Very nice outline, Ben. You wrote: BEN: "Peircean realism favors real, in-principle uncertainty and vagueness in nature itself, by reason of the imperfectibility of measurement, I.e., that which, even _in principle_, inquirers could never find, nature itself cannot find. Peirce bases tychism and synechism in realism and ultimately in fallibilism. "
EDWINA: I'd say that the nature of QM is not the 'imperfectibility of measurement', which suggests that 'the real' is individual and thus capable of measurement 'if only we could do so', but....Instead, I suggest that the nature of the QM reality is that it is generative; that it is a force of potentiality and as such, it can never be measured. As a generative potentiality, its role is...to generate actualities in diverse morphologies dependent on their niche/local interactions. BEN: "Peirce's realism includes the idea that there are real individuals, real existences. (So the 'complementarity' of generalism versus individualism is already encompassed in Peirce's brand of realism.) In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of reaction, resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements. This is congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate through interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc. If one holds with basicness of reaction/resistance for individual existence, and with the indeterminacy of the future, and takes into account similar considerations involving a signal speed limit (the light cone etc.), then QM starts to seem more a solution than a problem." EDWINA: Well, I don't think that 'realism' as a term actually includes real individual existences, but I get your point and think it is a good one. Individual existence is, reactive, but, it is reactive to local realities in time and space. Again, I have a problem with a view of QM that defines it as dependent on an Observer. I think that phase is really the transformation of potentiality to actuality and the 'agency' is not an Observer but the actual realm of individual existences in local time and space. A potential force cannot operate within such local existential (external) perimeters. Potentiality, as a force, operates in internal time/space. ----- Original Message ----- From: Benjamin Udell To: [email protected] ; Peirce List Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2014 11:40 AM Subject: [biosemiotics:7395] Re: Natural Propositions Howard, Frederik, lists, Howard, you wrote: there is general agreement that QM cannot be interpreted by Peircean Realism. In fact, most teachers of QM struggle with the intuitively realist perspectives of introductory students. In teaching QM, Realism blocks the path of inquiry. [End quote] It's hard to see how there can be general agreement, at least among physicists, about QM's being uninterpretable by Peircean Realism when most physicists are not well acquainted with Peircean Realism. Peircean realism favors real, in-principle uncertainty and vagueness in nature itself, by reason of the imperfectibility of measurement, I.e., that which, even _in principle_, inquirers could never find, nature itself cannot find. Peirce bases tychism and synechism in realism and ultimately in fallibilism. See "Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution" http://www.textlog.de/4248.html (CP 1.141-175). It involves an application of his idea that the real is only the object of a true proposition. The idea is that, if there is no true proposition to be formulated stating the exact quantities in a physical event, then there aren't such exact quantities in such physical event. While that idea does not entail Heisenberg's rather more specific uncertainty principle, it seems compatible with it. Peircean realism is not classical physical realism that assumes that every particle has fully determinate mechanical quantities at every instant. Moreover, Peirce's realism includes the idea that there are real individuals, real existences. (So the 'complementarity' of generalism versus individualism is already encompassed in Peirce's brand of realism.) In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of reaction, resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements. This is congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate through interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc. If one holds with basicness of reaction/resistance for individual existence, and with the indeterminacy of the future, and takes into account similar considerations involving a signal speed limit (the light cone etc.), then QM starts to seem more a solution than a problem. Best, Ben On 11/7/2014 9:17 PM, Howard Pattee wrote: At 09:08 AM 11/7/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: I am not sure. Much of the yet unresolved discussion of QM have to do with deciding which ontological commitments come with the Schrödinger equation. As far as I have understood, there is no scientific agreement about this. . . HP: That is true, and you mention several "unnatural" epistemologies; but there is general agreement that QM cannot be interpreted by Peircean Realism. In fact, most teachers of QM struggle with the intuitively realist perspectives of introductory students. In teaching QM, Realism blocks the path of inquiry. FS: . . .(unlike basic knowledge about iron and cakes etc.) HP: This assumption appears to beg the general question. Is there agreement about how "basic knowledge" relates to reality? FS: But this [QM ambiguity] is not generalizable to the idea that all scientific knowledge is subject to the same ambiguity. HP: I'm not sure what you are implying. Are you agreeing with me that different types of knowledge benefit from different epistemologies? Or do you only mean that ambiguities in classical models are different ambiguities from those in QM? (I assume you don't mean there are no ambiguities or that Peirce has spoken, the case is closed.) Howard
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