Thanks, Edwina. I tend to agree with both your points. Further responses
interleaved.
On 11/8/2014 12:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Very nice outline, Ben. You wrote:
> BEN: "Peircean realism favors real, in-principle uncertainty and
vagueness in nature itself, by reason of the imperfectibility of
measurement, I.e., that which, even _/in principle/_, inquirers could
never find, nature itself cannot find. Peirce bases tychism and
synechism in realism and ultimately in fallibilism. "
> EDWINA: I'd say that the nature of QM is not the 'imperfectibility
of measurement', which suggests that 'the real' is individual and thus
capable of measurement 'if only we could do so', but....Instead, I
suggest that the nature of the QM reality is that it is *generative*;
that it is a force of potentiality and as such, it can never be
measured. As a generative potentiality, its role is...to generate
actualities in diverse morphologies dependent on their niche/local
interactions.
BEN: Yes, I got too busy to attempt it but I actually wanted to say
something about how the idea of imperfectability of measurement, though
compatible with QM, doesn't do justice to QM. On one hand, Peirce's idea
of imperfectibility of measurement is an idea of a limitation _/in
principle/_, so it suggests that the real is not something that we could
find exactly 'if only we could do so' but for merely practical
limitations. Instead the limitations are not merely practical, not
merely limitations of current technology, etc., and the Peircean
conclusion is that a completely exact and certain reality isn't there to
be found. On the other hand QM is very specific about the conditions and
characteristics of Heisenbergian uncertainty, and Peirce didn't, so far
as I can tell, anticipate that kind of thing (nobody did). QM seems (I'm
getting above my paygrade here) to provide a mathematical framework for
potentiality in or as the wave function which is not an actual
individual thing, it is not detectable, much less measurable, as such.
> BEN: "Peirce's realism includes the idea that there are real
individuals, real existences. (So the 'complementarity' of generalism
versus individualism is already encompassed in Peirce's brand of
realism.) In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a
matter not merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of
reaction, resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements.
This is congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate
through interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the
'measurer', etc. If one holds with basicness of reaction/resistance
for individual existence, and with the indeterminacy of the future,
and takes into account similar considerations involving a signal speed
limit (the light cone etc.), then QM starts to seem more a solution
than a problem."
> EDWINA: Well, I don't think that 'realism' as a term actually
includes real individual existences, but I get your point and think it
is a good one. Individual existence is, reactive, but, it is reactive
to local realities in time and space. Again, I have a problem with a
view of QM that defines it as dependent on an Observer. I think that
phase is really the transformation of potentiality to actuality and
the 'agency' is not an Observer but the actual realm of individual
existences in local time and space. A potential force cannot operate
within such local existential (external) perimeters. Potentiality, as
a force, operates in internal time/space.
BEN: It's true, realism, unqualified, is usually taken to mean realism
about generals only. But, in the way that Peirce understood nature in
his time, individual existences (at least those that have some extension
and duration) do fit Peirce's definition of real, so that they are real
individuals to the extent that they have become determinate,
individualized. "Determinate for whom or what" seems a trickier question
now with light cones, 'elsewheres', cosmological horizon of an expanding
universe, quantum mechanics, etc., and I hardly know how to think about
it, I'm just hoping that there'll be a trail of bread crumbs leading
back to a mathematically informed phaneroscopic basis for understanding
time and space in these ways (signal speed limit constant, light cones,
quantum indeterminacy, etc.).
On observers: Yes, I don't think that QM is dependent on an Observer in
the usual sense. I'm thinking of individual existences in local time and
space as 'observers', an observational realm, in a generalized sense,
not necessarily as intelligent observers, but mainly as capable of being
imprinted with information from each other in local time and space, a
realm of reaction, registration, etc.
Best, Ben
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:[email protected]>
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ;
Peirce List <mailto:[email protected]>
*Sent:* Saturday, November 08, 2014 11:40 AM
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:7395] Re: Natural Propositions
Howard, Frederik, lists,
Howard, you wrote:
there */is/*//general agreement that QM cannot be interpreted
by Peircean Realism. In fact, most teachers of QM struggle
with the intuitively realist perspectives of introductory
students. In teaching QM, Realism blocks the path of inquiry.
[End quote]
It's hard to see how there can be general agreement, at least
among physicists, about QM's being uninterpretable by Peircean
Realism when most physicists are not well acquainted with Peircean
Realism.
Peircean realism favors real, in-principle uncertainty and
vagueness in nature itself, by reason of the imperfectibility of
measurement, I.e., that which, even _/in principle/_, inquirers
could never find, nature itself cannot find. Peirce bases tychism
and synechism in realism and ultimately in fallibilism.
See "Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution"
http://www.textlog.de/4248.html (CP 1.141-175).
It involves an application of his idea that the real is only the
object of a true proposition. The idea is that, if there is no
true proposition to be formulated stating the exact quantities in
a physical event, then there aren't such exact quantities in such
physical event. While that idea does not entail Heisenberg's
rather more specific uncertainty principle, it seems compatible
with it. Peircean realism is not classical physical realism that
assumes that every particle has fully determinate mechanical
quantities at every instant.
Moreover, Peirce's realism includes the idea that there are real
individuals, real existences. (So the 'complementarity' of
generalism versus individualism is already encompassed in Peirce's
brand of realism.) In particular, Peirce regards individual
existence as a matter not merely of location or proximity in space
and time, but of reaction, resistance, interaction, like so many
natural measurements. This is congenial to the QM view of things
as becoming determinate through interaction with the environment,
the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc. If one holds with basicness
of reaction/resistance for individual existence, and with the
indeterminacy of the future, and takes into account similar
considerations involving a signal speed limit (the light cone
etc.), then QM starts to seem more a solution than a problem.
Best, Ben
On 11/7/2014 9:17 PM, Howard Pattee wrote:
At 09:08 AM 11/7/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
I am not sure. Much of the yet unresolved discussion of QM have
to do with deciding which ontological commitments come with the
Schrödinger equation. As far as I have understood, there is no
scientific agreement about this. . .
HP: That is true, and you mention several "unnatural"
epistemologies; but there */is/*//general agreement that QM
cannot be interpreted by Peircean Realism. In fact, most teachers
of QM struggle with the intuitively realist perspectives of
introductory students. In teaching QM, Realism blocks the path of
inquiry.
FS: . . .(unlike basic knowledge about iron and cakes etc.)
HP: This assumption appears to beg the general question. Is there
agreement about how "basic knowledge" relates to reality?
FS: But this [QM ambiguity] is not generalizable to the idea
that all scientific knowledge is subject to the same ambiguity.
HP: I'm not sure what you are implying. Are you agreeing with me
that different types of knowledge benefit from different
epistemologies? Or do you only mean that ambiguities in classical
models are different ambiguities from those in QM? (I assume you
don't mean there are no ambiguities or that Peirce has spoken,
the case is closed.)
Howard
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