Frederik, Thanks for your informative post. As I remember, Edwina wrote something similar a while back, although I do not remember any details.
You wrote, "I think he is right that gene symbols code for functions (110414-1) both on a specific and a more general level - on several levels of generality, as it were. But all functions are general. This lies in the fact that several, numerically distinct events or processes can serve the same function." It is important for theoretical biology and biosemiotics to debate on the philosophical issues of genes (e.g., relation between genes and their functions) but it is also crucial not to neglect the MECHANISTIC aspects of genes. The former deals with the question of WHAT the gene is, while the latter is concerned with the question of HOW genes work. It is possible that many of the uncertainties and controversies surrounding WHAT questions about genes may be clarified as we learn more about HOW genes act in reality, not just in our mind, which many be viewed as a form of nominalism (if I am using the term correctly). With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Dear Howard, lists - > > I stumbled over a text bite from mid-October which gave me the idea that > there may be some terminological confusion at the root of some of our > discussions. > > Den 20/10/2014 kl. 18.19 skrev Howard Pattee > <hpat...@roadrunner.com<mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>>: > > HP: Exactly. More generally, do the symbols of the genes code only > nominalistically for specific amino acids, or do they code realistically > foruniversal functions like catalysis and self-replication? The evidence > seems clear that gene symbols code for both, as well as many other > conditional and control activites that can't be called either specific or > universal. > > Here, Howard couples nominalism/ realism with specific/ universal. But > this is strange to me. > > "Specific", of course, comes from "species", all the way back to > Aristotle (species/genus or eidos/genos) - and "species", of course is a > general concept, a universal (in traditional discussions, the staple > example of universals are animal species such as lions). So specific > terms are also universals. They come in many different degree of > generality: "artifacts" - "furniture" - "chairs" - "armchairs" - "Louis > XVI armchairs" - "red Louis XVI armchairs" are all universals on > different levels of generality. What is not universals is particulars, > individuals: "this armchair". The nominalism/realism issue pertains to > whether all such universal terms are only figments of the mind, grouping > together particulars in reality which have nothing at all in common > (nominalism) or whether there is some fundamentum in re in certain > universals (but not all universals, I think most scientists agrees that > universals like "demons", "ether", "unicorns", "fairies", maybe "gods" > have no fundamentum in re). > > Conversely, realism could not be the claim that signs refer to the most > general functions as in Howards's quote. Realism is the claim that some > predicates (or "codes") refer to real structures of the world ("round" has > its fundamentum in re in the existence of round objects, "iron" has its > fundamentum in re in the existence of objects made out of iron). > > But I think I can see where Howard is heading in the quote. I think he is > right that gene symbols code for functions both on a specific and a more > general level - on several levels of generality, as it were. But all > functions are general. This lies in the fact that several, numerically > distinct events or processes can serve the same function. As with Peirce's > example : baking an apple pie, you (and the recipe you follow) have only a > general conception of the cake you intend. Many different, idividual > baking processes may satisfy the recipe. The recipe speaks of, e.g. "4 > apples", not about "4 particular, identifiable apples found on a > particular branch on a particular tree in a particular orchard in > Massachusetts at a particular date". - But the resulting cake is not > general. > > Best > F >
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