Dear Howard, lists - I am not sure. Much of the yet unresolved discussion of QM have to do with deciding which ontological commitments come with the Schrödinger equation. As far as I have understood, there is no scientific agreement about this (unlike basic knowledge about iron and cakes etc.). Copenhagen intepretation, Everett interpretation, Penrose interpretation and others. As long as this is the case, one interpretation is as good as the other - so in this case you're right about the undecided plurality of positions - until further notice, that is. But this is not generalizable to the idea that all scientific knowledge is subject to the same ambiguity.
Best F Den 07/11/2014 kl. 14.49 skrev Howard Pattee <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> : At 03:51 PM 11/6/2014, Frederik wrote: Dear Howard, list This is where our ways part. HP: I'm not sure why. My 25 words was just trying to sound like a nominalist. It is not my view, as the other 700 words tried to explain. Suppose I agree to be a realist about iron, baking pies, round objects, etc., but prefer a nominalistic view of Schrödinger's wavefunction. That is, I assume Ockham's parsimonious attitude that the wavefunction is just the minimum subjective degrees of belief I need to predict the probability of an event. (This is sometimes called Quantum <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_Bayesianism> Bayesianism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_Bayesianism>.) Do our ways still part? Howard
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