeeds in meeting these functions is, by the real > definition he has provided, a dicisign. As such, Peirce is arguing that > sign complexes that bear the relations involved in the Dicent Indexical > Sinsign and the Dicent Indexical Legisign do convey information and > represent something as being true--and any that succeed at this are > dicisigns. Once we understand this point, we should be able to see that it > is not necessary for a dicisign to be symbolic in order for it to succeed > in these functions. > > It seems to me that while the idea of generalizing from the notion of the > proposition as carrying information to this being the very nature of all > dicisigns, and not just the symbolic one, is implicit in Peirce, that the > strength of Frederik's book is that he makes this explicit. And as I've > said elsewhere, not only does he explicate this idea fully, but he expands > it considerably, most notably in consideration of the role which it might > play in biosemiotic theory (but, certainly, not only there). > > I'm also beginning to imagine that the term 'quasi-proposition' may not be > needed, might even be misleading as pointing in the wrong direction (I'm > suggesting that the direction you've argued for is the right direction: it > is the dicisign idea itself which is crucial). > > You are also right, it seems to me, and as Gary F suggested earlier, that > questions related to how a dicisign might be asserted, etc. are separate > questions; although I'm not sure I would agree with you that they are > "secondary"--except in so far as there seems to be a natural order of > analyzing them. > > As for the second part of your message relating to some thoughts you had > during the discussion of Chapter 3, I think I'll have to ponder those a bit > further. Btw, the CP number for the quote you provided at the end of your > message does not seem to be correct. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Gary R., Lists, > > Here is a minor point. You say: "But Frederik is arguing in his book > that the other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical > Sinsign, may at times and in ways function in a manner similar to the > Proposition in that they can convey information. Thus, these other dicentic > signs may be referred to as Quasi-Propositions." > > Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that Peirce is providing a real > definition of the nature of the dicisign that generalizes from the nature > of the proposition so as to articulate what is necessary for any to convey > information and represent something as being true--without yet stating the > reasons for its being true? The questions of what is necessary for such a > sign to be asserted, or for it to be part of some kind of judgment are > separate and secondary questions. As such, any sign that succeeds in > meeting these functions is, by the real definition he has provided, a > dicisign. As such, Peirce is arguing that sign complexes that bear the > relations involved in the Dicent Indexical Sinsign and the Dicent Indexical > Legisign do convey information and represent something as being true--and > any that succeed at this are dicisigns. Once we understand this point, we > should be able to see that it is not necessary for a dicisign to be > symbolic in order for it to succeed in these fu > nctions. > > To restate a point I was trying to work towards at the end of our > discussion of chapter 3, the real definition that Peirce supplies for the > nature of the dicisign is, like any scientific definition, a work in > progress. Having said that, his real definition was formed on the basis of > fairly well accepted theories of the nature of inference and sign hood--and > the explanations in those theories have been tested against the relevant > observations. What is more, the particular kinds of observations we are > drawing on for the purposes of formulating our explanations and putting > them to the test are rather special. They are the kinds of observations in > which we should be able to place a fair degree of confidence because they > are the kinds of observed facts that noone in their right mind has been > able seriously to call into question. > > Or, as Peirce states the claim: "But there is a much more general > doctrine to which the name theory of cognition might be applied. Namely, it > is that speculative grammar, or analysis of the nature of assertion, which > rests upon observations, indeed, but upon observations of the rudest kind, > open to the eye of every attentive person who is familiar with the use of > language, and which, we may be sure, no rational being, able to converse at > all with his fellows, and so to express a doubt of anything, will ever have > any doubt." (CP 4.432) > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]>] > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:22 PM > To: Peirce-L; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions Chapter four, > "Proto-propositions" > > Jerry, lists, > > In the 1903 Classification of Signs Peirce terms three of the ten sign > classes > Dicisigns as regards the relation of each of those signs to the > Interpretent. However, only one of these three is, in its relation to the > Object, a Symbol, and that sign, the Dicent Symbol Legisign, is the one > commonly referred to as the Proposition. > > But Frederik is arguing in his book that the other two, the Dicent > Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign, may at times and in > ways function in a manner similar to the Proposition in that they can > convey information. Thus, these other dicentic signs may be referred to as > Quasi-Propositions. > > In the diagram below I, as do some others, use adjectives for the first > two relatives to show that they are relative to the sign itself, while > noting that Peirce is not consistent in this in his diagram of the 10 > classes (he sometimes uses nouns, sometimes adjectives for the parts > relative to the Interpretent and to the Object). > > Also, although I use my characteristic 'trikonic' diagram with firstness > at the top, secondness at the bottom, and thirdness to the right, the three > signs should be read involutionally from 3ns (relative to Interpretent) > through 2ns (relative to Object) to 1ns (relative to the Sign itself) > > So, the 3 Dicent Signs: > > Dicentic indexical sinsign (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a > weathercock): > > sinsign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) > |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) > indexical (as to Object, 2ns) > > Dicentic indexical legisign: (a proto-proposition; Peirce's example, a > street cry): > > legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) > |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) > indexical (as to Object, 2ns) > > Dicentic symbolic legisign: (a proposition; Peirce's example, any ordinary > proposition): > > Legisign (as to the Sign itself, 1ns) > |>Dicentic (as to Interpretant, 3ns) > symbolic (as to Object, 2ns) > > Note that only the bottom two of the three are legisigns. > > I hope this was helpful. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:09 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto: > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: > Tyler, List: > > I am a quite uncertain about the meaning of the term "proto-proposition" > > Could you hew-out a rough definition of your meaning? > > It would be helpful, but not necessary, to place the notion of > "proto-proposition" in relation to the terms of the triadic triad. > > It would also be helpful but not necessary to know whether or not a > proto-proposition should be thought of a form of an antecedent. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 10:56 AM, Tyler Bennett wrote: > > Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, Frederik, list, > > In my initial post I wanted to raise the question of the taxonomic > approach mainly because, from one perspective it is not possible within the > dicisign doctrine as it is laid out in NP. If all real signs partake of > arguments, the details of which are worked out as separate interactions of > icons, indices, etc., than these particular workings out are degenerate or > fragmentary and as such are not "signs" per se and have no individual > significance. Therefore to use the typology of ten for example to classify > different kinds of sign actions would be incorrect. > > On this topic Edwina wrote: > > "My own view is that the symbol is a semiosic relation (that between the > Representamen and the Object) which is confined to human cognition. As a > purely artificial relation, I think that it REQUIRES an artificial means of > expression - which is language or other cognitively constructed media > system. Furthermore, I think that this enabled the human species to free > itself from the restrictions of the physical realm and 'imagine' the world > as it 'ought to be' rather than 'as it is'...This leaves the non-human > realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a local mechanical reaction, and > the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by virtue of its Legisign, > connected to the truths of the Universal and thus, not merely reactive." > > While this is one way to preserve the taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of > signs (e.g. for distinguishing human from non-human semiosis), it seems to > me that the alternative solution could be just as effective. That > alternative solution would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis > (or at least to some non-humans), but to subdivide them and arguments > according to the typology of 66 signs, where some kinds of > symbols/arguments are applicable to E. coli for example, and others only > occur in the case of verbal language signs. > > One reason I think this approach would be better is that NP already goes > beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 > where Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic > objects. As Gary pointed out, this connection of the parts of the dicisign > to immediate and dynamic objects is one of the most interesting portions of > the book so far, and explains in a concrete example how one sign action can > possess more than one relation to an object (can be an icon, index, and/or > a symbol), something for which the 1903 classification does not > accommodate. Another reason to prefer this solution has to do with the > stress Frederik puts on hypostatic abstraction being the true human > semiotic threshold. Hypostatic abstraction is another of Peirce's terms > which, although it is not explicitly articulated within any known > typologies of the 66 types, certainly could be said to only obtain within > one of the six classes of symbolic legisigns (accordin > g to Romanini's periodic table of signs). This is just one way that we > could both cede symbols to all forms of semiosis, while retaining the > possibility of taxonomically differentiating human from non-human semiosis, > and would allow us to disambiguate some of the terms in NP. > > On this disambiguation, > Gary R. wrote, "your unsettling question concerning the differentiation of > proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs to be > addressed if we are to include the proto-propositions in the kind of > thinking just discussed above." > For example we could possibly distinguish proto-propositions from fully > fledged propositions as those which do not entail hypostatic abstraction. > > Though this solution would be a nice way to preserve the taxonomic use of > Peirce's signs, elsewhere Frederik does maintain, > "that higher animals are not only at the command of symbols in general, > but also of those most demanding and complex of symbols called arguments > and reasonings, involving diagrams," and > > "...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity of symbol types > which higher animals have access to as single signs," but > > "To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to reasoning proper -- > which is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to human reasoning > only rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." 245 Diagrammatology > > I wonder if he would also say that there is no "upper bound" to the symbol > use of the E.Coli bacteria? Frederik appears at once to allow for the > taxonomic approach ("My aim here is to render the semiotic aspects of > Deacon's hypothesis -- with which I basically sympathize -- somewhat more > precise" [Diagrammatology]), and at the same time to preclude the > possibility that this precision can be articulated in taxonomic Peircean > terms. > > There are two ambiguities: The degrees of "self control" that distinguish > the human use of signs, and the distinction between proto- and fully > fledged propositions. Can/should they be 'rendered more precise' according > to the higher types of sign? > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto: > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> . 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